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Multistakeholderism has become one of the fundamental principles of internet 
governance. It is commonly defined as a model of governance that requires the 
participation of three stakeholder groups - states, the private sector and civil society - 
“in their respective role.” However, the how, when, and more importantly the why of 
the stakeholders’ respective involvement have not been satisfactorily spelled out. This 
uncertainty is unsettling. Multistakeholderism is increasingly used to prevent 
governments from making decisions that may impact the internet pursuant to 
intergovernmentalism. A result of this pushback against intergovernmental initiatives 
in the field of the internet is the rarity of internet-specific international law. If 
multistakeholderism is to prevent the making of international law, its legitimacy should 
not remain a mystery. Whether we like it or (increasingly) not, traditional international 
law’s legitimacy is firmly grounded in state consent. There is no such clear legitimacy 
story supporting multistakeholderism.   
	Relying on global constitutionalism, this dissertation addresses this gap. It develops a 
model for a composite global constituent power, comprised of a state component and 
a global component, and explains how it may be exercised, whether directly or, under 
certain conditions, through mediators. The model is then used to assess 
multistakeholderism. It concludes that the composite global constituent power model 
legitimizes equal multistakeholderism. In this version of multistakeholderism, states on 
the one hand, and the private sector and civil society on the other hand, are the 
mediators of the state component and the global component respectively and are on 
strictly equal footing.  
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 	 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Once upon a time, there was a Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace.1 Its author, 
John Perry Barlow, believed “the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you [governments] seek to impose on us. You have no 
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true 
reason to fear.” The advent of the internet meant that the virtual space it had created 
would be free from any governmental interference and that law would have no 
application. The governed had not given their consent to government rule.  
At first blush, it looks like Barlow’s Declaration might have been nothing more than 
wishful thinking. Governments have gradually conquered the internet and the principle 
that “what is illegal offline is illegal online” is widely accepted. Furthermore, a number 
of laws that specifically target internet activities have been adopted in many countries. 
But Barlow is not as wrong as might appear. While governments are present at the 
domestic level, the same cannot be said at the supranational level. Very few instruments 
of international law have been adopted since the commercialization of the internet in 
the early 1990’s, suggesting that the spirit of the Declaration of Independence of 
Cyberspace is well and alive. Given the number of issues that the rapid growth of the 
																																																						
1	J. P. Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (last visited 23 April 2016). 
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internet has created, the absence of international law is surprising, to say the least. The 
emergence of multistakeholderism is to be blamed for this rather successful relegation 
of traditional international law to a cameo role.  
As understood in internet circles, multistakeholderism stands for the involvement of 
states, the private sector and civil society in the global governance of the internet. 
Beyond mandating this unlikely combination of decision-makers, multistakeholderism 
does not mean much. Although it is generally said to be one of the fundamental 
principles of internet governance, multistakeholderism has not been substantiated. The 
how, when, and more importantly the why of the stakeholders’ respective involvement 
have not been satisfactorily spelled out. This uncertainty is unsettling. If 
multistakeholderism is to supplant traditional international law, its legitimacy should 
not remain a mystery. Whether we like it or (increasingly) not, traditional international 
law’s legitimacy is firmly grounded in state consent. There is no such clear legitimacy 
story supporting multistakeholderism.   
This is not insignificant. It would be a mistake to think that global internet governance 
is all about code, protocols and other technical issues. Actually, even code and protocols 
are not just about technology. All the decisions related to the internet, from the highly 
technical ones to the more obviously policy-oriented ones, have an impact on internet 
users. This impact may be indirect, hidden to most, but it does not make it any less 
important. Our enjoyment of certain fundamental freedoms, such as our freedom of 
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speech, communication and information, depends on these decisions, even when we 
are offline. The allocation of IP addresses among regions and countries for instance 
might affect the ability of businesses in a given country to enter into online 
transactions.2 This might in turn affect the domestic economy, which might in turn 
affect all the individuals residing in that country.  
It thus becomes urgent to inquire about the legitimacy of multistakeholderism. A more 
open-ended way of phrasing the question is to ask who may legitimately consent to 
global internet governance. The answer to this question will either make or break 
multistakeholderism. In either case, the global governance of the internet should benefit 
from greater clarity.  
Methodology	
 
My methodology is guided by my choice of theory of international law. The normative 
puzzle that I aim to solve is essentially about consent in global governance. Who should 
get to consent to what? I chose constitutionalism as my theory of international law for 
one of its main values is self-government, and as a result one of its main ingredients is 
the consent of the governed. In domestic constitutionalism, this value gets implemented 
via a set of known mechanisms. By contrast, global constitutionalism has 
underconceptualized this essential function. Thus my research consists in filling the 
																																																						
2 L. DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 156 
(2009).  
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blanks. Filling the blanks requires to understand how different the global context is 
from the domestic one. Only then can we draw useful analogies with domestic 
mechanisms that conform to the essence of constitutionalism and adequately address 
the realities of global governance. The end result is a model or formula for the global 
constituent power that can be applied to global governance generally and internet 
governance specifically.  
Summary	of	chapters		
 
Chapter 1 starts by clarifying what is understood throughout this dissertation as the 
internet. My definition of the internet focuses on the technology, that is to say the 
protocols that enables data packets to flow along interconnected networks, but also 
encompasses the infrastructure that supports this technology and the content that it 
enables. This definition is sufficiently broad to cover all aspects of the internet while 
being sufficiently precise to allow an accurate description of the internet regulatory 
system. Indeed, the goal of Chapter 1 is to show that the internet is the object of 
regulations that come in all shapes and from all sources and observe that among all 
these forms of regulations, traditional international law is almost non-existent. Chapter 
1 continues by explaining that this is due to multistakeholderism, a model of internet 
governance that rejects the traditional intergovernmental model. While the 
multistakeholder model is widely accepted and supplants intergovernmentalism in 
internet governance, the basis for its legitimacy and its exact content remain unclear. 
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This situation is not tenable and a source of legitimacy must be found for 
multistakeholderism.   
Chapter 2 tells the story of the rise of multistakeholderism, identifying possible 
ancestors and showing how it has emerged and consolidated in internet governance. 
This helps understand how we have arrived at the situation described in Chapter 1 - the 
widely accepted claim that multistakeholderism should govern the intervention of states 
in global internet governance. We then temporarily move away from internet 
governance and step into the realm of international law theory.  
Chapter 3 explains why I rely on global constitutionalism to address the 
multistakeholderism puzzle. Constitutionalism focuses on democratic legitimacy and 
self-government. It does so through the notion of constituent power. When we move 
to the global level, the democratic promise should similarly revolve around the global 
constituent power. Identifying who the global constituent power is is a prerequisite to 
conceiving a legitimate governance model. Could it be that multistakeholderism is an 
iteration of the global constituent power? Furthermore, internet governance may be 
seen as going through a constitutionalization process, making global constitutionalism 
an even better fit.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the literature on the global constituent power and 
finds it surprisingly scarce and lacking in several important respects.  
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Chapter 5 thus attempts to address the gaps identified in Chapter 4 and offers a 
comprehensive approach to the global constituent power in the form of the composite 
global constituent power model. The global constituent power consists in both a state 
component and a global component and the involvement of both in global 
constitutional dot-making is necessary to ensure democratic legitimacy, both 
domestically and globally. Because the identity of the constituent power cannot be 
dissociated from its exercise, I also describe the several ways in which the composite 
global constituent power may be exercised.  
Chapter 6 acknowledges the limits to the composite global constituent power model. 
The composite global constituent power model fills many but not all the gaps left by 
the emerging theories of global constituent power. In addition, the composite global 
constituent power inherits a few as yet unsolved paradoxes from constitutionalism in 
general and global constitutionalism in particular. Practical challenges also arise in the 
implementation of the composite global constituent power.  
Chapter 7 sees us return to internet governance. Relying on the composite global 
constituent power model described in Chapter 5, we explain the circumstances under 
which multistakeholderism may be considered as an iteration of the global constituent 
power, and thus legitimate according to global constitutionalism. This helps us flesh out 
multistakeholderism. We then apply this set of recommendations to ICANN and its 
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recent foray into global constitutional terrain via the new generic top level domain name 
program.  
After summarizing the findings of the dissertation, the conclusion explains how 
multistakeholderism may be reconciled with traditional international law, allowing us to 
postpone the latter’s time of death until a later day. I finish on a more pessimistic tone, 
by noting that multistakeholderism only accounts for a subset of global internet 
governance. The composite global constituent power model does not reach the purely 
private forms of governance that are far from insignificant.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL LAW, A MINOR PLAYER IN A 
HEAVILY REGULATED INTERNET  
 
Multistakeholderism - understood as the involvement of governments, the private 
sector and civil society in their respective role - is claiming a preponderant spot in the 
regulation of the internet, and thus in the regulation of our online lives, though its 
legitimacy is not well established. In this chapter, we shall start by defining the internet 
before explaining how the internet has been regulated. We will then show that, out of 
all forms of regulation, international law has remained at the margin because of 
multistakeholderism.  
Section	1:	The	internet,	a	case	of	multiple	identities	
 
Internet seems full of contradictions. It is (almost) everywhere and nowhere. It is here 
and there, both conspicuous and intangible. It is hard to grasp. At the same time, 
defining the internet might seem as silly or pointless a task as defining a phone. Don’t 
we all know what it is? Don’t many of us use it on a daily basis, having integrated it into 
our life to such an extent that we are not even aware of it sometimes? Many aspects of 
our lives3 have migrated online, as the myriad “e-words” and “online this or that” that 
																																																						
3 According to the World Bank, nearly 60% of the world population does not have access to the 
internet. The World Bank, Digital Dividends 7 (2016), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/01/13/090224b08405e
a05/2_0/Rendered/PDF/World0developm0000digital0dividends.pdf (last visited 8 July 2016). This 
new dimension of the disparity between developed and developing countries is known as the digital 
divide.	 
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have emerged in our language have shown. From e-commerce to e-government to 
online dating, we seem to be living our lives online. The most telling sign however might 
be when we sometimes no longer specify that we do things online. We work remotely, 
share pictures or check our mail and it goes without saying that we do so online. 	
When asked what the internet is, people tend to equate what they do on the internet 
with what the internet is. However, these are only examples of activities that have been 
enabled by the internet. This tells us what the internet allows but not what the internet 
is. Neither should the internet be reduced to the web, as is so often the case. However 
central to the success of the internet the web, or world wide web, has been, it remains 
one of many applications supported by the internet. The web is not the internet.  
The confusion is understandable. As acknowledged by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (“IETF”) itself, the open-membership group that makes many important 
technical decisions about the internet, “there’s no agreed upon answer that neatly sums 
up the internet. The internet can be thought about in relation to its common protocols, 
as a physical collection of routers and circuits, as a set of shared resources, or even as 
an attitude about interconnecting and intercommunication.”4 So what is the internet?  
Oftentimes, the internet is defined by drawing analogies with modes of communication, 
such as television (in that the internet, like the television, is used to broadcast programs) 
																																																						
4 E. Kroll et al., Request for Comments 1462: FYI on "What is the Internet?", IETF (1993), 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1462.txt (last visited 1 November 2016).  
 	 10 
or telephone (with the introduction of online chat systems, and later on, of voice over 
Internet Protocol, which allows users to make voice calls) regulations. The Council of 
Europe has suggested that inspiration could also be drawn from “international law 
relating to certain natural common resources,” in particular water, which, like the 
internet, is “a global resource requiring global protection using international law.”5 
However, this comparative exercise faces certain limitations. On the one hand, “an 
analogy to any particular aspect of the internet may over-simplify the understanding of 
the Internet.”6 Because the internet is complex and permits the provision of different 
services, combining regulations that each deals with one aspect only of the internet is 
likely to bring unsatisfying results. On the other hand, “with the increasing convergence 
of different telecommunication and media services, the traditional differences between 
the various services are blurring,”7 so that the use of analogies is not entirely meaningful. 
It is better to adopt a stand-alone definition. As we shall see below, several definitions 
are available that each come with a different philosophy.   
A. Internet	as	cyberspace	
The term “cyberspace” comes from sci-fi novelist William Gibson.8 The connection 
between authors and computer scientists marked the early stages of the internet. A lot 
																																																						
5 Council of Europe, Internet Governance and Critical Internet Resources, 23 (April 2009). 
6 J. KURBALIJA, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE, 24 (6th ed. 2014), 
https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/An%20Introduction%20to%20IG_6th%20edition.
pdf (last visited on 23 April 2015).	 
7 Id. at 25. 
8 W. GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).  
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of dreams were poured into this new technology that ignited creatives’ imagination. 
Those dreams centered on the hope for a new world that would play by different rules. 
Lessig argues that the rise of cyberspace thought coincides with the realization that the 
world after the fall of the Berlin wall was not to become instantly more free.9 
Cyberspace thus became the new frontier where freedom, understood as freedom from 
governmental oppression, was finally to become a reality. The Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace, which is the work of Barlow, the lyricist of the rock band 
the Grateful Dead, proclaimed adherence to “rough consensus and running code,”10 
which refers to the decentralized self-regulation model that had prevailed over the birth 
and rise of the internet and made no room for governments in any capacity.  
Despite being influenced by technology and the community of computer scientists that 
created the internet, the proponents of cyberspace often believe that cyberspace is the 
result of an act of nature. Here again we can quote the Declaration of Independence, 
which states that cyberspace “is an act of nature and it grows itself through our 
collective actions.”11 This formulation, as ambiguous as it is, seems to indicate that 
cyberspace has a mind of its own, and that its evolution is organically fed by its 
participants’ actions. 
																																																						
9 L. LESSIG, CODE 2.0, 2 (2006). 
10 J. P. Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (last visited 23 April 2016). 
11 Id.  
 	 12 
The notion of cyberspace has made its way into the legal literature in a less poetic 
fashion. It has actually been a source of debate in the early internet scholarship. Post 
and Johnson are among those who have embraced the notion of cyberspace. They see 
the internet as a place with borders made up of the screens and passwords that allow 
us to move from the real to the virtual world.12 In the words of Post and Johnson, 
“[t]here is a "placeness" to Cyberspace because the messages accessed there are 
persistent and accessible to many people. You know when you are "there." No one 
accidentally strays across the border into Cyberspace.”13 Embracing cyberspace 
ultimately leads Post and Johnson to reject the applicability of domestic law and support 
self-regulation. “[O]nline phenomena” are physically disconnected from the various 
states that make up the real world and cannot legitimately be reached by their law.  
On the contrary, the opponents to cyberspace would insist that “[t]he Internet is not, 
as many suggest, a separate place removed from our world. Like the telephone, the 
telegraph, and the smoke signal, the Internet is a medium through which people in real 
space in one jurisdiction communicate with people in real space in another 
jurisdiction.”14 The emphasis is on the “people in real space”, those persons, whether 
real or legal, that enter into internet transactions. The way that law reaches those 
																																																						
12 D. R. Johnson and D. G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367, 1367 (1996). 
13 Id. at 1379. 
14 J. L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEG., 475, 476 (1998). 
 	 13 
persons is in no way novel. Goldsmith concedes that sometimes, the persons actually 
entering into the transactions cannot be easily identified or located but in that case, 
Goldsmith would target internet intermediaries for enforcement purposes – you can 
always find someone that can be identified and reached.  
Though the term cyberspace has now fallen into disuse, it deserves our attention. 
Cyberspace might seem like the fruit of an overly vivid imagination, and the Declaration 
of Independence, in all its grandiloquence, does little to dissipate this feeling. The 
internet is not an act of nature but the result of man-created code that is implemented 
over tangible objects, such as wires or computers. It also is not a new world that is out 
of states’ reach. People do not disappear into cyberspace, though some may be hard to 
locate.  
Nevertheless, a valuable takeaway from cyberspace is the emphasis that it places on 
freedom from governments and playing by different rules. We may disagree with the 
underlying reasons – the idea that the internet created a new place – but it is an 
expression of a user-maker ethos that has influenced the evolution of the internet and 
was prevalent among those who made the internet.    
 	 14 
B. Internet	as	a	communications	system		
Communication may be defined as the “transmission or exchange of information, 
knowledge, or ideas.”15 Because the internet moves packets of data from a source to a 
recipient, everything it accomplishes consists in exchanging information. Thus the 
internet is a remarkable means of communication. By this definition, purchasing a book 
is communication since placing the order and paying for it requires that data packets be 
sent to and from the buyer. Everything that we do on the internet may be analyzed as 
communication.  
 
However, this is not what people think of generally when they define the internet as a 
communication platform. They primarily think of the content that is generated on the 
internet: the countless websites, weblogs, podcasts, emails, chats, videos and more. That 
is what they mean when they say “oh I’ll check this on the internet.” It corresponds to 
the reality that most internet users (at least the vast majority of us who are neither geeks 
nor working for an internet access provider for instance) experience in their use of the 
internet.  
While this understanding of the internet is predominant, it does not reflect the original 
intent of those who first thought of ARPANET, the predecessor to the internet. They 
had in mind resource-sharing more than anything else. In those days that far predate 
																																																						
15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2016). 
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the emergence of personal computers, computers with significant computing capacity 
were rare. ARPA, a government agency within the defense department, was supporting 
most of the computer science research in the US. To try and optimize their spending, 
they wanted to facilitate the sharing of those supercomputers. The need to make 
resource-sharing easier was one of the main motivators behind the creation of 
ARPANET. It is only over time that communication became more central, first with 
the introduction of emails, the possibilities to share files, and later with the emergence 
of personal computers and the web (among others). Abbate talks of an unforeseen shift 
in the identity of the network from a computing system to a communications system.16  
A problem with this approach is that it gives the impression that most of the issues 
related to the internet are related to content. This definition tends to occult all other 
issues, which receive comparatively less attention. Content is indeed important and the 
free speech issues it raises – mostly defining limits to free speech in the name of 
copyright, national security, and privacy - are equally important. The internet has given 
the means for many people to exercise their right to speak, exchange information and 
offered them countless possibilities to learn or simply entertain themselves.  
The point is not to discount the tremendously positive contributions of the internet to 
people’s ability to create and consume content – or the negative ones as well (the 
																																																						
16 J. ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 109 (1999). 
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flourishing of conspiracy theories, the ease with which one may publish and access hate 
speech, for instance). Rather the point is to stress the fact that all this content will only 
happen if the internet is here to stay and evolves in a certain direction. Indeed, the 
content is not only affected by laws and regulations that directly target content, but also 
by the features of the technology that support content, as I shall explain below.  
The definition of the internet as a communication tool deservedly acknowledges the 
phenomenal change that the internet has brought to communications. However, it is 
reducing the internet to a subset of all online activities that are enabled by the internet 
and merges the medium with the content that circulates on the medium. Such a narrow 
view of the internet makes little sense as it ignores the critical nature of the technology 
and the infrastructure that implements it to whatever happens to content and users. A 
more technology-aware definition is needed.   
 
C. Internet	as	an	ensemble	of	layers		
	
In computer scientists’ circles, the internet is often presented as a group of layers, the 
number of which varying according to the person speaking. There would be an 
application layer, an internet layer and so on. The idea of slicing up the technology that 
makes up the internet, i.e. code or protocols, was introduced to make development of 
the set of internet protocols easier. By defining clearly which functions each layer was 
to accomplish and setting rules governing interactions between layers, the layer model 
made it possible for developers to focus on one layer without worrying about the whole 
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system, prevented redundancies that would have made the system unnecessarily 
complex and meant that the protocols could be developed in a decentralized manner.17 
Building on the layer model idea, scholars such as Benkler18 and Lessig19 have offered a 
layered definition of the internet. They have grouped together all the protocols under 
the term “logical layer” and added two additional layers: a physical layer, that consists 
in the wires, cables, airwaves, computers and other technologies implementing the 
protocols within the logical layer. The logical layer would thus cover “the necessary 
software components to carry, store and deliver content”20 and the content layer that 
sits on top of the logical layer would cover “all material stored, transmitted and accessed 
using the software tools”21 of the logical layer.  
In the layer definition, the logical layer is the starting point. It is in the strictest sense 
what the internet is. Indeed, internet is short for internetworking. Therefore, we can say 
that the internet consists in a set of protocols that enables computer networks to 
connect, regardless of the type of networks. Let us go back in time and explain a bit 
more what the logical layer consists of.  
																																																						
17 Id. at 51. 
18 Y. Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable 
Common and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L. J. 561, 568 (2000).  
19 L. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 23 (2001). 
20 A. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 44 
(2007). 
21 Id. at 44.  
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Computer networks were already all the rage in the 60’s. In the US, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency22 (or “DARPA”), the agency within the Defense 
Department that funds eclectic research and development programs in scientific fields 
relevant to the military,  was a major supporter of computer science. The internet was 
first conceived in the early 1970’s as a way to connect the three computer networks that 
had been built under the stewardship of DARPA. Those three networks were 
ARPANET, SATNET, a packet satellite network, and PRNET, a packet-radio network. 
It made sense to connect them so that resources could be shared more broadly among 
users of the three networks. However, they presented technical incompatibilities23 that 
made it impossible to simply merge them. Something more was needed. Cerf and Kahn, 
two researchers connected to DARPA, came up with an internetworking protocol that 
enabled the connections of networks.24 The internet was born.  
Among the protocols that make up the internet, one in particular stands out. It is 
TCP/IP. IP is a protocol that routes packets of data from one computer to the other, 
while TCP is a protocol that divides data into data packets of a predefined size and then 
reassemble them in the proper order at their destination. There existed alternatives to 
																																																						
22 The name of this agency changed a few times since it began funding internet-related research. It 
changed from ARPA, to DARPA, back to ARPA and later on DARPA since the 1970’s. I shall be 
using its current name, DARPA, in this dissertation.  
23 J. ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 122 (1999).  
24 Id. at 123. Cerf and Kahn benefited from the input of an international group of computer network 
experts. They created the International Network Working Group, which included foreign network 
researchers and telecom carriers, among others.  
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this set of protocols. The most serious contenders were those elaborated by an 
association of telecom carriers within the International Telecommunications Union 
(“ITU”), a United Nations agency, and the International Standard Association, which 
has a broader membership that includes not only telecom carriers, but also computer 
makers. Each of those protocols, far from being neutral, represented certain interests, 
economic policies and philosophies.25 For instance, telecom carriers wanted to replicate 
the telephony model. This would have meant three things: replicating national borders, 
with one public network in each country that would have interconnected with foreign 
networks at the border; control of the network by the telecom carriers, private networks 
remaining the exception rather than the rule; and a more circumscribed role played by 
the end user.  
However, the TCP/IP won the war for a variety of reasons, most notably a significant 
head start, TCP/IP being a refinement of NCP, the protocol supporting ARPANET, 
one of the first and largest computer networks in the world. The TCP/IP protocols are 
also designed to be flexible, so that they can accommodate heterogeneity, both in terms 
of computer types and network types. The personal computer revolution in the late 70’s 
also played a significant role in the success of TCP/IP. It lifted a hurdle that could 
otherwise have compromised the success of the TCP/IP protocol, which locates 
intelligence at the end-user level as opposed to network level and thus requires more 
																																																						
25 Id. at 161-179. 
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than a basic terminal. In addition, the system created by TCP/IP is easily scalable, as it 
does not overload the network itself with a plethora of complex tasks, but shifts as 
much as possible of its burden to the end-user. It is interesting to note that those 
characteristics that made the internet so successful were not all planned. The internet 
was to some extent an accidental success.  
The TCP/IP protocol has shaped the internet and given it its most distinctive and 
unique feature: decentralization. It is often referred to as the end-to-end argument.26 
According to Lessig, the end-to-end argument is the core of the internet.27 The end-to-
end principle is another way of describing the fact that the network does the least 
amount of work possible with the more complex tasks being left for computers – at the 
“end” of the network – to accomplish, such as reassembling the packets of data to form 
a message or check for errors. The network is often said to be “dumb,” with all the 
intelligence being located at the end. This is so because the network is assumed to be 
unreliable and needs to be kept relatively simple so as to be replaced easily. Here we see 
the military roots of the internetworking project. No part of the network should be so 
essential as to threaten the whole if under attack. This architecture thus offers more 
latitude, if not freedom, to users who are invited to take on a more active role. They 
can do whatever they want with the network. As Berners-Lee, the inventor of the world 
																																																						
26 J. H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANS. COMPUT. SYST., 277, 278 
(1984).  
27 L. LESSIG, CODE 2.0 44 (2006).  
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wide web puts it, “"There's a freedom about the Internet: As long as we accept the rules 
of sending packets around, we can send packets containing anything to anywhere."28 
The end-to-end argument is what allowed Zuckerberg to launch Facebook without 
having to ask for anyone’s permission.29 Nothing needed to change at the level of the 
network before this new service was launched. It all happened at the end. It is as open 
as possible so as not to presume, and unknowingly restrict, future innovations. An 
example is the web, which had not been thought of by the engineers and researchers 
initially in charge of creating the internet. It was several years later that Berners-Lee 
came up with it, completely changing the landscape of the internet in a way that had 
not been foreseen. Says an engineer who had participated in the elaboration of TCP/IP,  
we wanted to make sure that we didn’t somehow build in a feature of the 
underlying network technology … that would restrict our using some new 
underlying transport technology that turned out to be good in the future... That 
was really the key to why we picked this very, very simple thing called the Internet 
protocol.30  
 
Keeping the network bare has also meant that the network itself does not know of 
borders. There is no border on the internet, understood in its technological sense. It 
does not even make sense to talk about borders. The internet is a technology that 
																																																						
28 T. BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND THE ULTIMATE DESTINY 
OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 208 (2000). 
29 That is, from a technological point of view. From a legal point of view, his launch raised a series 
of questions, including privacy. Compare with the telephone network, for which innovation at the 
edge was not exactly welcome. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 
1956). 
 
30 Reed, a graduate student who participated in the conception of TCP/IP at MIT, as quoted in L. 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 35 (2001). 
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connects networks and is available in theory regardless of borders. The borders are 
materialized at the level of the physical infrastructure and at the content level, but not 
at the logical layer.  
We have just seen that at the center of the layered model is the logical layer. This is how 
it all started and stricto sensu, the internet is the logical layer. However, the protocols 
in the logical layer would mean nothing without the physical layer. They would remain 
a neat idea presented in a paper at a conference. The physical layer supports the 
technology and gives life to it. The physical and logical layers go hand in hand. On the 
other hand, the content layer is the output of the logical and physical layers. The content 
layer is the raison d’être of the logical layer. The unpredictability of the content, its wide 
variety and diversity are the consequence of the openness of the logical layer combined 
with the openness (or lack thereof) of the physical layer. Thus the three layers can be 
grouped together in a broader understanding of the internet. As we shall see below in 
Section 2, everything is connected. Each layer impacts the other two.  
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Figure 1: Internet as an ensemble of layers 
Adopting the layered definition leads to a greater clarity in the analysis. Each layer, as 
we shall see in Section 2, is regulated differently, according to its own specificities. The 
layered definition reflects the multiple faces of the internet – whether we are talking 
about protocols, the router in our apartment, the email we have just sent, or the 
newspaper we read online – while at the same time providing a framework for a more 
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refined analysis according to the specificities of each layer. The internet is not a 
monolith, contrary to what the cyberspace definition would suggest. Neither is it 
synonymous with self-generating communication.  
As the debate between Post and Johnson on the one hand, and Goldsmith on the other 
hand shows, how we understand the internet has a direct impact on how we approach 
the issue of its governance. It is easier to argue for a complete overhaul of governance 
if we believe that a new world has been created. On the other hand, if we believe the 
internet is just another communications system, the applicability of existing regimes 
governing telephony, for instance, should be welcome. Likewise, if we believe that 
freedom is a value that should govern the internet, the solutions offered will be different 
depending on whether you focus only on the content layer or whether you expand your 
view so as to include the logical and physical layers as well. In the following section, we 
shall go into more details about the regulability and modes of regulation of each layer 
of the internet.  
Section	2:	The	regulation	of	the	internet	
As the linguistic proximity suggests, governance and government are related. 
Governance would be a form of governing that involves non-state actors and 
depending on the case, governments as well. Regulation may also be seen as a form of 
governing though it is often perceived as a very specific form of governing. Indeed, 
regulation usually refers to rules that are made by governments, pursuant to a grant of 
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power by law or in some countries, directly by the constitution itself. Nevertheless, for 
the purpose of this section, we do not need to distinguish between regulation in this 
narrow sense and legislation. We will use the term “law” as encompassing both 
regulation in the narrow sense and legislation, as those rules made by a branch of 
government. The purpose is indeed to paint a comprehensive picture of all the forces 
that influence the evolution of the internet and in particular highlight those that involve 
governments. Thus regulation will be understood in this dissertation as synonymous 
with governance.   
A. Many	modes	of	regulation	
Lessig, for instance, explains that the internet is subject to four types of regulations:  
 
1. Law, or a form of constraint established by public authorities and enforced by 
the legal system;  
2. Social norms, which are elaborated and enforced by a community;  
3. The market imposes constraints by setting a price for goods and services; and  
4. Code, created by the technical community and which is self-enforced. 31  
The table below provides examples of each form of regulation for each layer of the 
internet.  
 
 
																																																						
31 L. LESSIG, CODE 2.0 340-345 (2006). 
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Table 1: Examples of layer-specific regulation 
  
 Physical layer 
 
Logical layer 
 
Content layer 
 
 
Social norms N/A Consensus based 
decision-making, 
participation in own 
name at IETF. 
  
Online copyright 
infringement is 
acceptable.32  
Market Price of internet 
access, quality of 
service  
 N/A Price of service (whether 
free, whether supported 
by ads, whether data 
monetized by service 
provider for instance). 
  
Law 
N
at
’l 
Common carrier 
regime, intermediary 
liability, access to 
internet as a public 
service. 
  
California law 
applies to ICANN 
privacy, copyright, 
national security, 
defamation, freedom of 
speech. 
In
t’l
 
Law of the sea 
applies to submarine 
cables; space law 
applies to satellites, 
airwaves.  
 
Trademark law 
applicable to domain 
names. 
Human rights law, in 
particular freedom of 
speech and freedom of 
information. 
Code Deep packet 
inspection.  
End-to-end 
argument built into 
TPC/IP; IPv6 
transition. 
Privacy settings offered by 
social media; no 
anonymity rule on 
Facebook; search 
algorithm.		
 
 
 
As we can see, the internet is heavily regulated. The cumulative weight of these forms 
of regulation is felt by the end user. Indeed, the content layer is the most subject to 
regulation since it is subject not only to regulation that directly targets content (such as 
																																																						
32 D. B. Levin, Note, Building Social Norms on the Internet, 4 YALE J. L. & TECH., 97, 132 (2002). 
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libel law, copyright law, or the privacy settings of social media, for instance) but also to 
regulation targeting the physical layer and the logical layer that indirectly but definitely 
impact – whether positively or negatively - content. Thus the content layer feels the 
compound effect of the regulation at each layer. For instance, if an internet access 
provider engages in content discrimination by relying on deep packet inspection, its 
users will be prevented from, or at least discouraged from, consuming certain content.  
Of course, regulation is not always synonymous with decreased freedom. For instance, 
the logical layer is mostly about creating possibilities and opening doors, rather than 
closing them. As we explained above, a choice for openness was built in the original set 
of protocols. The IETF, who is one of the main technical communities in charge of 
developing code for the internet, said it clearly:  
The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF. We want the Internet 
to be useful for communities that share our commitment to openness and 
fairness. We embrace technical concepts such as decentralized control, edge-user 
empowerment and sharing of resources, because those concepts resonate with 
the core values of the IETF community. These concepts have little to do with 
the technology that's possible, and much to do with the technology that we 
choose to create.33   
 
These modes of regulation mostly operate regardless of borders. Markets, social norms 
and code are forms of regulation that are not border-sensitive. Code is made up of a 
universal language that applies regardless of geography. It is a global regulator par 
																																																						
33 H. Alvestrand, Request for Comments 3935, A mission statement for the IETF, IETF (2004), 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3935.txt (last visited 8 July 2016).  
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excellence and that is particularly true of TCP/IP since its function is to connect 
networks irrespective of their characteristics. TCP/IP turns a blind eye to the location 
of these networks. Social norms are created among communities. While language, and 
thus indirectly citizenship, may play a role in forging the bond that is required to build 
a community, it is likely that communities will not exactly match state borders. For one 
thing, English being a dominant language on the internet, many people whose native 
language is not English are used to reading, writing, listening or buying in English. In 
addition, it takes efforts to exclude people from joining a community on the internet – 
passwords, requirement to sign-up, among others. As for markets, the private sector is 
sometimes forced to circumscribe its operations to users from specific countries 
(financial services for instance, or Yahoo! that was ordered to prevent French users 
from accessing auctions sites selling Nazi memorabilia34). Sometimes, it may require 
them to create country-specific websites to comply with local laws. However, when that 
it the case, the service is still the same so that the companies can really be considered 
to be global.  
Only law has a territorial anchor. Many domestic laws are applicable to the internet. To 
overcome some of the difficulties faced by traditional law enforcement (anonymity for 
instance), governments often will target the many internet companies that provide 
services to end-users, for instance social media platforms, and make them carry some 
																																																						
34 LICRA et UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo Fr., T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000. 
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of the burden of compliance. At the supranational level, some international law is 
relevant to the internet. For instance, freedom of speech. But as I shall explain below 
in Section 3 and 4, there has not been much internet-specific international law-making.  
B. Many	actors	involved	
 
As Table 1 above suggests, there is a wide variety of actors involved in the regulation 
of the internet.   
Physical	Layer:	governments,	the	private	sector	 
 
As end-users, our understanding of the physical layer often boils down to our 
relationship with our access provider. However, the physical layer involves a much 
broader range of private actors, and sometimes public actors as well, depending on how 
much of the infrastructure is owned by the private sector and how much is government-
owned. In the US, for instance, the physical layer is mostly privately owned by telecom 
and cable companies. These companies’ policies and contracts thus make up the bulk 
of the regulation at this level, within certain boundaries set by the government. A recent 
example of such a boundary would be the Federal Communications Commission ruling 
that has imposed common carrier obligations on broadband internet access providers.35 
A notable exception to the private sector-dominated regulation, however, is airwaves 
necessary for wireless connections. The wireless spectrum is a public resource that is 
																																																						
35 Federal Communications Commission, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order 
on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Red. 5601 (adopted 26 February 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (last visited 5 November 2016).  
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regulated by the government, which grants licenses to private operators and thus has 
greater control over how they operate their business.  
The list of actors involved at the physical layer level includes access providers, network 
operators (telecom companies, large content providers or content delivery networks) 
and internet exchange points. Some of these actors are directly in contact with the end-
users. This is the case of access providers. Whatever they decide, be it prices, terms and 
conditions, or content discrimination, will directly impact end-users. Often, however, 
the impact on end-users is indirect and harder to even uncover.  
An example is interconnection. Interconnection is a topic that has largely remained 
under the radar and is not regulated, whether at the domestic level or at the 
supranational level, although it is of great importance. As mentioned in Section 1, the 
internet is a network of networks. To send data to or receive data from other networks, 
there must be interconnections between the networks. There are two ways to 
interconnect: either bilaterally, in which case two network operators agree to exchange 
traffic, or to let traffic from one flow through the other, whether against a fee or not 
(this is called peering); or through an internet exchange point (“IXP”), basically a large 
room in a building in which several networks meet to exchange data. IXPs are unevenly 
distributed throughout the world. For instance, 61% of African countries do not have 
IXPs.36 As a result, data might be sent as far as Europe to be exchanged before making 
																																																						
36 L. DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 125 (2014). 
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its way back to a recipient located in the same country but connected to a different 
network. This translates in higher costs and lower speed and quality of transmission for 
end-users. It also decreases redundancy and thus reliability. Some are calling for 
regulation, particularly international regulation by the ITU. This was the object of a 
proposal by the European Telecommunications Network Operators at the ITU’s World 
Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai in 2012. The proposal, 
which was not adopted, advocated for ITU oversight of interconnection and the 
introduction of the “sending party network pays” principle to compensation for 
interconnection. This principle, which applies to international phone calls, would have 
meant that content providers would have to pay every time an internet user wishes to 
see content. That would change the whole logic of the internet and would have had 
profound effects.  
Just like IXPs, peering also raises issues. Two network providers, Cogent and Sprint, 
had entered into a peering agreement. Sprint argued that Cogent had failed to meet its 
end of the bargain, and suspended all interconnections with Cogent, leaving customers 
of both networks unable to send or receive data from the other. This for instance 
affected the federal court system, which for a few days, had trouble communicating 
with major law firms that tended to be connected to the other network.37  
																																																						
37 Id. at 128-129. 
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The companies involved at the physical layer level have often acquired an international 
dimension, out of necessity (multiplying interconnections all over the world so as to 
ensure great quality of service) and to expand their business. If you look at the map of 
the network of major telecom companies, you will see that their network usually spans 
several continents.38 Interconnections all over the world ensure that customers will have 
fast and high quality access to the whole internet. Network operators thus will enter 
into peering agreements in several jurisdictions, just like Sprint and Cogent had done.39 
They might also participate in international consortia to build and operate submarine 
internet cables. The often international nature of their activities means that their power 
to regulate goes beyond domestic borders.  
Logical	layer:	the	technical	community 
The logical layer follows a very different pattern from the physical layer. The code that 
makes up all the internet protocols is non proprietary. It is a commons. For instance, 
the specifications of TCP/IP were made public.40 Another well-known example is the 
code underlying the web. CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
																																																						
38 See e.g. Sprint, Global IP Map, https://www.sprint.net/images/network_maps/full/Global-
Global-IP.png (last visited 4 August 2016). 
39 L. DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 128 (2014).  
40 Information Sciences Institute, RFC 791: Internet Protocol (1981), IETF, 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt last visited 5 November 2016) and Information Sciences 
Institute, RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol (1981), IETF, https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt 
(last visited 5 November 2016). 
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where Berners-Lee worked at the time he created the web, released the protocols into 
the public domain.41 Nobody has an exclusive claim over any of it.  
Nonetheless, decisions must be made with respect to these protocols, regarding updates 
and improvements for instance, and several organizations have evolved that are 
generally accepted as the legitimate decision-makers - the standards they create are 
adopted by all internet users. Note that these organizations’ authority has no legal basis. 
At most they have received an official but subtle nod in the outcome documents of the 
2003-2005 UN World Summit on the Information Society (“WSIS”).42 These 
organizations’ functioning is unusual. First of all, these organizations are open to 
anyone. The only express requirement is that people participate in their own name and 
not on behalf of a government or company. In practice, however, there are obstacles 
to participation. You need both a technical background to participate meaningfully in 
discussions and money to fund trips to meetings (though remote attendance is 
possible). Second of all, decisions are consensus-based, or to use the famous phrase 
made by “rough consensus.”43 Thirdly, transparency reins over the decision-making 
process. For instance, all documents are made available on the internet, including 
																																																						
41 See W. Hoogland & H. Weber, Statement Concerning CERN W3 Software Release into the Public Domain, 
CERN (30 April 1993),  https://tenyears-www.web.cern.ch/tenyears-www/Declaration/Page2.html 
(last visited on 1 August 2016).  
42 World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, ¶¶ 35(b) and 36, 
(WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)) (2005), 
http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf (last visited 5 November 2016).   
43 H. Alvestrand, Request for Comments 3935, A mission statement for the IETF, IETF (2004), 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3935.txt (last visited 8 July 2016).  
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minutes of meetings and attendance lists.44 The IETF and the World Wide Web 
Consortium (“W3C”) are prominent examples. The IETF defines itself as “a large open 
international community of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers 
concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of 
the Internet.”45 The IETF is a descendant of a long line of groups of experts that 
presided over the destiny of ARPANET, and then the internet. W3C deals specifically 
with the protocols supporting the web.  
At the logical layer level, ICANN stands apart. I shall explain more about ICANN in 
Chapter 7 but for now it is sufficient to say that ICANN is a private not-for-profit based 
in California. It is in charge of the internet’s unique identifiers, including IP addresses 
and their alphanumerical translations, domain names. ICANN’s jurisdiction over 
internet’s unique identifiers is backed up by legal instruments, namely contracts with 
the US government – though some have argued that such contracts breach US law.46 
In any case, the US government is about to renounce its oversight powers and remove 
itself completely from ICANN, raising once again the question of its status.47 Unlike 
other organizations that agree on standards that are later on voluntarily adopted by 
																																																						
44 Id.  
45 IETF, About page, https://www.ietf.org/about/ (last visited 1 August 2016). 
46 See generally M. A. Froomkin, Wrong turn in cyberspace: using ICANN to route around the APA and the 
Constitution, 50 DUKE L. J. 17 (2000). 
47 L. E. Strickling, Updates on the IANA Transition, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
INFORMATION AGENCY (16 August 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/update-iana-
transition (last visited on 25 August 2016).  
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internet actors, ICANN’s decisions, which are made by its board of directors on the 
basis of advice provided by institutionalized communities representing affected parties, 
are mandatory. Until now,48 the decision-making process is structured so that input 
from the general public and affected parties is mostly channeled through the 
institutionalized communities and is limited to the drafting stage.49  
Content	layer:	internet	users,	the	private	sector,	governments	 
The situation at the level of the content layer is very diverse. Social norms undoubtedly 
play an important role within the myriad communities of internet users that have been 
created. The rapid growth of social media has encouraged the creation of multiple and 
sometimes tight-knit communities, which naturally leads to the emergence of social 
norms.  
Governments regulate content both directly and indirectly, by targeting internet 
companies that provide services and goods on the internet. There is a body of 
international and regional law applicable to the content layer. Human rights are 
particularly relevant. Human rights require that governments ensure that businesses 
within their jurisdiction do not perpetrate human rights violations. As a result, the 
private sector is indirectly under the obligation to comply with human rights. In 
																																																						
48 As we shall see below in Chapter 7, Section 2, procedures within ICANN will change as of 1 
October 2016.  
49 ICANN, Bylaws, Section 1 and Articles 8-9 (11 February 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-02-16-en (last visited on 4 November 2016).  
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addition, the private sector is encouraged, through the corporate governance 
movement, to go beyond those minimal obligations and become promoters of human 
rights. The UN’s Global Compact is “a call to companies to align strategies and 
operations with universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption, and take actions that advance societal goals.”50 In the field of internet 
governance, a few companies, along with civil society organizations and academics, 
have gotten together to create the Global Network Initiative (“GNI”). The GNI has 
devised a list of principles that are compliant with human rights and tools to help 
companies implement them. Among other things, member companies agree to 
independent audits assessing their compliance with the principles.51 At the regional 
level, we can point to several instruments adopted by the European Union, like the 
regulations on conflict of laws arising out of online transactions,52 or the e-Commerce 
Directive53 (in particular its provisions exempting intermediaries from liability for 
content originating from third parties as long as they remain passive). Occasionally, 
governments have also engaged in indirect regulation of content through code, for 
																																																						
50 UN Global Compact, Who We Are, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc (last visited on 
25 august 2016).  
51	Global Network Initiative, Accountability, Policy and Learning Framework (2015), 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Accountability%20Learning%20and%20Poli
cy%20Framework%20-%202015.pdf (last visited on 25 August 2016). 
52 See e.g. Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6. 
53 Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.  
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instance by trying to force phone manufacturers to program backdoors into the 
software of mobile phones.54  
The private sector is also a major regulator because of the scope of some internet 
companies, spanning several continents and counting millions of users. The private 
sector regulates both through the market and through code, very often across borders 
as many companies have an international reach.  
Let us cite Facebook’s stance against anonymity for instance that, given its current 1,18 
billion daily users,55 has a spectacular impact worldwide.56 Google is being threatened 
to be fined by the European Commission for tweaking its search algorithm so it favors 
its own services over competitors’.57 Uber, or Amazon have also show how these global 
companies modify behaviors, sometimes testing domestic law in many countries around 
the world. Concerns over the power of these companies have led some to push for 
more regulation, including by extending the domestic public utility regime to them as 
																																																						
54 See e.g. T. Timm, The Government Wants Tech Companies to Give Them a Backdoor to Your Electronic Life, 
THE GUARDIAN (17 OCTOBER 2014),  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/17/government-internet-backdoor-
surveillance-fbi (last visited on 5 November 2016). 
55 Facebook, Company Info. (September 2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited 
on 1 November 2016).  
56 Facebook’s policy is that “users provide their real names and information, and we need your help 
to keep it that way.” Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited 5 August 2016).  
57 C. Williams, Google faces record-breaking fine for web search monopoly abuse, THE TELEGRAPH (14 MAY 
2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/14/google-faces-record-breaking-fine-for-
web-search-monopoly-abuse/ (last visited on 5 August 2016).  
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antitrust laws seem unable to tackle this new form of power. This is the case in the US 
for instance.58  
Section	3:	Traditional	international	law	at	the	margin 
 
The last two sections have shown the scope and diversity of the modes of regulating 
the internet. Largely absent is international law. This is all the more surprising that 
internet would seem a fitting topic for international law. Cross-borders effects, common 
challenges irrespective of borders, transnational actors falling between the cracks of 
domestic law… all the ingredients for making new international law are there. Despite 
those seemingly favorable conditions for the expansion of international law, it has been 
confined to the margins.  
Here we are talking about two kinds of margin:  
a) a temporal margin: the few examples of traditional international law related to 
the internet date back to the early days of the commercialization of the internet; 
and  
b) a substantive margin: The scope of these instruments is limited. They either 
simply confirm that existing international law does apply to internet phenomena 
or else address very narrow issues, for instance the definition of some 
cybercrimes.  
																																																						
58 K. S. Rahman, Curbing the new corporate power, BOSTON REVIEW (4 May 2015), 
https://bostonreview.net/forum/k-sabeel-rahman-curbing-new-corporate-power (last visited on 1 
August 2016). 
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An example of these rare traditional international law instruments are the deceivingly 
named “internet treaties” that were adopted by the members states of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) in 1996. Contrary to what their ambitious 
name might suggest, the goal was only to dissipate doubts as to whether existing 
agreements applied to the internet.  The Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime of 2001 now counts 49 parties, including non-European states like the US, 
Canada, Australia or Japan. The Convention defines new internet-related crimes, such 
as illegal access, interception or interference with “computer data,” or the infringement 
of copyright or child pornography using computer systems. It also introduces 
mechanisms for international cooperation in this field.    
Of course, this is not to say that pre-existing international law may not apply to the 
internet. Members states of the World Trade Organization have been debating whether 
the provisions of the General Agreement on Trade of Services on basic 
telecommunications services should apply to the internet. In addition, it is no longer 
doubted that international human rights do apply online. However, the point is that 
new international law that would specifically target the internet is not being made.  
Section	4:	Multistakeholderism	as	a	shield	against	international	law 
 
In the previous sections, we have explained how and by whom the internet is regulated. 
We have also observed that international law does not feature prominently in the 
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regulation of internet. In this section, I will highlight the reason why international law 
has so far remained at the margin in internet matters: multistakeholderism.  
Though multistakeholderism could easily be applied broadly, to any decision affecting 
the internet, it has been used only under very specific circumstances. 
Multistakeholderism, it is claimed, should apply whenever a state or group of states tries 
and claims jurisdiction over internet issues – with a few exceptions. The function of 
multistakeholderism is basically to replace or prevent intergovernmentalism.    
This quote from the ASIL Conference in 2015 is informative.  
 
There are no overarching international agreements on the subject [the internet]. 
Our panel today will touch on the absence of such international frameworks and 
some of the many areas where that raises questions. This does not necessarily 
imply that binding international agreements are the solution. The near life-and-
death experience with the Internet Telecom Union (ITU) last year certainly 
convinced a lot of people that such negotiations are dangerous-and we are not 
yet out of the ITU woods yet!.”59  
 
This shows several things: it confirms the near absence of international law that 
specifically addresses the internet and shows that this comes as a surprise, at least to the 
legal community. It also highlights that despite a certain degree of ignorance (ITU 
stands for International Telecommunications Union) of internet governance matters, 
																																																						
59 G. N. Horlick et al., Can International Law Keep Up with the Internet?, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014), 
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/docview/1677184394?accountid=10267 (last 
visited on 5 November 2016). 
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there is a clear rejection of intergovernmentalism, the reasons of which are not 
immediately apparent.  
I shall describe multistakeholderism in greater details in the next chapter, but for now, 
let us simply rely on the usual definition of multistakeholderism: “the involvement of 
governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles.”60 While this 
definition would seem to indicate that multistakeholderism can be applied against any 
internet stakeholder – be it governments, the private sector or civil society – it is clear 
that it has so far been used to keep governments and intergovernmental mechanisms at 
bay.  
The 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (“WCIT”) 
convened by the ITU in 2012, which is referred to in the above quote from ASIL, was 
a spectacular display of the forces at play. The goal of the WCIT was to update the 
international telecommunications regulations (“ITRs”), described as “the binding 
global treaty designed to facilitate international interconnection and interoperability of 
information and communication services, as well as ensuring their efficiency and 
widespread public usefulness and availability.”61 Up until then, the ITRs, which had last 
been updated in 1988, only incidentally covered the internet to the extent that the 
																																																						
60 World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, ¶34 (WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)) (2005), http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf (last 
visited 5 November 2016).  
61 ITU, Conference Overview, http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited 8 
August 2016).  
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internet relies on existing telecom infrastructure. In 2006, ITU’s member states agreed 
to revise the ITRs so that the ITU could continue playing a central role in the regulation 
of global telecommunications despite “advances in technology.”62 However, before it 
even started, the WCIT turned into a highly controversial conference. There was 
disagreement among member states on whether the negotiations, which were 
intergovernmental in nature, should cover the internet or not. Some proposals were 
clearly aimed at the internet, like ETNO’s, the European telecom operators’ association, 
controversial proposal for including a ‘sending party network pays’ principle in the 
ITRs, or Russia’s bid for an ITU oversight of ICANN, while other proposals were more 
ambiguous and resulted in heated debates on interpretation. The WCIT was seen as an 
attempt by the ITU to “takeover” the internet, by bringing it within the scope of the 
ITRs. It was further claimed that the ITU, with its intergovernmental procedures, was 
not the right forum in which to make any decision about internet governance. On the 
other side, some states, as well as members of the private sector, viewed 
intergovernmentalism favorably, sometimes as a way of counterbalancing the US’ 
perceived hegemony over internet governance and, in other cases, as a way to gain more 
control over the internet.  
																																																						
62 ITU, Resolution 146 (Antalya, 2006), Review of the International Telecommunication Regulations, 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/itr-eg/files/resolution146.pdf (last visited 8 August 2016). 
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Hamadoun Toure, then the director of the ITU, proclaimed ITU’s commitment to 
multistakeholderism as the mode of decision-making at the Conference’s opening 
speech.63 Toure insisted that “[t]he Member State delegations include representatives of 
all stakeholders.” But that was not enough. There were many public expressions of 
protests. Note for instance a letter signed by several prominent civil society 
organizations and members of the private sector opposing ITU’s initiative. It said  
Further, the ITU maintains a relatively closed, non-transparent decision-making 
process in which only governments are allowed full participation. In contrast, the 
Internet has flourished under an open, decentralized model of governance, 
where groups representing business, the technical community, and Internet users 
as well as governments focus on different issues in a variety of forums. In 
keeping with the World Summit on Information Society commitments, we 
believe that such open, inclusive processes are necessary to ensure that policies 
and technical standards for the global Internet preserve the medium’s 
decentralized and open nature and protect the human rights of its users.64 
 
The causality is established between the successful evolution of the internet and the 
governance model, described as multistakeholder. This intimate connection that is 
drawn between the success of the internet and multistakeholderism is made time and 
again. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information 
Strickling expressed the same idea when he said 
 
																																																						
63 H. Toure, Opening of the WCIT-12 (3 December 2012), INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION 
UNION, HTTP://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12Pages/speech-toure.aspx (last visited on 8 August 2016). 
64 Center for Democracy and Technology et al., Sign-on Letter Opposing ITU Authority Over the Internet 
(5 September 2012), https://cdt.org/insight/sign-on-letter-opposing-itu-authority-over-the-
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My first point is that the Internet we enjoy today—this marvelous engine of 
economic growth and innovation—did not develop by happenstance.  It 
emerged as the hard work of multistakeholder organizations such as the Internet 
Society, the Internet Engineering Task Force and the World Wide Web 
Consortium.  These organizations have played a major role in designing and 
operating the Internet we know today. 
These multistakeholder processes have succeeded by their very nature of 
openness and inclusiveness.  They are most capable of attacking issues with the 
speed and flexibility required in this rapidly changing environment.  By engaging 
all interested parties, the open multistakeholder process encourages much 
broader and more creative problem solving.  These attributes of speed, flexibility, 
and decentralized problem solving stand in stark contrast to a more traditional, 
top-down regulatory model characterized by rigid processes, political capture by 
incumbents, and in so many cases, impasse or stalemate.65 
 
Going back to the WCIT, the conference was full of drama and in the end, no 
consensus could be reached among the member states. The revised amendments, from 
which most references to internet had been removed, were adopted by a vote, a failure 
for an institution where decisions are usually adopted by consensus. 55 states, including 
the US, all the European states, a few South American countries, Australia and Canada 
refused to sign the ITRs. Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa count among the 89 
signatories. As a way to pacify relations within the ITU, the member states adopted in 
2014 a resolution defining and limiting ITU’s role in internet governance.66 A victory 
																																																						
65 L. E. Strickling, Opening Remarks at the Internet Governance Forum, NATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION AGENCY (27 September 2011), 
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INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/itr-
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for the proponents of multistakeholderism, the resolutions circumscribe ITU’s role in 
internet governance and largely remove the specter of a UN takeover. In particular, it 
is now agreed that the ITU’s role does not extend to the content or logical layers. ITU 
will also revise its procedures so as to increase transparency and provide opportunities 
for public participation. The WCIT in Dubai had been criticized for its secretiveness. 
A website called WCITleaks had even been created to make public the various 
proposals for internet-related amendments to the ITRs. As I explained in Section 1, the 
ITU had unsuccessfully tried to develop and impose an alternative to TCP/IP, as if that 
original failure forecasted the ITU’s tumultuous relationship with the internet.  
In this Chapter, we have seen that among the many definitions of the internet, the 
layered approach, which sees the internet as an ensemble of three layers - the physical, 
logical and content layers - allows a better grasp of the myriad ways the internet, and 
thus end-users, are being regulated. Traditional international law accounts for very little 
of this regulation as multistakeholderism is being promoted as the legitimate way of 
governing the internet. While multistakeholderism is broadly defined as the 
involvement of governments, private sector and civil society in their respective role, in 
reality, it has been used as a shield against intergovernmentalism only, so much so that 
we can distinguish between two subtypes of multistakeholderism:  
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- public multistakeholderism that applies whenever governments would act 
according to the traditional intergovernmental model, in which the private sector 
and civil society are at best mere observers; and  
- private multistakeholderism, pursuant to which the private sector includes other 
non-state stakeholders but is under no obligation to include governments in any 
capacity.  
In this dissertation, I shall focus on public multistakeholderism as it represents a new 
attack on traditional international law, despite being an unidentified governance 
object. In the remainder of this dissertation, multistakeholderism will be understood 
to refer to the public multistakeholderism category only. The next chapter will be 
focused on the history of multistakeholderism.  
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CHAPTER 2: MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM, A RECENT SUCCESS 
RESTING ON UNCERTAIN GROUNDS  
	
Despite being a mouthful, or possibly because it is a mouthful, multistakeholderism is 
one of internet scholars’ favorite words. Multistakeholderism is presented and widely 
accepted as the key to the legitimacy of internet governance, one of its most 
fundamental principles. It is also often presented as a novel and revolutionary model of 
governance that is indigenous to the internet. At the same time, it must be remarked 
that nobody agrees on what multistakeholderism really means. This Chapter goes in 
depth about multistakeholderism, identifying possible ancestors and showing how it has 
emerged and consolidated in internet governance. This helps understand how the claim 
that multistakeholderism should constrain the role of states in global internet 
governance became widely accepted despite resting on shaky foundations.  
Section	1:	Multistakeholderism,	a	short	story	
					
A. The	roots	of	multistakeholderism		
In this section, we are exploring possible ancestors of multistakeholderism.  
Tripartism:	same	idea,	other	name?	 
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has implemented since its creation in 
1919 a very unique internal governance structure: tripartism. Tripartism may be defined 
in the case of the ILO as “the process by which workers, employers and governments 
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contribute to the setting of workplace standards and the protection of workers’ rights 
worldwide.”67 The underlying belief is that “voluntary interaction and dialogue among 
representatives of the various parties is vital for social and economic stability and 
progress while being consonant with democratic ideals.”68 All ILO institutions are 
structured in a similar way. Each member state is represented by two governmental 
delegates, an employer delegate and a worker delegate. Within the ILO, worker and 
employer delegates enjoy the same rights, including voting rights, as the governmental 
delegates.  
The adoption of tripartism by the ILO can be explained by the context of its creation 
at the end of the First World War. The impact of the war on the ILO cannot be 
overstated. After all, the creation of the ILO itself was inscribed in the Treaty of 
Versailles. The decision to adopt tripartism stemmed partly from the fact that tripartism 
had already been introduced for the benefit of workers in several Western countries 
during the First World War because they “needed to keep their armament industries 
working. To do that they had to cut some fairly extraordinary deals with organized 
labour.”69 Furthermore, the communist revolution made the need to pacify labor 
relations and improve working conditions even more pressing.   
																																																						
67 W. R. Simpson, The ILO and Tripartism: Some Reflections, 117 MONTHLY LABOR REV. (1994), 40, 40.  
68 Id.  
69 G. Ryder, The international Labour Organization: The next 100 years, 57 J. Indus. Rel. (2015), 748, 749. 
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However, it would be a mistake to equate tripartism at the ILO, which to this day 
remains unique among all international organizations, with multistakeholderism. 
Without undermining the progress that tripartism may represent in other respects, it 
remains that tripartism as implemented at the ILO is essentially a state-centered 
organization. “The statist model continues to dominate the ILO’s operation, as the 
participation of non-governmental interests (namely, the interests of employers and 
employees) is channeled through the state.”70 This makes sense given the context in 
which the ILO was created and tripartism first introduced. In 1919, state sovereignty 
was generally accepted as the central paradigm in international law and to this day, the 
state has remained the relevant unit of concern. Nongovernmental delegates to the ILO 
are appointed by their member states, though “in agreement with the industrial 
organizations (…) most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, 
in their respective countries.”71 In addition, states are overrepresented compared to the 
other two groups.  
If tripartism, like multistakeholderism, brings together three predetermined groups in 
an effort to enhance dialogue, it differs from multistakeholderism in that it does not 
operate on the same level. Tripartism is a form of representation within the state. It 
looks at the various interests at play within domestic borders and acknowledges the fact 
																																																						
70 Y. Dahan et al., Shared Responsibility and the International Labour Organization, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
(2013), 675, 693.  
71 ILO Constitution, Article 3.5. 
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that states are not opaque monolith but represent various interests. Those interests 
however do not transcend national borders. On the other hand, multistakeholderism 
entertains a different relationship with domestic borders. They are only relevant in the 
identification of the members of the state group. When it comes to defining the 
members of the private sector and civil society, they are no longer relevant. 
Multistakeholderism operates on a global level.      
Stakeholder	Theory	in	Corporate	Governance	
The term “stakeholder” comes from a body of literature devoted to management and 
business ethics, in particular the literature concerned with explaining the goals of the 
firm. It appeared for the first time in a memo by the Stanford Research Institute in 
196372 and progressively made its way to areas outside of corporate governance - the 
term “Internet stakeholder” shows up in the Green Paper preparing the privatization 
of the DNS by the Clinton administration in 1998.73 The stakeholder theory goes against 
the mainstream view that firms’ exclusive goal is their owners’ wealth maximization. 
The wealth maximization principle is deeply rooted in corporate law and finds its 
expression for instance in the fiduciary duties that managers owe shareholders. The 
																																																						
72 Some researchers argue that the “essence” of the theory already existed in the 1930’s, when the 
General Electric Company defined four categories of stakeholders, shareholders, employees, 
customers and the community. T. VERSTRAETE ET AL., A BUSINESS MODEL FOR 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2011), 37. Perhaps not entirely coincidental, the Stanford Research Institute 
was involved in the development of the ARPANET, the predecessor to the internet.  
73 NTIA, Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, Proposed Rule, 15 Fed. 
Reg. 8825 (20 February 1998).  
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wealth maximization paradigm relies on strong utilitarian and property rights 
arguments.  
The stakeholder theory, on the other hand, tries to bridge the gap between the owners 
of a firm and the rest of the world, possibly even including the natural environment, 
and between business and ethics. It also aims at overcoming the “separation thesis” 74  
that underlies so many discussions in business ethics and results in rigid distinctions 
(and oppositions) between business decisions and moral decisions. The stakeholder 
theory expands the circle of those whose interests must be taken into account beyond 
the owners of the corporation. But exactly who are the stakeholders?  
Though stakeholder theory has been around for some time, certain of its aspects are 
still very much debated. For instance, the identity of the stakeholders is far from 
settled.75 There is a narrow view, which defines stakeholders as all those without which 
the firm could not exist,76 a broad view, which extends stakeholder status so as to 
include all that can affect or be affected by the firm,77 and many views in between.78 
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Phillips observes that the question of the identity of the stakeholders is directly related 
to the question of their legitimacy, and that uncertainties surrounding stakeholder 
legitimacy result in uncertainties surrounding stakeholder identity.79  
When it comes to multistakeholderism in internet governance, however, the issue is less 
about who the stakeholders are. Somehow, as we shall see, the stakeholder categories 
are not under dispute. Rather, what is disputed is their relative powers or rights. Another 
fundamental distinction is that stakeholders in stakeholder theory do not argue that they 
should themselves have decision-making power. They simply ask that their interests be 
taken into consideration by the firm’s managers. On the contrary, stakeholders in 
internet governance demand to participate in decision-making.  
Environmental	Protection	and	the	Inclusion	of	Non-State	Actors	
Environmental protection is another area in which multistakeholder models of 
governance were introduced early on. The 1992 ‘Earth Summit’80 convened by the 
United Nations is said to have been the “beginning of the participatory turn in global 
environmental governance.”81 There was a strong presence of civil society, not only at 
the Summit itself, but also at the well-attended parallel Global Forum. Recognizing their 
importance, the Agenda 21 adopted by heads of states and governments in Rio provided 
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for the creation of 9 stakeholder categories (other than states) called “major groups” 
that were granted special access to the intergovernmental processes at the United 
Nations.82 These processes have later on been described as multistakeholder. 
The trend initiated in Rio has grown stronger, with the creation of public-private 
partnerships or the sharing of the responsibility for the implementation of sustainable 
development practices between governments and non-state actors. It is widely accepted 
that multistakeholder approaches to governance are needed in this field, though 
implementation is still hotly debated. For instance, some argue that the multistakeholder 
models are being abused by powerful actors to their own benefit, a criticism that, as we 
shall see, has also been expressed with respect to multistakeholderism in internet 
governance.   
We should note that this trend towards the inclusion of non-state actors in the 1990’s 
is not unique to the field of environmental protection. The emergence of “private 
authority”83 in the later part of the twentieth century has been widely commented. The 
example of environmental protection seems to show that intergovernmental processes 
have been somewhat adjusted to accommodate this new reality and make room for 
NGOs and transnational corporations. With respect to the internet, the movement 
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however is different. It was never within the realm of intergovernmental processes to 
begin with. The question was more whether it should become integrated in the 
intergovernmental process or follow a different path. Thus the issues raised are slightly 
different. It is not just whether states should collaborate with NGOs for instance, but 
whether states and NGOs, among others, have a role to play and if so, which it is.  
If internet governance and the rise of multistakeholderism fit in the broad trend of the 
emergence of private authority, it displays specific characteristics. Multistakeholderism 
in internet governance has no immediate predecessor that would have served as a ready-
made model to copy-paste onto existing structures. We shall now turn our attention 
specifically to how multistakeholderism has entered internet governance.  
A. The	introduction	of	multistakeholderism	in	internet	governance	
Though it is nowadays nearly impossible to discuss internet governance without the 
term multistakeholderism (or one of its variants) coming up, it has not always been the 
case. Multistakeholderism made its way into internet governance in two distinct waves, 
with the practice of multistakeholderism, or at least practices aiming to establish 
multistakeholderism, predating the use of the word.  
The	introduction	of	the	idea	
The privatization of the management of the domain name system provided the first 
opportunity for a public debate on internet governance. Until the commercialization of 
the internet and the remarkably rapid growth of the number of its users in the 1990’s, 
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the governance of the internet had evolved organically, as and when needed, without 
the involvement of many outside the technical community. Among governments, only 
the US government, essentially through the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency and the National Science Foundation, was involved.   
Since the very beginning, the domain name system had been the responsibility of Jon 
Postel, who became over the years a major figure in the internet community through 
this work but also through his involvement in other aspects of the development of the 
internet. As the internet and the number of connected computers grew, the 
management of the DNS could no longer be performed single-handedly by Postel. Staff 
was hired to work under Postel’s supervision. We have come to refer to the work done 
by this group as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority function (“IANA”).  
The US Government decided to privatize the management of the DNS in 1997. As the 
internet grew and the potential of the internet economy became clearer, domain names 
gained strategic importance. The informality that had prevailed over the management 
of the DNS until then became inadequate. Business owners demanded more 
competition, more transparency and predictability. Foreign governments were growing 
increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as the American control of a now global 
internet. The US government managed to find a broad consensus, embodied in a White 
Paper mid 1998. This document sets forth the principles that would govern the 
privatization.  
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The US government announced it would transfer the management of the DNS to a yet-
to-be formed nonprofit corporation to be headquartered in the US, while retaining 
some oversight powers. The board of this corporation would represent the interests of 
all internet stakeholders, both geographically - board members also had to be 
internationally representative – and functionally – all internet stakeholders had to be 
represented, from the technical community to internet users to the entities involved in 
DNS management (registrars for instance). The White Paper clearly rejected the 
possibility of the US government transferring the management of the DNS to an 
intergovernmental organizations and limited the involvement of governments in 
general.84 It provided that “neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor 
intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should 
participate in management of Internet names and addresses.”85 Instead, legitimacy was 
built upon representation of the internet community as a whole. The US government 
left it to the internet community to set up a corporation meeting those requirements. 
The internet community – possibly proving the absence of a single internet community 
– failed to gather a consensus and competing projects emerged. The proposal that was 
chosen, with some reservations, by the US government was none other than the 
proposal presented by Postel. This corporation was called the Internet Corporation for 
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Assigned Names and Numbers. ICANN and the US government entered into a 
memorandum of understanding on November 25, 1998.  
If the implementation of the privatization of the management of the domain name 
system turned out to be hotly debated, there was broad support from the beginning for 
a governance model that wholly departed from the classical intergovernmental model. 
The chosen model puts internet stakeholders in the center as a way to legitimize 
ICANN. The White Paper clearly states that “[t]he organization and its board should 
derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders.” It is the first official 
pronouncement in favor of a central role to be played by stakeholders in internet 
governance.  
Three years later, when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution convening the 
World Summit on Information Society (“WSIS”), it took for granted the participation 
of nongovernmental stakeholders in the preparation of the WSIS and in the WSIS itself, 
though it left the nature of that participation undetermined. It is actually through the 
WSIS that the word “multistakeholder” first emerged.       
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The	introduction	of	the	word 
It seems that the term “multistakeholder”86 first made its way into official documents 
during the WSIS. A foundational moment in the history of internet governance, the 
WSIS was convened pursuant to a UN General Assembly resolution.87 The WSIS 
occurred in two phases, the first one in Geneva in 2003, followed by a session in Tunis 
in 2005. The WSIS gathered a large number of participants, including numerous high 
level governmental officials, and representatives from international organizations, the 
private sector and civil society. The identity of the participants themselves showed an 
effort to include all stakeholders, a form of multistakeholderism. The outcome of the 
summit consisted in a series of documents, the “outcome documents,” which identify 
areas in which actions must be taken to create a global information society that would 
reap the benefits that the internet has to offer.      
A longtime actor of internet governance guesses that the term multistakeholderism 
“emerged from civil society participants in the WSIS.”88 The word itself made its first 
																																																						
86 Here I see multistakeholder model, process or approach as synonymous with multistakeholderism, 
though some may distinguish. See e.g. A. Doria, Use [and Abuse] of Multistakeholderism in the 
Internet 115-138, in THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE (R. Radu et al. 2013).  
87 UN, G.A. Res. 56/183 (21 December 2001). 
88 M. Kummer, Multistakeholder Cooperation: Reflections on the emergence of a new phraseology in international 
cooperation, INTERNET SOCIETY (14 May 2013), 
www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/05/multistakeholder-cooperation-reflections-emergence-new-
phraseology-international (last visited on 26 January 2016).  
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– modest – official appearance in the outcome documents, specifically in the Geneva 
Plan of Action.89 
At the time of the first phase of the WSIS, the wording of choice was “private sector-
leadership” to conform to ICANN vocabulary.90 The Working Group on Internet 
Governance (“WGIG”) that was called for by the Geneva Plan of Action91 and set up 
by the UN Secretary-General92 to work through a specified list of issues in the interim 
was instrumental in establishing multistakeholderism as a term of art in internet 
governance. It was used 9 times in its report93 and from there, was introduced in the 
Tunis Agenda, where it appears 16 times.  
Among other things, the WGIG was entrusted the critical task of defining internet 
governance and “develop(ing) a common understanding of the respective roles and 
responsibilities of Governments, existing international organizations and other forums, 
as well as the private sector and civil society in both developing and developed 
countries.”94 While the WGIG’s definition of internet governance made its way into the 
																																																						
89 World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Plan of Action, , ¶ 8(f) (WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E) (2003), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-
WSIS-DOC-0005!!PDF-E.pdf (last visited on 5 November 2016). 
90 Supra note 89.  
91 Supra note 90 at 13(b). 
92 United Nations, Press Release (11 November 2004), www.un.org/press/en/2004/pi1620.doc.htm 
(last visited on 31 January 2016).  
93 World Summit on the Information Society, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (June 
2005), www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf (last visited on 31 January 2016).  
94 World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Plan of Action, ¶ 13(b)(iii) (WSIS-
03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E) (2003), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-
WSIS-DOC-0005!!PDF-E.pdf (last visited on 5 November 2016).  
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Tunis outcome documents, its view on role allocation among the stakeholders did not. 
The WGIG had described in details the role of each of the three main stakeholders it 
had identified, namely governments, the private sector and civil society. Instead, shorter 
and more general language was adopted in Point 31.  
Point 31 of the WSIS states that the legitimacy of internet governance is “based on the 
full participation of all stakeholders, from both developed and developing countries, 
within their respective roles and responsibilities,”95 without defining in many details 
those respective roles and responsibilities:  
a) Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right 
of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related 
public policy issues. 
b) The private sector has had, and should continue to have, an important role in 
the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields. 
c) Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially 
at community level, and should continue to play such a role. 
d) Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should continue to have, a 
facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues. 
e) International organizations have also had, and should continue to have, an 
important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards and 
relevant policies.96 
																																																						
95 World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, ¶31 (WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)) (2005), http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf (last 
visited 5 November 2016). 
96 Id. at ¶¶35-36.  
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Point 36 additionally provides that “[w]e recognize the valuable contribution by the 
academic and technical communities within those stakeholder groups mentioned in 
paragraph 35 to the evolution, functioning and development of the Internet.” 
Interestingly, when discussing multistakeholderism, the definition that comes up most 
often is not that offered in Point 31, but rather the definition of internet governance at 
point 34. Shorter, it only requires the involvement of all stakeholders “in their respective 
roles.” 
The context in which the WGIG came up with the definition sheds light on the 
definition and the allocation of roles. The focus was less on a comprehensive role 
allocation and more on affirming the equality of all states at a time when there was 
growing criticism of what was often perceived as US control over the internet. Other 
governments, as well as the ITU, worked hard to try and change the governance model 
and assert their role in it. Finally, “[t]he definition assigned an Internet governance role 
to ‘Governments,” commensurate with global interest in greater multilateral 
administration and potentially a unique role for intergovernmental entities such as the 
United Nations in Internet oversight.”97  
																																																						
97 M. Raymond et al., Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate Global Institution, 7 INT’L THEO. (2015), 
572, 587.  
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Instead of really trying to define each stakeholder’s role, the definition essentially 
accomplishes three things: 
- In the context of the dispute over the management of the domain name system, 
in particular the role of the US, it acknowledges that all governments have an 
equal role to play and leaves open the door for international organizations to be 
involved in standard settings.  
- It acknowledges that stakeholders, other than governments, have been involved 
in internet governance in various capacities, and that it should continue to be so. 
- It does not grant stakeholder status to the academic and technical communities, 
which are instead merged into other stakeholder categories.  
The WSIS played a key role in establishing multistakeholderism as a governance model 
for the internet, not only by introducing the terminology but also by acquainting a wide 
range of actors, governments included, with the practice. La Chapelle argues that the 4-
year long process of the WSIS, from the preparation to the first phase in Geneva to the 
second phase in Tunis, served as training and helped consolidate the governance model. 
It forced hundreds of diplomats, business people, civil society actors and technical 
specialists to interact during four years. In that context, governments progressively had 
to accept the undisputable competence, and therefore legitimacy and utility, of actors 
from business and civil society who had not only invented but built and managed the 
now-ubiquitous global Internet at a time when few governments were paying attention. 
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By the same token, civil society and business actors were forced to recognize that the 
complex new policy issues raised by the growing use of the Internet could not be 
addressed without some government involvement.98  
B. Consolidation	phase	
After WSIS, multistakeholderism enjoyed a period of expansion culminating in 2011 
with the so-called principles hype.  
One of the decisions made during the second phase of the WSIS was the creation of 
the Internet Governance Forum (“IGF”).99 The first IGF was held in Athens in 2006 
and has since been hosted in a different country every year. The IGF’s initial mandate 
of 5 years has been extended until 2025.  
The contribution of the IGF to the expansion of multistakeholderism in internet 
governance is indirect. Indeed, the IGF is not a forum for multistakeholder decision-
making. Instead, the IGF is a forum for multistakeholder dialogue. To some extent, 
multistakeholderism starts with the preparation of the IGF. The Multistakeholder 
Advisory Group (“MAG”), which as its name indicates is comprised of members from 
each stakeholder group, is in charge of advising the UN Secretary-General regarding 
																																																						
98 B. La Chapelle, Towards Multi-Stakeholder Governance – The Internet Governance Forum as Laboratory 260-
282, 260, in THE POWER OF IDEAS: INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER 
ENVIRONMENT (Wolfgang Kleinwachter ed. 2007). 
99 World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, ¶67 (WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)) (2005), http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf (last 
visited 5 November 2016).  
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programming and organization of the IGF. The MAG members are selected by the UN 
Secretary-General among candidates that are nominated (or nominate themselves) by 
the general public using an online form. The candidates are chosen so as to make the 
MAG the most representative of all internet interests and all regions of the world. The 
number of representatives from each stakeholder is left at the discretion of the UN 
Secretary-General. The central role played by the UN Secretary-General prior to the 
IGF undermines somewhat the multistakeholder nature of the preparation of the IGF. 
The IGF itself takes place over the course of a few days. Several events run in parallel, 
differing in size and style – more or less formal - providing plenty of opportunities for 
dialogue. Some of the meetings are organized by IGF participants, rather than by the 
MAG.   
Like WSIS, which La Chapelle argued was good exposure of all stakeholders to 
multistakeholderism, the IGF contributes to forming new habits and new relationships 
among stakeholders, far from the intergovernmental processes that those actors may 
have been used to. From the point of view of content, the IGF contributes to the 
development and spread of ideas by organizing discussions on a wide range of topics, 
including multistakeholderism. Though the IGF meets globally only once a year, 
regional fora have been created to prepare contributions to the global IGF. For 
instance, at the European level, the European Dialogue on Internet Governance was 
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set up by the Council of Europe, ICANN, the Internet Society and others to continue 
the multistakeholder dialogue in between each IGF meeting.   
After the IGF took off, multistakeholderism spread to various international 
organizations. There was at first a few declarations of support for this model of 
governance. For instance, the OECD committed to a multistakeholder approach in its 
Declaration for the Future of the Internet Economy100 and the Council of Europe 
expressed its support for a “multistakeholder, democratic and transparent governance 
with the participation of all interested groups in society,”101 making the WSIS definition 
of internet governance its own.  
This was followed by what is commonly referred to as the “internet principles hype,”102 
in which multistakeholderism figures prominently. Kleinwächter coined this catchy 
phrase to describe those busy months of 2011 when several governments, usually within 
the framework of an international organization (OECD, Council of Europe, or Group 
of 8), adopted various sets of guidelines for the governance of the internet (6 drafts, of 
																																																						
100 OECD, The Seoul Declaration for the Future of the Internet Economy (18 June 2008), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/40839436.pdf (last visited on 12 February 2016).  
101 Council of Europe, First Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media and New Communication Services of 
28-29 May 2009, Report by the Secretary-General, ¶13 (CM (2009)143) (2009), 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805d089e (last visited 5 
November 2016). 
 
102 W. Kleinwächter, Internet Principle Hype: How Soft Law is Used to Regulate the Internet (2011), .NXT, 
http://news.dot-nxt.com/2011/07/27/internet-principle-hype-anon (last visited on 18 July 2013). 
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which 4 were adopted from May to September 2011).103 The negative connotation of 
the term “hype,” which suggests exaggeration and excessiveness, is not entirely justified.  
Table 2: Internet Principles Hype 
 
ENTITY 
 
DOCUMENT 
 
STATUS 
Group of 8  Declaration of the Group of 8 in Deauville, on May 26-27, 
2011 titled “Un nouvel élan pour la liberté et la démocratie 
”104  
Adopted by heads of states and 
governments on May 26-27, 2011 
EU Draft “Compact for the Internet“ presented in June 2011 by 
Vice-President of European Commission, in charge of digital 
agenda105 
Being considered by Vice-President of 
European Commission, in charge of 
digital agenda 
OECD Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy-Making106  Adopted on June 28-29, 2011 by 
OECD members, Egypt and 
stakeholders, including the Business 
and Industry Advisory Committee to 
the OECD (BIAC) and the Internet 
Technical Community (ITAC)  
UN International Code of Conduct for Information Security 
submitted by Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the 
UN Secretary-General on September 12, 2011 for 
consideration at the UN General Assembly.107 
Not adopted.  
																																																						
103 This section is adapted from A.C. Jamart, Internet Freedom and the Constitutionalization of Internet 
Governance 57-76, THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE (Roxana Radu et al. ed 
2013). 
104 Group of 8, Un nouvel élan pour la liberté et la démocratie (26-27 May 2011), 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Declaration_G8_Generale_20110527.pdf (last visited 
on 30 August 2016). 
105 N. Kroes, I propose a "Compact for the Internet", EUROPEAN COMMISSION (28 June 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/kroes/en/blog/i-propose-a-compact-for-
the-internet.html (last visited on 30 August 2016).  
106 OECD, Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy-Making (28-29 June 2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/49258588.pdf (last visited on 30 August 2016).  
107 RCTU, Proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security (12 September 2011), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm (last visited on 29 August 2016) and 
Amended Proposal (9 January 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-
150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf (last visited on 5 November 2016). Note that the Proposal was 
amended so as to incorporate comments in 2015. However, its position on multistakeholderism 
remains unchanged. See Amended Proposal (9 January 2015), 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf (last visited on 
5 November 2016). 
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ENTITY 
 
DOCUMENT 
 
STATUS 
Council of 
Europe 
Declaration on Internet Governance Principles108  Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on September 21, 2011 
UN Proposal for a United Nations Committee for Internet-
Related Policies submitted by India, with the support of 
Brazil and South Africa, to the UN General Assembly on 
October 26, 2011109 
Not adopted  
 
Regardless of the merits of the principles, these various initiatives show a sense of 
urgency on the part of the drafters and signatories, who are trying to entrench a 
particular vision of internet governance in the form of principles. Two competing views 
emerge, one that supports multistakeholderism and one that either rejects or downplays 
it.  
In the latter camp, we find proposals by Russia, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
(RCTU) on the one hand and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) on the other hand. 
Though both their proposals see intergovernmental oversight as the solution to their 
concerns, they are significantly different in tone and motives. The IBSA proposal is 
offered in response to a report prepared by the UN Secretary-General on enhanced 
cooperation among governments on internet-related policy issues. Its starting point is 
																																																						
108 Council of Europe, Declaration on Internet Governance Principles (21 September 2011), 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cc2f6 (last visited on 
30 August 2016).  
109 IBSA, Proposal for a United Nations Committee for Internet-Related Policies (26 October 2011), 
http://itforchange.net/sites/default/files/ITfC/india_un_cirp_proposal_20111026.pdf (last visited 
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that many critical internet-related issues are not adequately addressed because of a lack 
of a global policy-making mechanism that would be “open, democratic, inclusive and 
participatory manner, with the participation of all stakeholders.”110 The creation of a 
UN Committee for Internet-Related Policies (CIRP) would fill this void. CIRP’s 
members would be states only, though other internet stakeholders would be able to give 
advice via advisory bodies. The negotiation of treaties on internet policy would be a big 
part of the CIRP’s tasks. On the contrary, the RCTU’s main concern is information 
security, understood as states’ right to protect their “information space and critical 
information infrastructure.”111 This is an assertion of states’ sovereignty over the 
internet. The RCTU proposal, an International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security, starts by demanding compliance with the UN Charter as well as “universally 
recognized norms governing international relations, which enshrine, inter alia, respect 
for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states.”112 The 
commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms only comes later. The Code also 
proposes to assist in the creation of a “multilateral, transparent and democratic 
international management of the internet”113 without giving more details as to what 
such mechanism would look like. The adjective “multilateral” seems to refer to 
																																																						
110 Id. at 2.  
111 RCTU, Proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security, 4 (12 September 2011), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t858978.htm (last visited on 29 August 2016) and 
Amended Proposal (9 January 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-
150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf (last visited on 5 November 2016). 
112 Id. at 4. 
113 Id. at 4. 
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traditional intergovernmental mechanisms, a conclusion that is strengthened by the 
failure to mention non-state actors – the term “stakeholder” does not appear – other 
than in connection with their duty to ensure information security.  
In the former group, we find mostly Western democracies, with the US leading the 
charge, though a few non-Western countries, like Egypt, signed on to the OECD 
principles as observers. In those instruments, the emphasis is on substantive issues, like 
freedoms and rights and net neutrality and due process. Procedurally, 
multistakeholderism is professed as a norm, though in practice the principles 
themselves may not have resulted from a truly multistakeholder process. For instance, 
despite being involved in the negotiations from the beginning, the Civil Society 
Information Society Advisory Council to the OECD (CSISAC) ultimately refused to 
sign the declaration and claimed that governments had imposed their point of view, in 
particular regarding the balance struck between the protection of intellectual property 
rights and freedom of speech.114 A similar problem was seen at the eG8, the Group of 
8 Summit on the Internet in 2011, which came under fire for not opening up to civil 
society.115  
																																																						
114 CSISAC, Civil Society Coalition Declines to Endorse OECD Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy-
Making, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE (28 June 2011), https://www.piac.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/csisac_press_release_0628011_final_1.pdf (last visited on 7 November 
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115 La Quadrature du Net et al., Civil Society Statement to the eG8 and G8 (24 May 2011), 
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/civil-society-statement-to-the-e-g8-and-g8-0 (last visited on 4 
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The “internet principles hype” may thus be seen as a PR coup, a public declaration of 
support for multistakeholderism aimed at building multistakeholderism into a pillar of 
internet governance. However, the term remains undefined, the behavior of the parties 
involved in the negotiation of the principles does not suggest the existence of a shared 
understanding of what multistakeholderism entails in practice, and there is a fierce 
opposition to a reading of multistakeholderism that goes beyond granting an advisory 
role to non-state actors. Despite being associated with human rights and other 
progressive notions such as internet freedom, the intrinsic value of multistakeholderism 
remains undetermined. All that multistakeholderism seems to stand for is opposition to 
a certain form of intergovernmental control of the internet. 
C. Reaffirmation	of	support	in	reaction	to	perceived	threats		
2012 saw tensions around the topic of multistakeholderism surge again, with the 
proponents of multistakeholderism accusing the other side of fomenting a “UN 
internet takeover.” The UN takeover claim first appeared in 2005, during the Tunis 
phase of WSIS, when the US was fending off the European Union’s attempt to shift 
oversight of ICANN, the entity in charge of the domain name system, from the US 
government to a UN body. As Mueller explained, the European initiative was described 
by its opponents as a UN takeover of the internet.116 The feud finally ended with the 
US keeping its oversight of ICANN but agreeing to open up discussions on policy to 
																																																						
116 M. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
(2011), 75. 
 	 71 
all governments. As we have seen above, the “UN internet takeover” claim resurfaced 
at the WCIT in Dubai in December 2012.  
A concern often expressed by the anti-treaty is that an international organization with 
a quasi-universal membership like the United Nations would generate agreements ab 
minima, on the basis of the lowest common denominator. Any oversight of internet 
governance by the UN, and more generally by any intergovernmental body, would 
necessarily result in increased control and decreased freedom of the internet and 
internet users. As Assistant Secretary Posner declared, reacting to the idea of the United 
Nations getting involved in internet governance:  
We have, I think, a range of anxieties about throwing this issue and many others 
into the United Nations. We believe in the United Nations; it has a lot of 
important roles to play. But we have great trepidation that if this became a UN-
sponsored initiative, all of the most – all of the governments that have the 
greatest interest in regulating and controlling content and protecting against 
dissident speech in their own countries would be very loud voices. So I think 
we’re looking for alternatives that provide some form of governance but in a 
broader sense, without the race to the bottom.117  
The US Senate and House of Representatives had adopted even before the WCIT a 
concurrent resolution reaffirming the policy of the US in favor of a multistakeholder 
model of governance .118 
																																																						
117 M. H. Posner, Conversations with America: The State Department's Internet Freedom Strategy, US 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (18 February 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/rm/2011/157089.htm 
(last visited on 15 February 2016).  
118 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding actions to preserve and 
advance the multistakeholder governance model under which the Internet has thrived, S. Con. Res. 
50, 112th Congress (2012). 
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Multistakeholderism is a convenient tool to fend off intergovernmental initiatives on 
internet issues while not undermining intergovernmental processes in other areas. It is 
admittedly difficult to reject governance models that rely on the UN and equality among 
states. This is the very model that has been accepted as the legitimate way of conducting 
international affairs, including by those now rejecting it for internet matters. So 
multistakeholderism makes a narrow claim: when it comes to the internet, it is more 
legitimate than top-down intergovernmental mechanisms. Multistakeholderism in 
particular prevents control of the internet by governments, a concern expressed by 
Posner above. Though multistakeholderism remains undefined, there is an emerging 
understanding of what it is not. What it cannot accommodate is top-down 
intergovernmental mechanisms. The phrase “UN internet takeover” suggests that the 
internet already belongs to one model and that the involvement of the UN would 
modify the model. It implies that a particular model, the multistakeholder model, is 
firmly entrenched. However, multistakeholderism is far from being the only model in 
current internet governance.119 Actually, the “UN internet takeover” claim begs the 
question: taking over from whom? This question is never explicitly answered. 
Maintaining some amount of vagueness discourages possible challenges to the existing 
system.  
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The campaign against intergovernmental control of internet governance did not 
decrease in the wake of the summit. In February 2013, the House of Representatives’ 
Energy and Commerce Committee held a hearing with a very explicit title: “Fighting 
for Internet Freedom: Dubai and Beyond.”120 Among the witnesses was FCC 
Commissioner McDowell, who painted a very dire picture of internet governance, 
conveying that the internet is under serious and imminent threats and that the US is 
fairly lonely in its fight for internet freedom. The House went on to approve an 
“internet freedom bill”121 in May 2013, which declared that the official policy of the US 
was to support a multistakeholder control of internet governance.122 As for the ITU, its 
member states adopted resolutions in 2014 declaring that the ITU will steer clear of 
internet governance, except for narrowly defined topics.123  
D. The	latest	test:	the	IANA	transition	
The US government’s decision in March 2014124 to end its residual role in the DNS has 
been unanimously welcomed by foreign governments, international organizations, civil 
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society and the private sector alike. The US government made it abundantly clear that 
it would only consider a full transition to an entity that would be truly multistakeholder 
in nature, and expressly stated that it would “not accept a proposal that replaces the 
NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution.”125 
It is uncertain whether the cheerful reactions to the NTIA announcement that poured 
in from all over the world can be construed as support for the termination of the US’ 
preferred role in the management of the DNS, however symbolic, or a whole-hearted 
support for multistakeholderism.  
Shortly after the US government’s announcement regarding the DNS, the “Global 
Multi-Stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet” (“NETmundial”) was convened 
at the invitation of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (“CGI.br”). The 
NETmundial gathered representatives of governments, civil society, the private sector, 
the technical community and academia. The NETmundial produced two documents: 
the Internet Governance Principles and the Roadmap for the Future Evolution of the 
Internet Governance Ecosystem.126 Among the Principles figures multistakeholderism. 
The definition does not go much farther than that of the decade-old WSIS, though it 
specifies that participation of all stakeholders must be “meaningful and accountable” 
and that the “respective roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be interpreted 
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in a flexible manner with reference to the issue under discussion.” Furthermore, the 
Roadmap provides that there should be more discussions on the roles of each 
stakeholder, “including the meaning and application of equal footing.” This shows that 
there was at a minimum a consensus that equal footing of all stakeholders might be the 
way forward.  
The proposal on the IANA transition developed by ICANN and recently accepted by 
the NTIA has not gone fully in the direction of equal footing for all stakeholders. As 
we shall see below in Chapter 7, it operates a revamping of multistakeholder processes 
within ICANN, with increased power granted to the internet community, including 
states, but falls short of equal multistakeholderism. 
After having reviewed the turbulent history of multistakeholderism, it is useful to 
provide an overview of what we know, and do not know, about multistakeholderism.  
Section	2:	Sketching	the	contours	of	multistakeholderism		
As we have seen, several organizations have set out to implement some form of 
multistakeholderism but this has not translated into the further substantiation of the 
term, or the identification of the minimum requirements to be met in order to qualify 
as multistakeholder. Many, if not most, intergovernmental processes could qualify as 
multistakeholder if multistakeholderism were to be understood as requiring nothing 
more than some form of involvement of non-state stakeholders, for instance as 
observers. This observation of Cammaerts and Padovani in 2006 is still very relevant a 
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decade later: “Different actors hold very different perspectives as to how stakeholders 
should be conceived, who is to be included and who is excluded and how their 
interaction should lead to information exchange, deliberation or decision.”127 So is 
everything multistakeholderism? Do we know it when we see it? What is the essence of 
multistakeholderism? 
Based on the history of multistakeholderism above, we shall attempt to paint a portrait 
of multistakeholderism in internet governance, highlighting the unknowns.  
A. The	cast	
The WSIS Outcome Documents themselves do not reflect a clear agreement as to the 
identity of internet stakeholders. In most places, the list of stakeholders includes not 
only states, the private sector and civil society, but also intergovernmental 
organizations. As for the technical community and academia, they are not stakeholders 
in and of themselves but are subsumed under other categories. It is worth noting here 
that the composition of the WGIG tilted in favor of government officials, including 
from countries with dubious internet freedom practices like Saudi Arabia or China.128 
Underrepresented were “large Internet users (e.g. corporations relying on the internet 
for financial and business transactions and basic operations); private sector companies 
																																																						
127 B. Cammaerts et al., Theoretical Reflections on Multi-Stakeholderism in Global Policy Processes: the WSIS as 
a Learning Space, Paper presented at the IAMCR Conference (2006). 
128 M. Raymond et al., Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate Global Institution, 7 INT’L THEO. 
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involved in provisioning Internet products or providing infrastructure; or any 
representatives from the leading standards setting and administrative entities 
operationally responsible for the security and stability of the Internet.” This might 
explain the fact that the technical community, which had presided over the birth and 
development of the internet, was mentioned almost as an afterthought, while 
governments and international organizations secured a more prominent spot.  
However, in one place, namely Point 34 of the Tunis Agenda, the WSIS Outcome 
Documents clearly express support for a tripartite form of multistakeholderism, that 
involves governments, the private sector and civil society, “in their respective roles.” 
As we have seen above in Section 1, this is the part of the WSIS Outcome Documents 
that has stuck over time. States, the private sector and civil society have become the 
classic internet stakeholders. International organizations have been completely removed 
from the multistakeholder formula. International organizations may convene meetings 
in which the three stakeholders will participate (like the OECD or the Council of 
Europe for instance) but their role is that of organizers, hosts and facilitators, not of 
stakeholders.  
Though it may seem straightforward, the tripartite definition raises issues. For instance, 
ICANN’s organigram does not follow the simple states, private sector and civil society 
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division suggested in the classic definition of multistakeholderism.129 Governments, 
who participate in ICANN through the Governmental Advisory Committee (“GAC”), 
can give advice to the Board on all ICANN activities and the Board has the duty to give 
reasons whenever it decides to disregard GAC advice.130 This prerogative places the 
GAC in a privileged position over other stakeholders. The private sector and civil 
society do not actually make decisions but are involved in developing policies and may 
offer advice to the Board. In terms of composition, there are different versions of the 
private sector and civil society depending on the topic. Indeed, ICANN has tried and 
identified which subset of the private sector and civil society, respectively, may be 
affected in each area of activity and has institutionalized those subsets and granted them 
certain prerogatives. For instance, in matters related to generic top level domain 
names131 (“gTLDs”), the private sector is represented by the registrars, registries and 
commercial users subsets, while civil society is represented by the subset that owns at 
least one domain name. The only time when civil society acts as a whole and not as a 
subset is when it appoints board members.132 This highly sui generis breakdown of 
stakeholder categories makes sense as it seems somewhat unrealistic to expect each 
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130 ICANN, Bylaws, Article XI, Section 2(j) (11 February 2016), 
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stakeholder category to be animated by the same goals and think alike. But this raises 
issues. How narrowly or broadly should interests be defined? Here, going back to the 
origins of the concept of “stakeholder” might not be as helpful as one might hope. 
Indeed, the management literature is still debating the pros and cons of a narrow vs. 
broad vs. middle ground definition. If stakeholders are those who can affect or are 
affected by a certain decision, then the question arises how to define “affected.” Is it 
directly affected or could a stakeholder be only indirectly affected? Should interests be 
pre-determined in abstracto or should they be defined as issues arise by inviting all 
affected parties to join? A related question is the relative power within one category. 
For instance, registries and registrars are both subcategories of the private sector 
category. Should each subset be granted the same rights as the other categories that may 
not have been further divided? Or should all the private sector subsets, for instance, 
“share” the rights granted to the private sector? ICANN has selected the former, giving 
equal power to each subset, irrespective of the stakeholder group to which they belong. 
This has lead to the private sector subsets to outnumber the civil society subset.  
B. The	scenario	
Once we know, at least in theory, who the stakeholders are, how to figure out what 
each does? What is their relationship? Or relying on WSIS’s definition of internet 
governance, what are their respective roles?  
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The Tunis Agenda at Point 31 sketches an allocation of roles among stakeholders. The 
(non)operative word in the definition is the noun “role.” The definition generously 
grants many actors “a role”, without specifying the type of role, whether it is a role as 
an observer, a consultative role, a decision-making role, an exclusive or shared role… 
For instance, it is hard to conceive how the “role” of civil society could be more 
undetermined. It does not even go in the details of what “internet matters” civil society 
has been involved in, contrary to what the WGIG had attempted to do. 
This allocation essentially relies on a technical/economic vs. policy dichotomy. Policy 
is the dominion of states while the technical and economic decisions are left to the 
private sector. As for civil society, it has a role at the “community level.” This latter 
phrase suggests involvement on the ground, locally, which seems to ignore the existence 
of internationally organized NGOs with a wholly different agenda.  
The policy vs. technical/economic dichotomy is fallacious. For instance, ICANN 
routinely makes policy decisions of great impact that cannot be seen as exclusively 
technical. ICANN was initially conceived as a purely technical body. For that reason, it 
was deemed unnecessary to include any reference to human rights. The NTIA White 
Paper that outlined the position of the government regarding the transition of the 
management of the DNS to the private sector, including the creation of the entity that 
was to become ICANN, proclaimed that “[e]xisting human rights and free speech 
protections will not be disturbed and, therefore, need not be specifically included in the 
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core principles for DNS management.”133 Needless to say, this assumption turned out 
to be wrong. Technical choices always require policy choices to be made. The internet 
is no exception, as DeNardis showed. Even a relatively obscure and seemingly wholly 
technical decision such as the choice of the protocol for addressing (IPv6) proved to 
be highly political and the result of intense political transactions.134  
As for the rest of the definition, it is an understatement to say that it lacks specificity. 
This does not deter La Chapelle, who argues that “in their respective roles” does not 
mean that the stakeholders should be assigned distinct roles.135 According to him, the 
stakeholders are jointly responsible.136 His interpretation seems unsupported by the text 
of the Tunis Agenda, which clearly supports the idea that each stakeholder has a specific 
area of competence. For La Chapelle, however, a comprehensive approach to internet 
governance, which would include technical, economic, social and political facets of a 
given matter early on in the decision-making process, is necessary and requires the 
involvement of all stakeholders. Likewise, he believes that because of the architecture 
of the internet, the implementation of decisions requires the participation of various 
stakeholders. To have all the relevant stakeholders on board would require their prior 
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involvement in the decision-making process.137 “Defining transparent, non-
discriminatory rules to identify ‘relevant’ stakeholders for each issue will be delicate. But 
the basic principle of multi-stakeholderism is the fundamental right of any actor to 
participate, in an appropriate manner, in the governance process by addressing issues 
they are concerned with or impacted by.”138 This begs the question: what is an 
“appropriate manner”? Another set of issues regards the decision-making process. How 
would decisions be made in a multistakeholder environment? What kind of majority 
would be required? Or would we need unanimity?      
Overall, many features of multistakeholderism remain blurry. Only one thing is 
becoming clearer over time. Multistakeholderism is irreconcilable with purely 
intergovernmental decision-making, by which I mean a model of governance in which 
only governments would have decision-making power. This was the gist of the IBSA’s 
proposal to set up a CIRP. Decisions would have been made by governments with other 
stakeholders, namely civil society, the private sector, international organizations and the 
technical/academic community, involved as mere advisors. This was also what was 
perceived to be at stake at the WCIT. The reaction was swift and strong. 55 out of the 
133 member states – mostly Western democracies led by the US – refused to sign the 
ITRs, even after they were revised so as not to mention the internet. A coalition of 
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NGOs and tech companies joined the opposition. For instance, Google started a 
petition that has now been signed by almost three million people. It argued that “[a] 
free and open world depends on a free and open Internet. Governments alone, working 
behind closed doors, should not direct its future. The billions of people around the 
globe who use the Internet should have a voice.”139 Beyond this feature, which once 
again, is not universally accepted, it is hard to define multistakeholderism.  
C. The	genre	
Multistakeholderism is not neutral but has been associated with certain values. As we 
have just seen, one of these values – the prohibition on exclusively intergovernmental 
decision-making - has been transformed by some into a standard defining what is and 
what is not multistakeholderism. IBSA’s proposal of setting up a CIRP is interesting in 
that respect. The goal was to provide a forum for multistakeholderism. But the goal was 
reached by placing states at the center.  
Multistakeholderism has generally been associated with progressive values, notably 
internet freedom. Internet freedom is a rather elusive notion that combines both a 
substantive human-rights based content with some procedural principles such as 
multistakeholderism. It sounds promising. “By promoting a certain governance model 
as most compatible with widely resonant norms like ‘freedom,’ ‘privacy,’ ‘democracy,’ 
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‘equality,’ and ‘political self-determination,’ opposition to multistakeholderism becomes 
synonymous with opposition to those norms and leaves little room for alternative 
views.”140 Certain progressive values often associated with multistakeholderism are 
“openness, inclusiveness and transparency of processes. The fact that everyone can 
participate in a process and make their voice heard makes the process multistakeholder 
by nature.” This approach leaves the decision-making out of the picture. It seems that 
the ultimate decision-making may be left to one stakeholder without undermining the 
multistakeholder nature of the process if other conditions are met (those conditions 
being vague).141 Is that right? 
To summarize, we do not know: 
• Who decides who decides? And why? 
• Who decides? And why? How do we overcome democratic legitimacy issues with 
civil society or the private sector?  
• The definition of stakeholder seems to be issue-specific. But how do you define 
an issue? How do you draw the line? 
• What is the relationship among stakeholders? Could there be a hierarchy and if 
so, when? Or must they all be equal? How are decisions made? 
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• What is the legitimacy of the stakeholder model? Why not direct democracy, 
direct representation? In an era where state interposition in international law is 
more and more called into question, it could seem outdated –but possibly 
necessary - to once again channel individual interests via states, or civil society 
organizations.  
The answer to the question of the real identity of multistakeholderism is as of yet 
lacking. Multistakeholderism à la internet is basically an empty shell, making it even 
more useful (and more likely to be abused) as a strategic rhetorical tool. Being clearer 
about the reasons why we have multistakeholderism in internet governance would help 
us answer those fundamental questions.   
The idea of multistakeholderism is widely, but not universally, accepted although, or 
perhaps precisely because, it is not substantiated and there are a lot of uncertainties that 
allow actors to practice multistakeholderism without truly changing the power 
dynamics. A solution would be to adopt a very broad definition of multistakeholderism 
that would cover a lot of practices. For instance, DeNardis and Raymond show that 
there is a wide range of practices that meet their definition of multistakeholderism, “two 
or more classes of actors engaged in a common governance enterprise concerning issues 
they regard as public in nature, and characterized by polyarchic authority relations 
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constituted by procedural rules.”142 This definition does not prescribe a specific 
relationship between the actors, nor does it explain the legitimacy of this kind of 
arrangements. Such a definition, as the authors themselves recognize, “leaves open the 
empirical question whether there is, in fact, a single distinctive kind of relations between 
actors typical of cases commonly described as multistakeholder.”143 Some actually 
suggest that multistakeholderism is not so much a new governance model with a 
significant redistribution of powers among stakeholders but a novel way of 
consolidating existing governance arrangements under an appealing new name.144 
“[T]he lack of diversity in debates about Internet governance signal the potential for 
multi-stakeholderism to become ‘a rhetorical exercise aimed at neutralizing criticism’ 
rather than a truly unique and participatory mechanism for governing a global 
resource.”  
There is a new trend that consists in qualifying multistakeholderism by adding 
adjectives, signaling that multistakeholderism in itself does not mean much: meaningful 
multistakeholderism,145 equal multistakeholderism, or democratic 
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multistakeholderism.146 Is that enough? “As governments increasingly turn to Internet 
governance technologies like protocols and the Domain Name System for content 
control – whether good or bad – (…) there is increasing interest in gaining more formal 
jurisdiction for controlling these infrastructures.”147 It is therefore urgent to define the 
roles of the stakeholders and dig deeper than the shallow surfaces at which we are 
currently swimming.   
Section	3:	Why	multistakeholderism? 
The existence of multistakeholderism has been justified in many different ways, which 
we are going to look at now. This overview will show that there are still some important 
questions to answer. 	
A. History	
Some may at times be tempted to argue that multistakeholderism – the involvement of 
all stakeholders in the decision-making via a bottom-up process - is how internet 
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governance has always taken place – or is the closest to the way it has always been 
governed.148  
In her history of the internet, Abbate describes the innovative management style at 
DARPA that prevailed during the birth of the internet and was seen as the key to the 
successful development of this new technology.149 The management style was actually 
making the most of the innovative features of the design of the network. For instance, 
the technical decision to introduce layering. Layering can be described  as “dividing 
complex networking tasks into modular building blocks.”150 To each building block 
corresponds a narrowly defined function (for instance, package the data in data packets, 
or route the data packets). Once a simple set of rules for joining the blocks together has 
been set, it is easy to build a coherent system even though many are involved in the 
process. Layering thus facilitated the involvement of many teams of computer scientists, 
who could work on their own on specific parts of the project without too big a risk of 
inconsistencies.  Furthermore, the existence of the network eased communication 
among those teams, keeping coordination from becoming cumbersome. Management 
during the development stage of the internet was thus characterized by decentralization 
																																																						
148 See e.g. in academia C. Schaller et al., Internet Governance and the ITU: Maintaining the Multistakeholder 
Approach, The German Perspective, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (22 October 2014), 
http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/internet-governance-itu-maintaining-multistakeholder-
approach/p33654 (last visited 23 February 2016). In the private sector, see e.g. ARIN, Internet 
Governance and the Multistakeholder Approach (2014), https://www.arin.net/knowledge/ig_factsheet.pdf 
(last visited 23 February 2016).  
149 J. ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999), 54.  
150 Id. 
 	 89 
and a collaborative environment in which technical decisions were made by consensus. 
This management style has survived the expansion of the internet. Technical decisions 
about the development of the internet are made by groups whose membership is open 
to anyone so that all interested parties can get involved (though participants must act in 
their individual capacity and not as representative of companies or governments). The 
fact that decisions are made by “rough consensus” ensures that everybody’s opinions 
are heard and taken into account.  
The role of governments -  to the exclusion of the US government, which was directly 
involved via DARPA - was very indirect, by regulating the tech companies within their 
jurisdiction that would provide services at the physical layer level. Governments were 
mostly left out of the internet, which once again at the time was a research project and 
tool rather than the medium of great political, economic and social importance that it 
is today.  
The reality was that a plurality of actors was involved and would make decisions as and 
when required, rather informally, in a piecemeal fashion. This was only possible because 
not a single government had control over the whole internet. It was also possible 
because the stakes did not seem that high. Otherwise, how to believe that the 
governments would have left it alone? Belief in market, as well as strong diplomatic 
pressure, would eventually lead the US government to let the internet go.  
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In the end, the sum of all these decisions by researchers, tech companies, and a few 
decisions made by the US government made up early internet governance. Many argue 
that there is no reason for the internet to be governed in any other way since this model 
succeeded in turning a research project and tool into a global medium for social, 
economic, and political activities.  
This view would equate multistakeholderism with piecemeal, decentralized, 
uncoordinated decision-making by a wide variety of actors who are directly affected by 
the internet: the researchers that need it to conduct their research, the tech companies 
that provide services related to the internet. However, this does not fit in with the WSIS 
definition of multistakeholderism as two important pieces are missing: civil society and 
governments. How can civil society’s status as a stakeholder be justified as it was not 
historically involved in creating or running the internet, unless we consider the 
community of computer scientists part of civil society? Even if we were to do so, civil 
society in general cannot be reduced to the technical community. Similarly, what about 
governments’ involvement? The understanding of multistakeholderism promoted here 
is closer to regulation by the private sector and the technical community, to the 
exclusion of the people and governments, a far cry from the WSIS definition. As for 
legitimizing multistakeholderism, it falls short. Saying that “this is how things have 
always been done” hardly constitutes legitimate ground for multistakeholderism to rest 
on.  
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B. Necessity			
Necessity is often invoked as the justification for multistakeholderism. Necessity comes 
in different flavors, however, depending on what aspect of the internet you decide to 
focus on. Indeed, this line of arguments relies on technological determinism and define 
necessity by reference to certain features of the internet.  
A common argument among technical circles is that multistakeholderism is necessary 
because of the way the internet is designed. Specifically, multistakeholderism is 
mandated by the architecture of the internet itself. Its distributed nature and the fact 
that only few, though crucial, functions are centralized, seems to suggest that 
centralization, in the form of governmental power and top-down models of 
governance, are inadequate. Gatekeepers, in the form of a hierarchy or states, are 
incompatible with the design of the internet. On the internet, users can easily become 
“producers,” as they do not have the need to ask permissions before improving, 
innovating, creating. This empowering aspect of the internet, even though it may remain 
only theory for the vast majority of internet users, has created a different ethos: an open 
internet in which everybody has a say. This is for instance an idea that Google relied on 
in its petition against WCIT: “Internet policy should work like the Internet — open and 
inclusive.”151 By bringing together all spheres of society, multistakeholderism is 
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accomplishing just that: it brings everybody to the table, in theory not leaving anyone 
behind.  
Others emphasize the fact that for it to work properly, the internet requires the 
collaboration of many players, so much so that governments alone would not be able 
to make the internet work. DeNardis and Raymond underline that  
private companies, or private not-for profit corporations, play a considerable role 
in keeping the Internet operational. Private Internet registries like VeriSign 
oversee generic top-level domains. Individuals working for private companies 
contribute to standards-setting processes like the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), which has established the bulk of core Internet protocols, and the 
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which developed the 
Wi-Fi family of standards, among others. Network operators carry out network 
management tasks and respond to security problems on their private networks. 
Telecommunications carriers enter private contractual agreements to 
interconnect. Social media set privacy policies to which users must agree before 
using these services. This privatization of oversight is a dominant feature of how 
Internet governance has evolved in practice.152  
Desai, the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Internet Governance, added 
that “the Net is a product of partnerships and therefore its management has to reflect 
a modality of cooperation between stakeholders who normally operate on different 
sides of the fences that define the traditional structures of governance and of the market 
economy.”153It is only normal that the governance structure reflects that state of affairs. 
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In a similar vein, it is often argued that classic governmental processes would be too 
slow to adapt to the fast-paced internet. Ira Magaziner, a policy adviser for President 
Clinton who was instrumental in the commercialization of the internet, wrote that “[w]e 
believe that the Internet as it develops needs a different type of coordination structure 
than has been typical for international institutions in the industrial age. Governmental 
processes and intergovernmental processes by definition work too slowly and 
somewhat too bureaucratically for the pace and flexibility of this new information 
age.”154 The fast-paced internet environment requires equally fast-paced modifications 
of applicable rules, so as not to create unnecessary hurdles to the development of the 
internet.  
The problem, however, with this approach is that it mostly justifies the involvement of 
the private sector – not so much of governments and not at all of civil society. 
Therefore, it only legitimizes the private sector’s role within multistakeholderism. 
Unless we accept that the legitimacy of multistakeholderism can be cumulative and 
result from various sources, necessity does not legitimize multistakeholderism.   
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C. Power		
Other accounts of the rise of multistakeholderism in internet governance shed a very 
different light. For instance, Chenou argues that multistakeholderism was first 
introduced in internet governance discussions in the 1990s so as to “manufacture” 
consent155 around internet governance arrangements proposed by a “power elite.”156 
This power elite comprised “the technical/scientific elite that had managed the Internet 
before its commercialization in the early 1990s,”157 the “corporate elite”158 with large 
telecom companies, computer manufacturers and intellectual property owners, “the US 
political elite, represented by the National Telecommunication and Information 
Authority (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce and the Internet Czar, Ira 
Magaziner,”159 and the “non-US political elite” with inter alia the EU Commission, the 
OECD or WIPO.160 Likewise, Carr argues that argues that “multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance serves largely to reinforce existing power relations rather than disrupt them. 
Specifically, the multi-stakeholder model in Internet governance privileges the interests 
of those actors that were instrumental in establishing it.”161  
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This reading of multistakeholderism underlines that we should not view the first 
implementations of multistakeholderism as significant for the purpose of determining 
what multistakeholderism should be. To that extent, it goes against the history and 
necessity accounts of the legitimacy of multistakeholderism. It also explains why civil 
society’s position within multistakeholderism is the most uncertain. Civil society is not 
part of the “power elite.”   
If power plays account for the emergence of multistakeholderism in the 1990’s, does it 
account for what multistakeholderism is now? Multistakeholderism has had a life of its 
own, to a large extent escaping its creators. If a new term is introduced without any 
meaning, it should not come as a surprise that someone somewhere will find it necessary 
to substantiate it at some stage. Multistakeholderism has been taken over, fiercely 
adopted by civil society to try and turn it into something more. Prominent members of 
the private sector are also on board.  This account informs us of the reason why we 
have multistakeholderism but does not address its legitimacy. Irrespective of how 
multistakeholderism came into being, it may or not be legitimate. 
D. Weberian	legitimacy		
Weber’s work on the sources of legitimacy has inspired several internet scholars, who 
were, like Post, trying to establish the legitimacy of a plurality of actors.162 Indeed, 
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Weber expands the sources of legitimacy beyond consent and beyond the state.163 For 
instance, Malcolm identifies sources of legitimacy for each of the stakeholders. The 
state relies on its territorial sovereignty and the democratic representation of citizens’ 
interests. The private sector derives its legitimacy from its “superior efficiency of free 
markets in the distribution of goods and services”164 and civil society, from expertise, 
or in Malcolm’s view, from its role in promotion of substantive values.165 Ketteman 
departs from Malcom with respect to civil society. He argues that justifying civil 
society’s status as a stakeholder by its expertise is incorrect as “it is premised upon the 
fallacious assumption that individuals, as a group, need to be especially legitimized to 
participate in governance process.”166 Ketteman’s central thesis is that international law 
is about human beings and that individuals’ participation in world affairs is of right, 
rather than being the exception. Which does not mean that anyone can participate in 
all internet governance matters. Rather, knowledge and representativeness justify the 
participation of a given individual in governance. “The legitimation potential of civil 
society draws from its role in aggregating and articulating opinions and acting as a filter 
and focal point of concerns common to individuals.”167 These sources of legitimacy are 
of equal importance. None of the stakeholders alone can claim to be legitimate.168 
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Because each entity is independently legitimate, the involvement of all of them is 
required to make governance legitimate.169   
What these authors underline is that multistakeholderism stands for non-exclusivity of 
legitimacy, in contrast with the classic model that saw states as monopolizing legitimacy 
at the international level. Weberian legitimacy provides a better framework for 
legitimacy, one that clearly embraces the coexistence of legitimate stakeholders. But 
Malcolm and Ketteman’s work raises many questions, including a deceivingly simple 
one: how do we know these forms of legitimacy are equal? that there is no other 
stakeholder out there that is equally legitimate?  
E. Consent	of	the	governed	
As we have seen above in Chapter 1, Section 1, many debates on legitimacy in internet 
governance have taken the form of a debate opposing the proponents of a state-
centered system on the one hand and the supporters of self-regulation on the other 
hand. For the former, the internet is a mere communication tool that has not 
fundamentally altered the sovereignty of states. For the latter, internet has created a new 
world to which the legitimacy of states does not extend. The consent of the governed 
is the source of the power to govern and the relevant individuals have not consented to 
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being governed by states. The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace epitomizes 
this viewpoint.  
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You 
have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know 
us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do 
not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. 
You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective 
action.170 
Post is thinking along similar lines. While we usually think exclusively of the state as the 
entity able to receive such consent, it does not have to be the case. We must recognize 
that other entities are equally strong candidates, especially since the consent theory on 
which state legitimacy is built is not unimpeachable. For one thing, as Brilmayer171 
explained, for the governed to give consent to a state requires that the borders of the 
states have already been defined, begging the question of who in the first place 
consented to that crucial determination. This paradox is well-known in the 
constitutional literature as the infinite regress issue. 
This logical flaw shakes the foundations of the territorial state and opens the door to 
other forms of governing, such as a-territorial governance. According to Post, 
cyberspace allows consent of the governed to truly become the source of power by 
getting rid of the incorrect territorial presumption. Only those who have consented are 
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bound by the governing entity’s decisions. How would this work in practice? How 
would we recognize that consent has been given if we drop the traditional frame of 
reference that assigns a large role to elections? The idea that the state is not the only 
possible recipient of the consent of the governed opens up possibilities and prompts 
Post to ask 
(1) Whether the state (as opposed to these alternative agents of collective action) 
is the institution best able to serve the agency role contemplated by the theory 
of Liberal sovereignty for a given population? and, (2) How we might recognize 
alternative delegations of "sovereignty" away from the state and toward these 
alternative institutional arrangements?172  
For Post, this theory, when applied to the internet, will lead to the rise of “decentralized 
and a-geographical lawmaking groups that do not impose order on the electronic world 
but through which order can emerge.”173 He argues that network access providers could 
be the relevant units of governance as the choice of a network access provider amounts 
to consent by the customer.174 The question that Post’s theory raises, from the 
multistakeholderism point of view, is whether individuals may consent to being 
concurrently governed by several entities (here states and civil society) or whether 
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consent can only be granted to a single entity. One of multistakeholderism’s challenges 
is that it requires an “and” approach, rather than an “either or” approach. Thus the 
focus on consent does not immediately provide legitimacy to multistakeholderism.  
In this Chapter, we have seen that multistakeholderism has started taking roots in 
internet governance. However, those roots are still fragile and resting on uncertain 
grounds. The reason is that multistakeholderism does not mean much, or rather that it 
means different things to different people. A decade after the word was first introduced, 
it remains unsubstantiated. The upside is that multistakeholderism is often invoked and 
has become a familiar figure in internet governance. Furthermore, some have taken it 
to heart to turn this trendy concept into reality. In particular, civil society has been 
consistently pushing for more multistakeholderism. This is not surprising. Of all three 
major stakeholders, civil society is the one that is in the most precarious position, being 
more of an outsider. Indeed, states, though latecomers, have relied on their historically 
exclusive role in international affairs and democratic legitimacy to claim their spot in 
internet governance, while the private sector’s practical role in the functioning of the 
internet has helped it to some extent. Civil society on the other hand is having a harder 
time asserting itself. To move from supporting multistakeholderism as a rhetorical tool 
to actually embracing multistakeholderism in practice, we need solid foundations. Who 
are the stakeholders? How do they act and interact? To be able to answer, we need to 
think about legitimacy in internet governance, and we need to think fast. Alternative 
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models of governance, in particular intergovernmental processes, are constantly being 
promoted. It would be so easy to fall back onto them. It is far more difficult to promote 
multistakeholderism and come up with a legitimacy rationale that not only supports 
multistakeholderism in a way that is acceptable to all but also integrates seamlessly with 
existing governance models, including state sovereignty at the domestic level.  
Some of the justifications for multistakeholderism offered so far have emphasized 
history or necessity but have failed to convince. The course of history may be changed 
and necessity is very subjective and malleable. We have learnt with Lessig that there is 
nothing “natural” about the internet and its design could be modified so as to create a 
new version of “necessity.” These models also lack reproducibility: their validity is 
limited to internet governance and as a result, less powerful. Weberian grounds for 
legitimacy do make room for all stakeholders but this room is not well-defined and 
leaves open the question of the relationships between stakeholders. As for revisiting the 
consent of the governed, it provides a potential ground for the legitimacy of non-state 
stakeholders, but may do too good a job at discrediting states. Overall, these models do 
not focus on the consequences of what is at the heart of multistakeholderism, that is to 
say non-exclusivity. Non-exclusivity requires unpacking the relationships among 
stakeholders and their respective legitimacy. Those questions must be answered before 
multistakeholderism can really establish itself as an alternative to intergovernmentalism 
and I propose to rely on global constitutionalism to start providing answers.  The next 
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two chapters thus take us away from the field of internet governance to focus on global 
constitutionalism.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEGITIMACY, CONSENT AND GLOBAL 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
In this chapter, I explain why I rely on the notion of global constituent power to 
approach the question of the legitimacy of multistakeholderism. I start by showing that 
global constitutionalism is essentially about democratic legitimacy, which obtains from 
the consent of the constituent power (Section 1). I then emphasize that for the 
legitimating mission of global constitutionalism to succeed, we need to rethink how 
consent happens, in all three dimensions: time, manner of the consent and most 
importantly identity of the consenter (Section 2). Finally, I use an example from internet 
governance to illustrate the fact that it may be seen as undergoing constitutionalization 
(Section 3).  
Section	1:	The	promise	of	democratic	legitimacy	at	the	heart	of	the	global	constitutional	
project 
 
First introduced by Alfred Verdross in the 1920’s, global constitutionalism has been 
gathering increasingly larger throngs of supporters since the early 1990s. This has been 
particularly true among European Union scholars who have looked to global 
constitutionalism to strengthen the conceptual foundations of the EU and its expanding 
powers. Global constitutionalism, generally speaking, is often portrayed as providing 
tools to increase legitimacy beyond the nation-state, for instance by “improv[ing] the 
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effectiveness and fairness of the international legal order,”175 or “placing limits on the 
activities of international organizations, subjecting those organizations to standards of 
proper behavior.”176 Global constitutionalism would also be the answer to the 
fragmentation of international law.177 Nevertheless, the benefits of global 
constitutionalism are not to be felt solely at the supranational level. Indeed, the 
globalization of more and more areas of life, from communication to trade, means that 
many such activities often fall outside of states’ reach. Global constitutionalism has the 
ability to “compensate” for the “de-constitutionalization” at state level.178 Thus global 
constitutionalism may be seen as complementing domestic constitutionalism, rather 
than competing against it. More rarely, however, is it mentioned that global 
constitutionalism offers the promise of self-government, which I believe is central to 
the global constitutional project. I shall thus focus on this contribution of global 
constitutionalism.   
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Simply put, global constitutionalism consists in taking constitutional ideas, values, 
frames of reference beyond the nation-state, where constitutionalism was born. This 
exercise raises many logistical questions. Which parts of constitutionalism do you keep? 
Which ones do you discard? But before even delving into those considerations, we must 
ask why. Why in the first place bringing constitutionalism to the global stage? Global 
constitutionalism can be viewed as a lens, among many other available lenses, through 
which to look at developments in international law. The engineers of global 
constitutionalism are scholars and there is no hard evidence that it is the right – or 
wrong for that matter – way of looking at the world. Global constitutionalism can 
contribute to supplying leads, tips, and answers to some difficult questions and guide 
further developments. Going back to the why of global constitutionalism, a short 
answer is legitimacy. Global constitutionalism comes with a legitimating mission. It 
provides a set of answers to shut down doubts that may arise concerning international 
law.  
Old controversies – is it even law? Do we have to obey it? – on the nature of 
international law aside, new phenomena have come to disrupt the traditional foundation 
of international law, which is state consent. This is a blow to the voluntarist framework 
that has been prevalent in international law. Voluntarism, first elaborated by Vattel and 
further developed by Moser and G.F. de Martens, posited that the law agreed upon by 
the states was not subordinated to natural law. It was a clear break from past visions of 
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international law which, if they did recognize the existence of a states-made law, made 
clear it was subordinated to natural law and only valid to the extent it was compatible 
with natural law. In this early version of voluntarism, states, by their consent, could 
modify natural law and decide how they would behave. This contractual vision of 
international law will gradually be radicalized, with the complete eviction of natural law 
from the equation by the end of the 19th century. There is nothing above the will of the 
states. There is nothing but the will of the states.  
Two relatively recent phenomena have weakened the voluntarist foundation of 
international law. The rise of international organizations and the expansion of their 
quasi-regulatory competences is one such phenomenon. The principal-agent 
relationship that characterizes, according to the traditional view, the relations between 
an international organization and its member states is under severe strain. With the 
inflation of norms adopted by the international organizations, it is impossible for 
member states to keep up. Furthermore, peremptory norms of international law, or 
norms of jus cogens, stand for the fact that there are rules of international law that are 
so important that they apply regardless of whether states have consented to them. 
Though the idea of jus cogens had been floating around for some time, its introduction 
into international law results from the atrocities of the Second World War.179 More 
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recently, it is often pointed to the Yusuf and Kadi cases,180 those cases in which the 
Court of First Instance of the European Union examined the compatibility of certain 
acts of the United Nations Security Council with jus cogens. They are understood as 
suggesting that “no one is above the law; what matters is that the CFI suggested that 
there is some legal space hovering over all political activities, containing some 
untouchable norms which themselves originate in the hearts and minds not of selfish 
states, but of humanity itself.”181  
To summarize, we have here instances where international law is being created without 
the consent of the states. It cannot be denied that jus cogens is a positive development. 
Suffice is to refer to the Nuremberg trials to be convinced. It remains however that it 
does not fit in well with the international legal system. How do you explain that states, 
whose consent is at the center of the system, may not derogate from jus cogens? As for 
international organizations’ expansion, it is often justified by functionalism. But is that 
enough? As Kumm shows,182 the changing role of state consent is a problem not just 
for states as abstract entities, but also for the citizens of those states. These 
developments seem to weaken the capacity of citizens – in democracies that is – to have 
a say in the creation of the norms that govern them. It decreases their capacity to govern 
themselves. Once the veil of the states is lifted, we see more clearly the concerns that 
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arise from the above-mentioned developments in international law. We cannot just 
brush them aside by saying that “it is for the good of the people.” As it directly negates, 
or at the very least weakens individuals’ self-government, the question must be 
addressed.  
Global constitutionalism brings most, if not all, these pieces together to form a coherent 
order, a framework that is more robust than the one relying on state consent.  The 
weakness of voluntarism is that it does not accommodate any exceptions to its model. 
By promoting such a vision of international law, which is nothing more than what states 
decide, it makes it impossible for any international law to stand that is not strictly what 
has been consented to. There may be implied consent, tacit acceptance, or 
functionalism that stretch the scope of the consent of the states beyond what has 
expressly been consented to. But it is merely stretching, pushing, and does not provide 
a solid foundation for entirely new blocks of international law. It makes the blocks of 
law thus legitimated more vulnerable to attacks and violations.  
On the contrary, global constitutionalism, while not departing fully from consent, 
integrates it in subtle ways. We should, however, be wary of not removing consent 
entirely lest we would promote an undemocratic system. Generally speaking, global 
constitutionalism does not make state consent a necessity. This statement is troubling 
at first. Rest assured. Global constitutionalism does not completely eliminate the need 
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for consent. It just comes at a different time and from a slightly different source. Or at 
least it should.  
If we go back to domestic constitutionalism, the scenario is as follows. The constituent 
power – a single entity made up of individuals – adopts a constitution that spells out 
the rules that will more or less directly govern the life of those very individuals and their 
children, by constituting a government that may only act within the rules established by 
the constituent power. Put differently, there are outside limits imposed on the day-to-
day governing of the people. These limits are not created by the constituted powers but 
come from the constituent power, who is distinct from the constituted powers.  The 
constituent power has the power to impose limits because it has the power to create. 
The limits may be substantive, taking the shape of fundamental rights granted to 
individuals. There are also structural limits, such as regular elections, making the 
government being accountable to citizens, separation of powers and checks and 
balances or a constitutional court.  
The idea of constituent power is a “direct challenge to the positivist premise that legal-
constitutional authority is conclusively justified by the fact of its successful reduction to 
canonical constitutional form.”183 For instance, according to positivist French author 
Carré de Malberg, the question of the original legitimacy of the original constitution is 
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a question of fact, not of law. The constitution is the act by which the peoples become 
an organized society, by which a state is created and law becomes possible. Thus before 
the constitution, it is impossible to find a legal answer to the question of who should 
have the power to make the constitution. The legitimacy of the constitution is not 
dependent on who originally created it. Once a constitution has been created, however, 
any change to the constitution, whether an amendment or a completely new 
constitution, must be agreed on in compliance with the currently valid constitution.184  
On the contrary, the concept of constituent power stands for the proposition that 
“authority should be duly authorized—that it should possess an authentic democratic 
pedigree. That is to say, those who are ‘constituted’ as the subjects of constitutional 
authority should also be its ‘constituent’ authors.”185 It also requires that “in its design, 
execution, and application, the constitutional form produced by the constituent power 
should carry a resilient guarantee of ‘democratic’ fidelity to the interests, values, 
potential, or otherwise-conceived ‘goods’ associated with that constituent power.”186  
The notion of constituent power is an indispensable ingredient of self-government. 
Indeed, the creation of the notion of constituent power has opened the door to the 
containment of constituted powers, and correspondingly the preservation of the 
sovereignty of the people, the holder of the constituent power. At the end of the 19th 
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century, this was no small feat. In the years following Independence and before the 
adoption of the federal constitution, the various states had experimented with, and 
arguably suffered the consequences of, sovereign parliaments that had abused their 
powers and ignored public interest.  
As a result, it was decided that sovereignty should be in the hands of the people and 
that the legislative power should be subordinated to the people. This was achieved 
through the creation of a constituent power that would belong to the people and would 
be separated from constituted powers. The constituent power is the source of all 
powers. It is the maker of the constitution. By contrast, the constituted powers are those 
that are created and defined by the constitution. They only exist as a result of the 
constitution and must be exercised within the boundaries set out in the constitution. 
The hope is that constituted powers will not outstep their role and in particular, deprive 
people of the rights that were enacted in the constitution. The constituent power 
belongs to the sovereign, and thus the constituent power sits above the constituted 
powers. In the American version, the constituent power is exercised by a specific body, 
the convention, which is distinct from the legislature and specially created for the 
purpose of adopting a constitution. The constituent power is sometimes said to be a 
corollary to the separation of powers. Indeed, to ensure that powers remain separated, 
we need to make sure that they cannot themselves change the extent of their own 
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powers. This requires a superior authority, which can impose its will onto the 
constituted powers, i.e. the constituent power.   
An important contribution of the constituent power consists in providing an 
explanation for where the constitution come from.  This has probably been most 
relevant in the French context, and thus underlined mostly in French literature. Klein 
notes the similarities between the discourse on constituent power and the religious 
discourse187 and indeed Preuss remarks that “[t]he concept of a constituent power 
invented by a theologian, is a famous example of what has been called political theology: 
The constituent power is the secularized version of the divine power to create the world 
ex nihilo.”188 Both aim at answering the question of the origins, of how it all started. 
What was there before the state? Where does the constitution come from? How is it 
created? By whom?  
At the time when the notion of constituent power was picked up by the French, they 
were still operating under an absolute monarchy. The king was the sovereign and the 
origin of his powers was divine. Religion was still the explanation for authority. 
Constituent power, coupled with popular sovereignty, allowed for the people to become 
the source of all power, the maker of the constitution. Thus replacing the divine 
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narrative, constituent power offered an empowering account of the origins for the 
people. 
When we transpose this framework to international law, we should have a global 
constituent power that would consent to a global constitution that would set global 
rules, global limits for global governance. These limits may be substantive or more 
structural, as we have seen above. The global constitution might also constitute a 
government, that would operate within the limits set by the constitution.  
Within this framework, it seems easier to address and justify the recent phenomena 
mentioned above. In particular, global constitutionalism can justify situations in which 
state consent is not required. But that requires a shift in perception. Instead of seeing 
international law as stemming from states and state consent, we need to re-imagine it 
as being a composite of whatever is decided by constituted powers as creators of 
international law within the limits imposed by the constituent power via the 
constitution. State consent remains relevant as states are constituted powers that are 
creators of international law but they act according to the guidance given by the global 
constituent power in the form of the constitution.  
If we take jus cogens norms, a global constitutionalist approach would consider jus 
cogens norms as part of the constitution itself. They are akin to fundamental rights in 
the domestic context and constrain the actions of constituted powers for the benefit of 
the people. This is why they can be imposed onto states, without their prior express 
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consent. The authority to set limits to states’ actions does not stem from the states’ 
consent to it but comes from the global constituent power.  
If we regard international organizations as constituted powers that are bound by the 
constitution, their expansion appears less problematic. Their expanding regulatory and 
quasi-judiciary roles are bound by a set of constitutional rules, instead of being bound 
by the scope of the member states’ consent. It does away with the need to trace their 
actions back to a grant of power from member states, while still keeping international 
organizations constrained by constitutional rules.    
By changing the role of state consent in the framework of international law, from a 
central all-justifying function to a toned-down subordinated role, the global 
constitutional framework better accounts for and legitimizes the changes that we have 
been witnessing in international law – provided the global constituent power gets to 
consent.  
Section	2:	The	central	role	of	the	global	constituent	power’s	consent	
The legitimacy of the global constitutional framework rests entirely on consent. As we 
have seen earlier, global constitutionalism displaces the need for consent from the states 
to the global constituent power.  
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A. A	well-known	pattern	in	domestic	constitutionalism	
In the domestic context, consent happens early in the process, at a single point in time 
(though there may be amendments). Consent of the constituent power is required in 
setting up the original plan. The government of the governed by themselves, which is 
often cited as the definition of democracy, does not mean that the governed actually 
make all the decisions. It means that they make what is seen to be the single most 
important decision to set the rules that would govern their government. Thus what we 
are talking about is indirect government of the governed by themselves and the question 
of consent is tied to a specific stage in the constitution-making process. 
Schematically, the constitution-making process in the domestic context follows these 
steps: 
1. Drafting. The actual drafting is usually not done by the constituent power, which 
is only given the option of either approving or rejecting the draft constitution. 
Some modern constitution-making processes however have attempted to 
involve the people into the drafting process by holding consultations at the 
community level or by inviting the public to watch, attend and participate in 
drafting meetings.189 
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2. Adoption of the constitution by the constituent power by a vote. This is the 
consent per se.  
3. The constitution enters into force, constituting and concomitantly constraining 
the constituted powers – executive, legislative and judiciary – and granting 
constitutional status to a list of fundamental rights for the benefit of individuals.  
4. Life pursuant to the constitution. A constitutional court usually serves as the 
arbiter ensuring compliance by the constituted powers with both the letter and 
the spirit of the constitution. Life under a given constitution ends with the 
adoption of a new constitution.  
When we move to the international scene, how does it work?  
B. Imagining	consent	in	global	constitutionalism	
The well-known pattern of domestic constitutionalism cannot apply without substantial 
modifications as difficulties of two orders arise.  
Identity	of	the	consenter		
	
In the domestic context, the question of the identity of the constituent power usually 
does not raise issues. Only in the case of states in transition has the issue arisen. In 
theory, however, scholars still struggle with the infinite regress difficulty: who decides 
who the constituent power is? Klein has argued that the constituent power can be 
considered as, and is actually largely considered as, a necessary myth. It is necessary as 
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it provides a reason why the constitution is binding.190 It may be seen as a myth, in the 
sense of “a traditional story, typically involving supernatural beings or forces, which 
embodies and provides an explanation, aetiology, or justification for something such as 
the early history of a society, a religious belief or ritual, or a natural phenomenon.”191 
And that story is that “in the beginning was constituent power. From it and only it 
everything derives. Without it there is no binding legal order. Without it there is no legal 
basis for the constitution.”192 On the contrary, the case law of the constitutional courts 
in Israel and South Africa takes the view that the constituting process falls within the 
jurisdiction of the court, thereby indicating that the realm of the law does not start with 
the constitution but predates it.193 The debate is not settled. In practice, the exercise of 
the constituent power is normally governed by domestic law, for instance by the 
legislation on elections (age requirements, need to register etc.).  
When we move to the global level, there is no simple ready-made answer. Intuition or 
habit might make us believe that states are the ones that should consent. This is the 
principle underlying voluntarism. But as the case of jus cogens shows, the consent of 
states is not always required, which tends to show that they are constituted powers 
rather than the constituent power. This leaves the door open for other possibilities, 
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192 Supra note 190 at 192. 
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such as the global demos, the sum of all domestic constituent powers, or the 
international community (whatever that may mean). The identity of the consenter, of 
the global constituent power, is not the only aspect of the consent to the constitution 
that needs to be adjusted.  
Time	and	manner	of	consent 
	
Some argue that the UN Charter is the global constitution,194 but that is only a minority 
of scholars. For most, there is not a single text that would qualify as the global 
constitution. Instead, most scholars identify norms and ascribe them a constitutional 
nature. They talk more of constitutionalization than of constitutions. There is not a 
single “constitutional moment” at which the global constituent power is summoned to 
consent. The process they are observing is an organic evolution of the law rather than 
a deliberate design, unlike what is usually the case at the domestic level.195  
The constitutionalization process is pointillist in nature. Dots after dots are added to 
the canvas, slowly uncovering the contours of the landscape. It is necessary to take a 
step back to see how seemingly isolated events eventually come together. This artistic 
analogy provides a vocabulary to describe the constitutionalization process. In the 
remainder of this dissertation, constitutional dots will refer to these instances in which 
a new step in the constitutionalization of global governance will have been taken. 
																																																						
194 See e.g. B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. (1998), 529. 
195 J. KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
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Constitutional dot-making refers to the adoption of rules that are constitutional in 
nature.  
What makes a rule constitutional in nature? What is constitutional governance? To 
define constitutional governance requires to think outside of the box labelled 
“constitution.” Ackerman reminds us that not all domestic constitutionalization even 
happens this way. Leaving the case of the UK and its unwritten constitution aside, there 
are “constitutional moments” that legitimately modify the constitutional order despite 
not following the amendment procedure provided for in the constitution. Ackerman 
notes that those constitutional moments follow a particular procedure, which includes 
a proposal, public debate, ratification and consolidation by the constituent power.196 
This procedure guarantees the openness of the change. The challenge of defining 
constitutional governance lies in capturing all of these moments. Which dots are part 
of the constitutional picture and which are not?  
There is a constitutional threshold beyond which a dot can be called constitutional. It 
has two components, a substantive one and a procedural one. The substantive 
requirement is that the content of the dot must relate either to the management of 
constituted powers (for instance allocating power or on the contrary, constraining 
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them) or to the introduction of rights and freedoms for the enjoyment of individuals. 
The procedural requirement consists in the consent of the global constituent power.  
Concretely speaking, constitutional dot-making is triggered in one of two ways. The 
phase preceding the constitutional dot-making – the drafting stage - may be accidental, 
when it consists in uncoordinated action. Because of this informality, it might be more 
difficult for this initial phase to later be considered as material for constitutional dot-
making. Such initiatives will typically be sub-global, for instance regional, and take shape 
by accretion. Repeated actions might be necessary for the initiative to become the 
reference, relying on the network effect. The internet principles hype described in 
Chapter 1 is a good example. On the contrary, intentional constitutional dot-making is 
characterized by the intent of the actors to engage in global constitutional dot-making. 
An example would be the UN Charter, as analyzed by Fassbender.197 
In such a context, the first two steps of the domestic constitutional process – the 
drafting and the adoption of the constitution – cannot be transposed without 
substantial modifications. On the one hand, there is no drafting stage as such, by which 
I mean that at the time of drafting, it is not perceived as global constitutional drafting.  
Instead, there is a screening for norms that have the potential of becoming 
constitutional. Who does the screening? As is the case with drafting, the screeners are 
not necessarily the constituent power. It may be courts, or states that by their actions, 
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or often in their discourse, isolate certain principles. On the other hand, the adoption 
of the constitution is not a single event but takes place every time a dot is added to the 
global constitutional canvas. This necessarily has an impact on how consent comes 
about.  
Thus the question of consent has multiple dimensions that need to be reworked as we 
move to the global level: 
- the time of consent 
- the manner of consent 
- the identity of the consenter.  
Before delving into the literature that has addressed these aspects of global 
constitutionalism, let us look at internet governance and its constitutionalization efforts.  
Section	3:	The	constitutionalization	of	global	internet	governance	–	a	status	update	
When looking at internet governance through the global constitutionalist lens, we can 
identify efforts to establish certain norms as meta-norms of reference constraining the 
policy choices made not only by governments, but also the private sector. These may 
be construed as constituting the substantive dimension of constitutionalization. I will 
use the example of the right to internet access as an illustration.  
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The history of the right to internet access shows that the actions of several domestic 
and international actors may converge to try and establish internet access as a global 
constitutional dot.  
The story of the right to internet access began with domestic legal instruments –
legislative, regulatory and constitutional – being adopted in a handful of countries and 
declaring internet access, understood as the right to connect to the internet, as a legally 
protected right. Later came a highly publicized case by the French Constitutional 
Council. This case dealt with the infamous HADOPI law that introduced the “three-
strike system,” in which third-time online copyright infringers may see their Internet 
connection suspended for a period of time. The French Constitutional Council held 
that:  
In the current state of the means of communication and given the generalized 
development of public online communication services and the importance of the 
latter for the participation in democracy and the expression of ideas and 
opinions, this right [freedom of speech] implies freedom to access such 
services.198  
Although the Court did recognize the right to access the Internet, it did not hold that 
disconnection was unconstitutional, as long as a judge, as opposed to an administrative 
agency, made the decision. It stated that disconnection was both necessary and 
proportionate to the purpose it sought to achieve, that is the protection of intellectual 
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visited on 2 November 2016) (FRANCE).  
 	 123 
property. The Court logically extended the legal regime applicable to freedom of speech, 
which allows for necessary and proportionate restrictions, to this new freedom to access 
Internet services.  
The French case was quoted a few months later by the Costa Rican Constitutional 
Tribunal,199 albeit in a different context. According to the claimants, the government’s 
failure to timely reassign frequencies in compliance with Costa Rica’s Trade Agreement 
with the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central America, had negatively 
affected the exercise of their rights. After quoting the French case, the Constitutional 
Tribunal stated that the government had the obligation to promote and guarantee the 
universal access to the Internet. It concluded that the government’s delay in opening 
the market for telecommunications amounted to, among others, a breach of “the right 
of access to new information technologies, the right to equality and the eradication of 
digital divide (info-exclusion) – article 33 of the Constitution, the right to access the 
Internet through the interface chosen by the consumer, and freedom of enterprise and 
commerce.”200  
Even though both the French and Costa Rican cases have recognized a new right to 
Internet access and even though the Costa Rican decision relies on the French decision, 
the content of the right recognized in each case is different. In the French case, 
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recognizing a right to internet access requires the government not to interfere with such 
right beyond what is necessary and proportionate. On the contrary, the Costa Rican 
Constitutional Tribunal imposes an obligation on the state to actively provide its 
population with access to the Internet. Emphasis is placed on the connectivity 
dimension of the right to Internet access. Connectivity refers to the possibility to gain 
access to the network.201 There is another side to the right to access the Internet, which 
consists in the possibility to access all the data that flows through the network once you 
have gained access to the physical layer. This is the content dimension of Internet access 
right, which is actually at stake in the French case. Indeed, in the French case, 
disconnection is analogous to almost completely blocking the content of the Internet 
(email communications are still allowed) on a person-by-person basis. Thus, the French 
case is properly analysed as a content case, as opposed to a connectivity case.  
Both cases were later mentioned in the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of speech 
on the internet, Franck LaRue, who labels them both as cases making internet access a 
fundamental right.202 The Special Rapporteur himself did not say that internet access 
was a human right, but encouraged states to make internet access a priority. A similar 
discourse could be observed in other international organizations. For instance, the 
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OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media203 issued a press release stating that 
internet access should be considered a human right. Together with the Organization of 
American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information, the UN Special Rapporteur and the OSCE 
Representative issued another declaration stating that freedom of speech “imposes an 
obligation on States to promote universal access.”204 So far, the organs of the 
international organizations they are reporting to have failed to declare internet access a 
human right. Only the UN Human Rights Council has somewhat continued the trend 
by adopting a resolution cautiously declaring that human rights equally apply online.205   
A positive aspect of judges’ participation in internet governance is that it allows for the 
participation of less developed countries. Indeed, it gives a chance for countries like 
Costa Rica, which is not otherwise a major player in global Internet governance, to 
indirectly weigh in. We should also underline the crucial role of relay played by the 
international organizations’ rapporteurs. They are the ones that brought the right to 
internet access from the domestic level to the international level.  
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This initiative is an illustration of accidental constitutionalization as the intent to 
constitutionalize is absent from the mind of the actors involved in the drafting stage. 
What would turn this chain of events into a global constituent dot would be the consent 
of the global constituent power. This leaves us in a dead-end as the identity of the global 
constituent power is, as of yet, unknown. 
In this chapter, we have shown that global constitutionalism could provide an answer 
to the legitimacy deficit currently suffered in internet governance. Democratic 
legitimacy is indeed at the heart of the constitutional project and requires that the 
constituent power consent to the constitution. When we move to the supranational 
level, adjustments need to be made. The role of state consent changes from being 
central and indispensable to being somewhat downgraded. The time and manner in 
which consent happens at the global level needs to be rethought. The pointillist nature 
of global constitutionalization prevents the domestic constitution-making process from 
being transposed as is. Finally, and critically, the identity of the global constituent power 
needs to be ascertained as all constitutional legitimacy stems from it. The next chapter 
will provide an overview of existing literature on the global constituent power. 
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CHAPTER 4: LOOKING FOR THE GLOBAL CONSTITUENT 
POWER 
 
A review of existing literature on the global constituent power reveals that the topic has 
barely been addressed. We will see that the emerging theories of global constituent 
power adopt different approaches, but share common traits (section 1). As the field 
remains relatively unexplored, major gaps become quickly apparent (section 2).   
Section	1:	Emerging	theories	of	global	constituent	power 
Before reviewing the existing literature on the global constituent power, I will start by 
clarifying the scope of this exercise. I am not addressing the body of literature that 
questions the inner workings of constituent power. This extensive literature answers a 
different question. Instead of focusing on “who is the constituent power,” it focuses 
on how or what. How does the constituent power come together? What is the 
constituent power? Examples of prominent debates are infinite regress, constituting the 
constituent power or how to go from a multitude of “I”s to a “we.” These issues, while 
important, are premature in the case of global constitutionalism. The earlier question 
of “who” has not been answered satisfactorily. In these days of humanization of 
international law, what should be the role and status of individuals? What should be the 
role and status of states? The rise of non-state actors generally, and the emergence of 
multistakeholderism as a potential governance model specifically, put a challenging spin 
on the binary “individuals or states” question. Identifying the global constituent power 
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would do a lot to contribute to the conceptual clarity of global constitutionalism and 
global governance.  
Table 3: Overview of global constituent power theories 
 
	
Who	is	the	global	constituent	power?	
 Peoples	of	the	nation-
states	(if	yes,	how	do	
they	act?)	
States	 Global	People	(if	yes,	how	
does	it	act?)	
Besson No Yes (no democracy condition) Yes (not exactly directly, through 
democratic participation) 
Fassbender Yes (indirectly) No No 
Habermas Yes (indirectly if democracy)  No Yes (unknown) 
Peters Yes (indirectly if democracy)  No Yes (directly through 
individualist track) 
Walker Unknown Unknown Yes (indirectly) 
 
One could summarize the emerging theories of constituent power beyond the nation-
state in just a few words: power to individuals and to a lesser extent, states. Indeed, 
somewhat unsurprisingly, states remain a central figure of the constituent power beyond 
the nation-state, if not as a fully-fledged member of the constituent power, at least as 
an integral part of how it is exercised.  
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A. Individuals	are	members	of	the	global	constituent	power		
All the scholars here assume that individuals are members of the global constituent 
power. They may not be the exclusive global constituent power, or exercise this power 
unmediated, but the premise from which all scholars start is that of popular sovereignty. 
As we saw above, the constituent power was conceived as a tool of self-government. 
For it to fulfill this promise, it has to be in the hands of the governed and the governed 
are (according to some, non-exclusively, as we shall see below) individuals.  
The status of individuals in international law has changed from that of object to that of 
subject of international law. The door to the recognition of non-state entities as 
international legal subjects was open by the International Court of Justice in a 1949 
Advisory Opinion,206 in which it declared that the UN had international legal 
personality. However, it is not until much later that individuals acquired international 
legal personality as well. The constant expansion of human rights law since the Second 
World War, which has not only given individuals rights but has also provided them with 
avenues to enforce them without the interposition of their state, has been construed 
since the 1990s as indicating that individuals have also become international legal 
subjects. This profound change has impacted all areas of international law - we speak 
of the “humanization of international law.”207 By recognizing that individuals are 
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directly affected by international law, the humanization of international law makes it 
even more necessary to grant individuals the status of constituent power. As Besson 
remarks, “[d]emocratic legitimacy actually requires a self-constituting process when 
constitutional constraints have started applying and unilaterally constraining law-
making processes without giving individuals affected a right to have a direct or indirect 
input into the identification of those constraints.”208 Though the exact impact of the 
humanization of international law is sometimes debated,209 it supports individuals as 
constituent power beyond the nation-state.  
While there is a consensus among the reviewed scholars on this point, they have 
diverging opinions on how individuals get to be the constituent power.  
B. Single	constituent	power		
By single constituent power, I mean that the constituent power is made up of units of 
the same nature. For instance, Fassbender writes that “in the international community 
the constituent power lies with the ‘Peoples of the United Nations’, who today are 
virtually all peoples of the world, and who normally act through their governments.”210 
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In Fassbender’s view, the peoples are the unit that makes up the global constituent 
power. Fassbender believes that the national borders remain relevant at the global level 
and thus there is no need to look further than existing institutions and mechanisms – 
the national peoples and their government – to implement this new constituent power.  
The peoples as the global constituent power sounds so similar to intergovernmentalism 
that it is worth asking whether there is any difference. Insisting on the fact that it is the 
domestic peoples that are members of the constituent power could be read as 
commanding that governments adequately represent the will of their people and thus 
mandating democratic practices at the state level. While we should not downplay the 
importance of democratization at the state level, from the point of view of global 
constituent power theory, the single constituent power does not lead to any major 
change to the current state of affairs.  
C. Dual	constituent	power	
Dual constituent power is the name generally given to models of constituent power 
made up of two different components. This category actually divides into two 
subcategories, one in which both components are truly different in nature and one in 
which both components are ultimately made up of the same unit.  
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The	truly	dual	constituent	power	or	states	as	co-constituent	power	
In this scenario, the constituent power beyond the state is a mixed bag in which we find 
two types of members that differ in nature. So far, proposals have associated natural 
persons and legal persons, namely states. This is the approach adopted by Besson.  
According to Besson, states may be co-members of the constituent power, along with 
individuals. Besson’s reason for offering this model is not entirely clear. Besson starts 
by defining a hypothesis – that the international community would be the global 
constituent power – and thus restricts the scope of her inquiry ab initio. Although the 
concept of international community is commonly used in public international law, the 
precise contours and content of this community are not set. This lack of a shared 
definition makes it hard to “institutionalize global democracy.”211 Besson remarks that 
there are three main views of what the international community is. Some consider that 
the international community is a community of states while others believe that the 
international community is made up of individuals. A third view is that the international 
community is both a community of states and of individuals. Besson falls in that latter 
category.212 It is clear though that she does not conceive of this international community 
as being composed of states on the one hand, and of individuals on the other hand. She 
has in mind a far more complex structure that juxtaposes the community of states with 
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a plurality of communities of individuals at each level of law-making, whether national, 
transnational, and supranational. Should be included in the decision-making process 
“all those whose fundamental interests are significantly affected by a decision, even 
when they cannot be physically present or even represented.”213 She is here hinting at 
the idea that the interests of those who would not traditionally be allowed to take part 
into the decision-making process in a given community should be taken into 
consideration by those within the community – though she does not explain how. This 
is the translation at the international level of the pluralism she roots for. “The 
international community is not located at one level only, but it internationalizes as it 
were each political community at all levels of governance including national ones.”214 
There must be plurality even at the national level. 
Besson argues that the constituent power is “the political community that considers 
itself as such and therefore constitutes itself by adopting constitutional norms.”215 She 
sides with those that believe that the existence of a political collectivity precedes the 
exercise of constituent power. She then asks whether the international community can 
be considered as a constituent power under this definition. Although the international 
community is not a legal entity in international law, it is a legal community to the extent 
that its interests are shaping the law and being shaped by law.216 Is that sufficient to 
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constitute a political community? Once again, there is not a single definition of a 
political community. Besson explains that “members of a political community are 
usually thought (1) to share common, interdependent, or reciprocal interests and goals 
and (2) to organize themselves autonomously to reach those goals.”217 She believes the 
first prong is met in the case of the international community. States and individuals can 
be said to have common objectives, such as peace, or the protection of human rights.218 
However, the level of organization within the international community does not rise to 
the level required for a political community to emerge.219 The existence of many 
international institutions and lawmaking procedures, while showing a certain level of 
organization, should not hide the fact that this organization is primarily by states for 
states, so much so that we cannot fairly say that the members of the international 
community have come together to constitute themselves as a political community.220 
Some believe it is simply impossible for the international community to ever become a 
political community “because of the lack of plausibility of the political and democratic 
processes required for it to develop and consolidate.”221 But once one abandons the 
model of “full and direct democratic participation” for the more realistic model of 
democratic participation, it becomes conceivable for an international political 
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community someday to emerge.222 Thus for Besson, the constituent power beyond the 
state is in theory made up of both states and individuals but has yet to come into 
existence.  
The	single	dual	constituent	power	
The name may seem confusing but it signals both the unitary nature of this form of 
constituent power and the duality of the mode of participation in constituent power. 
Rather than a schizophrenic episode, it must be seen as one individual wearing two 
caps. The idea is that only individuals may be considered as holders of the constituent 
power but they exercise that power in various capacities.  
Habermas is promoting this vision for the European Union.223 The constituent power 
belongs to individuals both in their capacity as citizens of the European Union and as 
citizens of a member state. Habermas explains that both components of the 
supranational constituent power must be seen as equals since the unit of reference in 
both cases is the same, namely individuals.  
Peters seems to be adopting this viewpoint as well. She believes that the source of all 
political authority is citizens224 and places individuals at the center of her constitutional 
project. To her, one of the most important achievements of global constitutionalism 
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should be a “fully democratized world order,”225 both at the level of states and at the 
global level. At the global level, however, citizens may be represented by their 
(democratic) state. But there must be an “individualist track,” regardless of whether 
states are democratic or not, that would be available to citizens so that international 
institutions become directly accountable to citizens. Peters sees citizens as principals, 
suggesting that international institutions are thus agents or representatives of citizens. 
This individualist track seems to be available irrespective of borders, to any and all 
citizens in the world.  
We must note here that both Habermas and Peters talk about citizens. Citizenship is an 
attribute conferred upon individuals by state. This would suggest that states are 
somehow dictating participation of individuals at the supranational level. In the sui 
generis case of the European Union, citizenship at the EU level is indeed conditioned 
upon citizenship at the member state level. This is however a unique case and begs the 
question why citizenship should condition participation in the supranational constituent 
power.  
Walker’s developments on the constituent power beyond the nation-state are more 
tentative. He suggests that a supranational people is the key to fixing the legitimacy 
deficit in the European Union. He does not identify clearly his supranational constituent 
power, simply noting in the context of the European Union that the draft Constitutional 
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Treaty seemed to lean in the direction of a dual constituent power, referring to “the 
citizens and states,” though it also at times, and quite confusingly, would make reference 
to “the peoples of Europe.” Nevertheless, he believes that the supranational constituent 
power derives to some extent from the various national constituent powers and thus 
cannot be considered completely independently from them.226 “The ‘people’ of second-
order supranational understanding can never be just like the otherwise politically 
unencumbered and unmediated ‘people’ of our first-order state imaginary; the second-
order people necessarily describes a compound structure.”227 
Overall, Fassbender’s view is really the one that stands out by not recognizing the 
possibility of a constituent power that would be at least partially disconnected from 
states. All the other scholars embrace this possibility while at the same time recognizing 
that the nation-state is still relevant. All but Besson view the domestic peoples as 
participants in the constituent power. Instead she considers the states themselves as the 
co-constituent power.  
Section	2:	Mind	the	gaps	
The emerging theories of a constituent power beyond the nation-state may be criticized 
for having left many gaps in their models. This may result from a tendency to take stock 
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of whatever exists (institutional arrangements and texts) and extrapolate a theory from 
that rather than starting with theory first.  
A. Limits	of	the	Identification	method	
It is important for our purposes to understand how these authors justify their view of 
what the global constituent power should be. Not surprisingly for lawyers, this largely 
depends on whether there is a constitutional text or not.  
For instance, Fassbender builds his global constitutional theories on the UN Charter. 
He draws parallels between the drafting procedure and style of the United States 
Constitution and the UN Charter. The UN Charter was drafted by a convention 
composed of representatives of the states involved in the initiative and the UN Charter 
echoes the US Constitution, opening with the words “We the peoples of the United 
Nations.”228 But the comparison only goes so far. Indeed, the representatives at the San 
Francisco conference were appointed by their respective governments and not elected 
directly by the citizens. In addition, language that would have gone farther in 
establishing the peoples as the authors of the UN Charter and would have downplayed 
the role of states was rejected. Although Fassbender argues that global constitutionalism 
is different from domestic constitutionalism, his arguments in favor of considering the 
peoples of the United Nations as the constituent power are very similar to the ones that 
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could be advanced in the domestic context. In the end, he seems to have identified the 
peoples of the United Nations as the constituent power because the UN Charter is 
proclaimed in their name, as if they were the authors. It seems that it is the people of 
each state that is a member of the United Nations that compose the constituent power 
but not a global demos comprising all the individuals from all the member states of the 
United Nations irrespective of borders. His approach is internationalist with a twist. At 
the EU level, as we have seen above, Habermas and Walker also rely on the text of the 
treaties as conclusive evidence of the identity of the constituent power.  
As far as Besson is concerned, she did not really explain her choice. As mentioned 
above, she focuses her investigation from the outset on the narrow question whether 
the international community is the supranational constituent power. As to Peters, her 
vision is informed by the goal that a global constitutional order should pursue: 
democracy both at the global and domestic level. The democracy argument also plays a 
large role for those scholars focusing on the EU. The idea that the EU presents a 
democracy deficit is recurring and Walker, for instance, sees the involvement of the 
supranational constituent power as a very necessary remedy.  
But for Besson’s, the emerging theories of global constituent power have been thought 
in the context of the European Union and the United Nations, for which there are 
preexisting institutional arrangements and foundational texts on which to rely. On the 
contrary, global internet governance and many other instances of global constitutional 
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governance lack such a foundation. This strategy tends to divert the attention away 
from some difficult questions, including whether the choice of a constituent power 
reflected in the texts makes sense. This also raises the question how to identify a global 
constituent power in the absence of a text, which would arguably be most of the time 
given the pointillist nature of global constitutionalization.  
B. Implications	of	pointillist	constitutionalism		
The pointillist nature of global constitutionalization modifies the traditional relationship 
between the constituent power and time. In the domestic context, the constituent 
power is a rather elusive creature that disappears as quickly as it appears, once it has 
finished “constituting.”229 But because global constitutionalization does not happen all 
at once but consists in a slow accretion of constitutional pieces, the constituent power 
is called upon on a regular basis. The multiplication of constitutional dots may easily 
disrupt the well-established distinction between constituent and constituted powers. 
The resulting blurring of the lines, far from being solely a theoretical issue for scholars 
who enjoy debates on the true nature of the amending power, may make it hard to 
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contain constituted powers, in particular states when they are co-constituent powers. 
Because states are involved either as co-constituent power with Besson or mediators of 
the constituent power, and are also constituted powers, the constraining effect of 
constitutionalism might be somewhat lost.   
Walker does address this concern but his solution fails to convince. He explains that 
the role of the constituent power extends until after the constitution is adopted because 
constitutional legitimacy requires not only that “those who are ‘constituted’ as the 
subjects of constitutional authority be its ‘constituent’ authors”230 but also that the form 
of government resulting from the constitution effectively realize the projects, and 
embody the values articulated by the constituent power.231 The people, by being 
involved in the life of the system of government created by the constitution, whether 
as subjects of the constitutional form, as legislators or as editors in the case of 
constitutional amendments, retroactively builds itself as a constituent power.232 The 
people thus becomes a “reflexive interpreter,” which Walker describes as happening 
when “‘the people’, through public discourse, see themselves involved in a continuous 
project of self-government.”233 It is unlikely that this type of involvement of the 
																																																						
230 N. Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union, 247-268, 248 
in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 
(M. Loughlin et al. ed. 2008). 
231 Id. at 248. 
232 Id. at 263. 
233 Id. at 263. 
 	 142 
constituent power would function as a serious constraint on the constituted powers and 
restore the distinction between acts of constituent power and acts of constituted power.    
We might also wonder about the impact that the repeated involvement of the 
constituent power has over the “constituting the constituent power” debate. The 
constituent power is a concept that supposes unity, which leads to ask how this unity 
has come about. How has the will of many become the will of one, or as Klein puts it, 
how have we moved from “an aggregate of “I” to “we””?234 And equally importantly, 
when did that happen? There are two main ways of looking at this transformation 
process. Some authors believe that the constitution is what “constitutes” the collectivity 
whereas others believe that the collectivity preexists the exercise of the constituent 
power. Both approaches have flaws. The earlier one fails to explain how what is 
“essentially formless” can act.235 The latter one also fails as it seems hard to conceive of 
a polity whose contours are clearly and uncontroversially accepted.236 Preuss notes that 
this issue is not just theoretical but has practical implications, for instance in the 
constitutional making process in former USSR republics.  
Is the constitution the manifestation of the national identity of a particular 
people, or is it an act of political self-organization of a civil society? Is the 
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constituent power of the people essentially the power of an ethnically 
homogeneous nation, or is it the capacity of a pluralist and diverse society to 
govern itself?237  
With a constituent power on standby, as in the case of pointillist constitutionalization, 
the terms of the debate slightly change. If we were to adopt the view that the 
constitution creates the constituent power, in the case of a pointillist global 
constitutionalization, we would ask whether the constituent power is fully created only 
once the constitutionalization process is over (which might be never), or whether the 
constituent power is created concomitantly with the first dot on the constitutional 
canvas or whether a constituent power is created anew with every single dot. On the 
other hand, if we were to believe that the constituent power preexists the constitution, 
then we would ask whether each dot represents the exercise of a new constituent power 
or of the same constituent power. This in turn leads to another set of questions: could 
there be more than one global constituent power at any given time? If so, how do those 
global constituent powers relate to one another? Are they all modeled after a single 
general constituent power formula or are there issue-specific constituent powers?  
C. Implications	of	states’	involvement	as	co-constituent	power	
Having states as co-constituent power creates difficulties because individuals, while 
being co-constituent power, remain within the jurisdiction of states. This cannot be 
analogized with pluralist group-based constituent power at the state level, where each 
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component of the constituent power is on equal footing. The constituent power stands 
for the idea that it is the ultimate authority. How can individuals be considered as such 
if their co-constituent power, namely states, has authority over them (even though they 
are the domestic constituent power)?  
In the domestic context, in theory, when the constituent power is called on to exercise 
its power, there is no authority that may be exercised over it since the exercise of the 
constituent power is itself founding the institutions of the state that could exercise any 
authority over such citizens. On the contrary, states as co-constituent power would be 
in a position to exercise power over individuals. When individuals exercise their global 
constituent power, are they still “within the jurisdiction” of their state? Or are they, by 
virtue of their participating in the global constituent power, completely removed from 
state jurisdiction? Does the response differ whether individuals are participating as 
members of the various domestic peoples or as members of the global people?  
Even when states are not involved as co-constituent power, similar questions may arise. 
As mentioned above, in the single dual constituent power models, conditioning 
participation in the supranational constituent power to citizenship reintroduces states 
in the exercise of the constituent power. How can this be justified?  
Another question is simply whether having entities other than individuals as constituent 
power is compatible with popular sovereignty. This distinction may not be as 
fundamental as it first appears. Indeed, a humanized understanding of states could 
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justify looking through the state veil, at the individuals that are present within the 
domestic borders. As a result, considering states as co-constituent power would look a 
lot like having domestic peoples as co-constituent power, in particular when these 
domestic peoples would be represented by state institutions in the exercise of their 
constituent power. A humanized approach to states also has the advantage of 
addressing the concerns regarding the heterogeneity of the constituent power. How can 
it act as one? How do you justify granting the same status to apparently widely different 
persons? States and individuals have been traditionally presented as belonging to two 
different legal categories from the point of view of international law.  
While the continued relevance of states presents challenges, we must acknowledge that 
there are arguments in their favor. For Habermas, states need to continue playing a role 
as they are guarantors of freedom. As to Walker, he believes that the global constituent 
power is unable to participate directly in the constituting process and needs to be 
mediated. These are important considerations to take into account. 
D. Mediation	by	states	
Mediation or no mediation, that is the question. Somek answers with a resounding no. 
“[I]t would be misleading to speak of a constituent power in a context where ordinary 
people are mediated by their governments, for this would rob the concept of its radically 
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democratic core.”238 Does this exclude all forms of mediation or only mediation via 
states? Scholars here have embraced mediation without giving it much thought. If states 
are democratic, they should in theory represent their citizens and act in their interests.  
A case in point is the UN Charter as analyzed by Fassbender. As he pointed out, each 
state sent officials to the drafting meetings. The people in each state indirectly weighed 
in on the position adopted by such officials by choosing a head of state or government, 
who in turn selected such officials and defined the position they had to support. Thus 
the involvement of the people was likely to have been prior to the constitutional dot-
making, on issues unrelated to the constitutional dot-making. It differs from the 
situation in which the constituent power acts directly, as we can see in the domestic 
context where the procedure may vary from country to country. For instance, the 
constituent power acts through a specially-elected convention in the US. France 
followed a different pattern for its 1958 constitution, which was adopted by the French 
people by referendum. These procedures can be said to be direct or unfettered because 
the people decides whether they support or not a finished project. There is a direct 
causal link between the vote they cast and the final result of either adoption or rejection 
of the constitutional proposal. On the contrary, in the mediation model, and assuming 
a democratic state, the causation is indirect since many intervening factors will come 
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into consideration. The people votes for representatives who will then decide to act a 
certain way based on many considerations, whether values or self-interest, among many 
others.  
E. Implications	of	accidental	constitutionalization	
A side-effect of the phenomenon of accidental constitutionalization is the constituent 
power’s awareness (or lack thereof) that it is engaging in constitution-making activity. 
The question boils down to this: can the global constituent power be involved without 
even knowing it? This question brings us back to the raison d’être of the constituent 
power, namely consent. The consent of the constituent power is the key to democratic 
legitimacy. Consent should not be inadvertent, should it? While law provides that 
silence means acceptance in specific circumstances, it would seem hard to be satisfied 
with such a passive role for the constituent power in such crucial times.  
If we look at Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, that is to say constitutional 
changes that fail to follow the constitution’s amendment procedure and are nevertheless 
legitimate, we see that constitutional moments require a certain degree of openness. To 
qualify as a constitutional moment, Ackerman argues that a change in the constitution 
has to follow a certain procedure, including a proposal, followed by a public debate, 
followed by ratification and finally the consolidation by the People.239 Even though 
there is no formal consent, the constituent power is given ample opportunity to debate 
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the modification and engage. This seems to be somewhere in between the act of actively 
consenting on the one hand and the act of not opposing on the other hand.   
F. Absence	of	a	global	constituent	power	formula		
The scholars herein reviewed all believe that the constituent power belongs to 
individuals, save for Besson who believes that states should be co-constituent power. 
A popular constituent power fits in nicely with the vision of constitutionalism as a 
toolkit to ensure democratic legitimacy and it is understandable that these authors feel 
that they do not have to provide support for this view.  
But it remains that Besson falls back on the well-known notion of international 
community to justify the status of states as co-constituent power, without explaining 
why in the first place she decided that the international community was her candidate 
for global constituent power. Walker, Habermas and Fassbender, for their part, rely on 
the text of the draft Constitutional Treaty and of the UN Charter, respectively. As we 
have seen above, the problem with the purely textual approach is that it seems to take 
at face-value whatever is written down in the documents identified as having 
constitutional value. It seems to be giving credit to the rather reductionist view that 
holds that the constituent power is whomever is mentioned in the constitution. But the 
constituent power actually needs to be involved. There is a need for a more theorized 
test to determine the identity of the global constituent power, and in particular the role 
of states. Are they co-constituent power or mere agents?  
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This chapter has shown that existing literature on the global constituent power is scarce 
and has left many questions unanswered. Global constitutionalism and global internet 
governance may be said to be evolving along a similar path in at least one respect. They 
both are in search of an author. In the next chapter, I lay out my vision of the global 
constituent power, which builds on the emerging literature on the constituent power 
beyond the nation state and tries and address the set of fundamental questions that I 
have outlined above in an effort to paint a more thorough portrait of the global 
constituent power. 	
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CHAPTER 5: THE COMPOSITE GLOBAL CONSTITUENT POWER 
MODEL 
 
My contribution to the emerging literature on the global constituent power is two-fold. 
It relates first of all to the composition of the constituent power and builds on an insight 
from federalism (section 1). It also addresses the question of the exercise of the 
constituent power beyond the state as this is intimately connected to the identity of the 
constituent power (section 2).   
Section	1:	Identity	of	the	constituent	power	beyond	the	nation-state	
In this section, I detail the strategy I have adopted to build a global constituent power 
model, from discussing the assumptions that underlie the model, or the inspiration 
drawn from federalism to justifying the co-existence of a state element and a global 
element within the global constituent power.  
A. A	review	of	assumptions	
	
At the outset, it is worth reemphasizing the assumptions that are underlying this model. 
Constitutional governance happens in multiple sites, at the level of the nation-state and 
beyond, and will happen in such a manner in the foreseeable future. I do not advocate 
either for a world government that would do away with states or for a purely 
intergovernmental system for addressing supranational issues. At the domestic level, it 
is easy to identify constitutional governance. All the countries in the world have adopted 
constitutions. Written constitutions are the most common. A few countries have 
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unwritten constitutions, like the UK, but the existence and the content of the 
constitution are readily ascertainable. Beyond the nation-state, however, constitutional 
governance takes the more hidden form of pointillist constitutionalization. As we have 
defined in Chapter 4, constitutionalization has two components: a substantive 
component and a procedural component. Substantively, constitutionalization means 
the introduction of norms enabling and constraining the day-to-day governing of 
individuals. Procedurally, constitutionalization requires the intervention of the 
constituent power. Another crucial assumption is that constitutionalism, whether 
domestic or global, places popular sovereignty at its center. This leads to conclude that 
individuals are making up the global constituent power, to the exclusion of states or 
other entities. 
Briefly put, our world today comprises well established sites of constitutional 
governance – states – and emerging sites of constitutional governance beyond the state. 
With self-government of individuals being at the heart of the constitutional project, 
whether at the domestic level or beyond, this multiplicity of constitutional governance 
sites suggests the existence of multiple coexisting constituent powers. At any given 
point in time, each constituent power must be given appropriate consideration. 
Dissociating levels of governance must be avoided as it would lead to favoring one 
constituent power over the other, which is what has tended to happen until now, the 
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global constituent power appearing as an afterthought. This is key to understanding the 
constituent power beyond the state.  
Self-government also suggests that, as the source of all power, the constituent power 
should exhibit certain characteristics. In particular, it should be active, as opposed to 
passive, and explicit and conscious, as opposed to implicit.  
B. Constituent	powers	and	federalism	
Coordination among constituent powers is a feat that federalism is no stranger to. In 
federal states, there coexist a federal constituent power alongside state constituent 
powers. The dynamic between these constituent powers is created at the time the 
federal constitution is adopted. In the case of states coming together within the 
framework of a federal state, which case can be approximated to globalization, the 
mechanism is as follows: the preexisting constituent power of each of the soon-to-be 
federated states accepts that its government will be bound by a federal constitution 
adopted by the federal constituent power, of which they constitute a part only.  
If we look at the American Constitution for instance, we can see that this step is 
conflated with the adoption of the federal constitution itself, making it an interesting 
moment when both federal and state constituent powers are involved simultaneously. 
The domestic constituent powers agree to this new governance arrangement, which 
results in a transfer of competences to the federal level, while the federal constituent 
power – acting as “We the people” - agrees to the new federal constitution.  
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C. Transposition	beyond	the	nation-state:	the	case	for	a	state	component	
The takeaway from federalism is that each global constitutional dot-making must be 
understood as constituting both the act of the global constituent power who engages in 
global constitutionalization, as well as the consent of the domestic constituent powers 
to commit to global constitutional governance. However, unlike what is found at the 
domestic level, the constitutional moment is only one dot among many others, rather 
than a broad constitutional plan that lays out comprehensive rules designed to apply to 
any and all issues for the foreseeable future. In pointillist constitutionalism, on the 
contrary, decision-making is narrowly focused on one set of issues, if not a single issue. 
Thus the domestic constituent powers cannot be said to have accepted to share 
competences with the global constituent power beyond the particular issue at stake. The 
domestic constituent power has no visibility, no expectation regarding what future 
constitutional dot-making moments will look like. As a result, the domestic constituent 
powers must be involved again and again every time the global constituent power is 
called on to make decisions on new sets of issues.  
At this stage the question becomes how to ensure the continued involvement of the 
domestic constituent powers in global constitutionalism. A possibility would be to offer 
the domestic constituent powers the option to independently consent, followed by the 
intervention of the global constituent power. Taking a cue from federalism, we can see 
that it is possible to combine both steps to ease the burden that such a procedure would 
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constitute. In the case of the United States, it was possible because the federal 
constituent power consisted in the sum of all state constituent powers. The federal 
constitution was indeed ratified by specially elected conventions in each of the states. 
At the moment the required number of state ratifications was obtained, the state 
constituent powers that had approved the text of the federal constitution jointly became 
the federal constituent power. But in the case of the global constituent power, this 
cannot be, for the global constituent power is not the sum of all domestic constituent 
powers, as we shall now see.  
D. Common	experience	regardless	of	citizenship:	the	case	for	a	borderless	component	
Following the example of US federalism, among others, we could argue that the global 
constituent power should consist in the sum of all domestic constituent powers. 
However, seeing individuals exclusively through the state lens amounts to reducing their 
identity to their citizenship, and dividing their interests and beliefs along state lines only. 
It denies the common core, the humanity that is shared by individuals regardless of 
one’s passport number. Global constitutionalism builds on the fact that more and more 
governance of a constitutional nature happens beyond the nation-state. This means that 
individuals are exposed to the same constitutional governance regardless of their state 
of origin. In those circumstances, it seems contradictory and counterfactual to retain 
solely a state prism for the global constituent power. While their citizenship might to 
some extent inform their views and beliefs, individuals will form their opinions based 
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on a wide range of factors. The global constituent power becomes disconnected from 
citizenship and revolves around the notion of humanity. By freeing individuals from 
state borders, we are giving them a chance to be more than just about their state. This 
opens the door to a richer understanding of individuals’ global identity.  
In addition, disconnecting the constituent power from the state helps regain some of 
its authenticity by taking citizenship out of the equation. At the domestic level, exercise 
of the constituent power by individuals is constrained by rules, whether regarding 
citizenship or voting rights. This does not sit well with the theory that the state is a 
creation of the constituent power and thus citizenship and other restrictions of the right 
to exercise constituent power, some of the state’s creations, cannot predate the 
constituent power. This paradox makes it difficult to approve of practices that 
subordinate participation in the constituent power to citizenship (which would typically 
be the case with referenda or special representation) among others.  
On the other hand, disconnecting the global component from the state raises doubts 
as to its ability to unite and act as a collective. The constituent power, while made up 
of individuals, acts as one. The ability to act collectively has raised a lot of theoretical 
issues, such as what creates this sense of collectiveness. At the global level, many have 
denied the possibility of collective action because of the absence of a global demos. 
However, as I shall explain below in Chapter 6, there is no agreed upon definition of 
the concept and depending on the definition, it might be possible to discern the 
 	 156 
existence of a global demos. Furthermore, we may not even need a global demos in the 
first place. The brand of global constitutionalism that I favor does not aim for the 
establishment of a world state. It is to some extent less ambitious and is not trying to 
govern all aspects of life, leaving most of that to be decided locally. Instead it focuses 
on global issues (environment, internet) or questions that arise out of humanity (human 
rights for instance). The global component of the global constituent power is there 
precisely because individuals have a lot in common regardless of their citizenship. 
Globalization expands the range of such interests. The same phenomena can be 
witnessed throughout the world, exposing individuals across and irrespective of 
borders, to the same issues. In addition, regardless of recent globalizing trends, there is 
the notion that humanity, or the human condition, is a sufficient enough common core 
when it comes to the most fundamental issues. The subsidiarity of global 
constitutionalism, coupled with its pointillist nature, means that if the intensity of the 
collective action is similar to that encountered at the domestic level, the scope is 
narrower. This in turn suggests that the collectiveness should also be narrower in scope, 
making it easier to obtain.  
The sense of belonging to a collectiveness flows from participation in common projects, 
from time spent together debating – and agreeing - on specific issues, all things that a 
more deliberative process would foster. Unity does not need to mean identity of beliefs, 
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of experience or of culture. Unity would be a gradually developing feeling that is 
associated with the act of participating in a shared project.  
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Figure 2: The composite global constituent power model 
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To summarize, the global constituent power is composed of two components: a state 
component and a global borderless component that act side-by-side. The state 
component will represent the involvement of the domestic constituent power that 
needs to agree to the transfer of powers to the global level. The existence of the state 
dimension within the global constituent power is explained by the fact that states remain 
primary site of governance and that we need to reconcile the global with the local. The 
state element of the global constituent power should not be seen as diminishing its 
global nature but rather as bolstering its legitimacy by ensuring self-government for 
individuals. Alongside the state component is the global component, that is made up of 
individuals regardless of their citizenship. This combination not only permits 
coordination among sites of constitutional governance and ensures concomitant self-
government by individuals at the domestic and global levels, but also strengthens forms 
of identity that do not revolve around citizenship.  
One may ask whether a global constituent power made up of a borderless global 
component and a state component is not better seen as two constituent powers joining 
forces rather than a single constituent power. We should note that it would be difficult 
to justify the existence of a purely global constituent power. While the domestic 
constituent powers have a purpose, aside from acting at the global level, the borderless 
global constituent power would never act on its own (because of the premise that a 
state element is necessary to enable the borderless global constituent power), making it 
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a powerless constituent power. This impossibility to act on its own is contrary to the 
notion of constituent power. Thus we must look at the global constituent power as a 
single constituent power made up of these two elements that work hand in hand.  
Section 2:	Exercise	of	the	constituent	power	beyond	the	nation-state 
Having identified the need for both a state component and a borderless global 
component within the global constituent power, it is now time to explore in more 
details how this global constituent power actually acts. There is not a single option but 
rather several options for each of the state element and the global element to exercise 
their power that may be combined.  
A. Common	features	
As usual, the starting point here is self-government. The constituent power must 
consent to the constitutional dot so the exercise of the constituent power must be 
tailored to reach that goal. In practice, this means that the involvement of the 
constituent power must be specific. Specificity refers both to the definition of the 
constitutional question on which the constituent power must weigh in and to the impact 
of the members of the constituent power – individuals - on the decision being made. 
There must be a plausible connection between the constitutional dot and the 
constituent power that is its source. We should note that specificity prescribes a certain 
timing of the involvement of the constituent power. We cannot expect the constituent 
power to participate in a specific manner if we are too far removed in time from the 
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constitutional dot-making. Conversely, the closer in time we are from the constitutional 
dot-making, the more likely it is that the constituent power’s involvement will be 
specific.    
Note here that we are talking specifically about the consent stage in the 
constitutionalization process and not about the drafting stage. Getting the constituent 
power involved at the time of drafting is not a theoretical necessity but a practical one. 
Obtaining consent is more likely if people have been involved ahead of the decision, in 
line with deliberative democracy principles.  
B. State	component	 	
The way the state component of the composite global constituent power may be 
exercised will depend on how it is analyzed. On the one hand, the exercise of the global 
constituent power could be seen as an amendment to the existing domestic constitution. 
I have explained above that ensuring popular sovereignty in the exercise of the global 
constituent power required that domestic constituent powers gave their consent. 
Exercises of the global constituent power typically result in either a transfer of 
competence to the supranational level or the introduction of limits on state powers. 
This type of modification clearly qualifies as a constitutional amendment at the 
domestic level. On the other hand, the exercise of the global constituent power, while 
requiring the participation of the domestic constituent power, is of a different nature. 
It is the combination of both the state component and the global component that make 
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up the global constituent power. Hence its name, the composite global constituent 
power.  If it starts out as an individual exercise of domestic constituent power, it merges 
with and morphs into the global constituent power the moment the global component 
and the state component agree to a constitutional dot.  
Adopting the latter approach means that the exercise of the state component is not 
constrained by the procedures for constitutional amendments provided for in domestic 
constitutions. While these procedures are definitely available, it is possible to think 
outside the box and offer novel modes of exercise of the state component.  
Constitutional	amendment	procedures	
	
Constitutions tend to be designed so as not to be too easily amended and provide for 
relatively cumbersome procedures. There are three main ways in which domestic 
constitutional amendments are usually adopted. 
Unfettered	direct	action	
Unfettered direct action is, from a theoretical point of view, the most ideal case. The 
constituent power expresses itself without any intermediary – though its expression is 
channeled by a procedure. The typical example would be a referendum on a specific 
issue or text.  
Special	representation	
This form of representation is “special” as it is established specifically for a 
constitutional amendment, in our case a global constitutional dot-making purpose, as 
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opposed to general-purpose forms of representation (parliament for instance). Ratifying 
conventions are a common example of special representation. At the global level, the 
proliferation of constitutional dot-making moments might make it cumbersome to hold 
elections every single time. We could conceive of specially elected representatives 
competent for a limited set of issues rather than a single global constitutional dot.  
Ordinary	representation	with	a	twist	
Another commonplace procedure for amending constitutions consists in relying on 
existing institutions. For instance, parliaments may be able to adopt amendments by a 
qualified majority vote. Occasionally, additional formal requirements are added. In 
France, it is required that both chambers of parliament meet in Versailles, the seat of 
the French monarchy since Louis XIV, to vote on a constitutional amendment.240 This 
method should not be used to exercise the state component as it does not meet the 
specificity requirement. The individuals making the decisions are too removed from the 
state component as they have not been selected for a specific constitutional purpose.  
Outside	the	box:	the	state	as	agent	
Another avenue that would not be governed by constitutional amendment procedures 
is available: exercise of the constituent power by states acting as agents of the state 
component. The specificity requirement mentioned above precludes the state from 
acting as agent of the constituent power simply by virtue of the constituent power 
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having created the state. Indeed, the act founding the agency relationship – the act of 
constituting – would look more like a blank check than a specific instruction on how to 
approach particular constitutional dot-making. In addition, the possibility that the 
constituent power does not even survive the act of constituting – a point debated in the 
literature - makes agency based on the act of constituting even less likely. The 
disappearance of the constituent power as principal would extinguish any agency 
relationship with the state. Nevertheless, specificity does not completely preclude states 
from acting as agents of the state component. In specific circumstances, states may 
rightly be deemed the agents of the state component. I will look at them briefly. 
Constituent	power	boosters		
We have established that the state cannot be considered as the agent of the constituent 
power simply by virtue of the constituent power having created the state. The state in 
this case would be lacking the necessary direct connection to the constituent power. 
The agency relationship needs to be supplemented by boosters, that is to say injections 
of constituent power that reactivate the connection and accountability between the 
agent and the principal and ensure that the will of the constituent power is the one that 
rules, thereby meeting the specificity requirement in both its meanings. Unlike referenda 
and special representation, practices qualifying as boosters are not formal, which makes 
them harder to pinpoint. A booster of the state element will logically be found within 
state borders. The challenge here is to ensure that booster phenomena or practices are 
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representative of the constituent power despite their informality. Let us review potential 
candidates.  
Social	movements	
Social movements, understood as individuals acting – usually protesting - together to 
effect social change, could be seen as a manifestation of the constituent power. They 
indeed represent the idea of a collective and of action, two qualities of the constituent 
power. Social movements can be said to be specific to the extent that they usually 
emerge in response to a specific issue. However, social movements do not always 
change the government’s policy, including for legitimacy reasons. Unlike social 
movements, governments usually enjoy democratic legitimacy through free and fair 
elections. How representative are social movements? How do we ascertain that the view 
put forward is really that of the constituent power? We could derive the 
representativeness of social movements as constituent power from the lack of 
opposition to the same, or the lack of equal or greater opposition. In other words, the 
lack of opposition to the opposition would signify acceptance of the opposition. By 
definition, the constituent power is free at any point in time to resurface to establish a 
new order if the old one is no longer satisfactory. Thus it could be argued that its silence 
means its acceptance. On the other hand, why would we more readily construe such 
silence as support for the opposition as opposed to support for the government? 
Furthermore, this negative approach misconstrues the nature of the constituent power, 
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which exists through its actions, whose existence is verified by its actions – the doubt 
is always present what its absence truly signifies. Thus social movements hardly seem 
to constitute an appropriate constituent power booster.  
Non-state	actors	
What about non-state actors, in particular civil society organizations? They could be 
seen as channeling the interests of individuals all the way to the government and could 
negotiate with the government, whenever needed, to arrive at a mutually agreeable 
position. Negotiation here would be the key to the legitimacy of the arrangement. This 
would build on principles of deliberative democracy, which seeks to expand public 
participation in the decision-making process beyond the act of voting. But for this to 
work as a constituent power booster, individuals must be confident that their voice has 
been heard. This would require government to commit to and organize genuine and 
transparent deliberations involving all non-state actors that are interested in 
participating.  
Public	comments	
Another potential constituent booster could be public consultations preceded by a 
media campaign to alert individuals of the upcoming constitutional dot-making. This 
would present the advantage of not filtering the voice of individuals and would mobilize 
civil society organizations, encouraging them to contribute to the debate. This option 
may not be reduced to reliance on public opinion. Public opinion can be considered as 
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an ersatz of constituent power, a powerless constituent power. The specificity 
requirement, in particular the control over the outcome, may not be fulfilled. Public 
opinion does not predictably sway the government’s policy and thus does not meet the 
specificity requirement.  
This form of involvement of the general public in constitutional matters has been 
developing, thanks to new technologies. We have seen most recently the example of 
Iceland, that has experimented with constitutional crowdsourcing.241 It is likely that new 
modes of participation in decision-making may appear in the future creating new 
opportunities for participation. 
In this part, I have outlined the various paths that the state component of the composite 
global constituent power can take, from the most direct to the least direct form of 
action. In the latter case, the need arises for a constituent power booster to ensure that 
the connection between the domestic constituent power and its agent, the state, remains 
tight. I have mentioned a few possible – imperfect - boosters. The challenge lies in their 
informality, which constitutes a hurdle to ensuring adequate representation.  
C. Global	component	
When it comes to the global component of the global constituent power, the question 
of its exercise turns mostly on the practicality of mobilizing such a large group of 
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people. We can conceive of a continuum of acceptable practices, from the more direct 
to the less direct form of action, from the more formal to the less formal. The main 
requirement is that the mode of exercise must result in decisions that embody the will 
of the global component.   
This requirement prevents reliance on an assembly of states or on traditional 
international organizations. We could have imagined the creation of an assembly of 
states that would make decisions on global constitutional dots, possibly modelled after 
the UN General Assembly that some occasionally compare to a world parliament. The 
state representatives could either have been state officials or have been directly elected 
by citizens in their respective countries. However, the main issue with this solution is 
that it would negate the very existence of a global component. I have argued earlier that 
the global component of the global constituent power is essential as it reflects the fact 
that there is a common core of issues that affect individuals all over the world in a 
similar fashion regardless of their geographic location. This indicates that there is a 
global demos, even if to a significantly lesser extent than the common core that cements 
domestic constituent powers. The global demos needs to fully express itself regardless 
of borders. Having recourse to an assembly of states would do just the opposite.  
Similarly, traditional international organizations are not structured in such a way as to 
reflect the will of the global component of the global constituent power.  They follow 
the intergovernmental model and provide individuals with very little access to decision-
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making processes. Thus the outcome of the decision-making process in traditional 
international organizations is a compromise found among the will of the various states 
rather than the will of individuals across the world. Furthermore, many international 
organizations do not have a membership that covers the whole world. While the United 
Nations is one of the few organizations that has quasi universal membership of states, 
individuals have little access to the UN agencies, certainly not on a regular basis or as a 
matter of course. This option cannot be considered. Let’s now turn to methods that 
truly enable the global component. 
Unfettered	direct	action	and	special	representation	
 Just like for the state component, unfettered direct action, for instance through the 
organization of referenda, or special representation, through the election of special 
dedicated representatives, are both available options in theory. Practically speaking, 
both unfettered direct action and special representation seem equally unlikely. They 
would require a global electoral campaign and the introduction of a worldwide voting 
system. Not even addressing practical concerns such as financing of the elections, we 
can see that these theoretical answers would likely fail at the implementation phase (see 
below Chapter 6). However, new forms of involvement of the general public in 
constitutional matters have been developing, relying on new technologies. As I have 
mentioned above, Iceland has experimented with constitutional crowdsourcing.242 It is 
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likely that modes of participation of individuals in decision-making may evolve with 
progress in technology and that new possibilities will emerge in the near future. 
Mediation	
 
Against this background, mediation of the global component must be taken seriously. 
There is no obvious candidate here since we do not have a world state that could 
potentially fulfill this role. Thus the mediator has to be found somewhere else. It seems 
difficult to find a single candidate that would span the whole world of individuals while 
at the same time provide easy access to individuals to ensure they really are the decision-
makers. Such mediator could also reignite the fears of hegemony of the opponents to 
global constitutionalism.     
Following the lead of internet governance, we could think of non-state actors as 
candidates. The aim would be to entrust non-state actors with the difficult task of 
channeling all the various interests and opinions that the general population may have. 
This would build on principles of deliberative democracy, which seeks to expand public 
participation in the decision-making process. The motto would be the more diversity 
the better, hoping that a balanced solution would be found. The possibility of non-state 
actors as mediating the global element of the global constituent power, however, raises 
various issues.  
 	 170 
Which	non-state	actors?	Global	scope	requirement	
The non-state actor category almost seems like a sweeping rug. Any entity that is not a 
state or related to a state should qualify as a non-state actor. One may ask whether 
individuals can be non-state actors. While in theory it would seem possible, individuals 
are not commonly included as such in this category. The concept of non-state actors 
comes from international relations and has been used to describe new forms of power 
in the international system that have been enjoying some legitimacy independently of 
states. An individual alone would rarely have authority in this sense. Commonly cited 
examples are global market forces, private market institutions engaged in the setting of 
international standards, human rights and environmental non-governmental 
organizations, transnational religious movements, or even mafia and mercenary 
armies.243  
What is the value of relying on this concept? First of all, we shall underline the fact that 
the goal here is to offer mediation for the global element of the global constituent power 
while meeting the specificity requirement. Because the global constituent power has a 
state component, we do not want to duplicate it and thus require a global component 
to be truly global. Relying on entities that are disconnected from states is the first step 
in this direction. This requirement raises interesting issues. What is truly global? Would 
a national NGO be allowed? Lack of financial means for instance could explain that a 
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particular group’s reach remains circumscribed to one country. Could we require them 
instead to adhere to a transnational network? What if a group has such a unique take 
on issues that it cannot be part of a transnational network? Should particularized 
interests be ignored? 
Second of all, the vagueness of the concept of non-state actors is a positive attribute 
and should be embraced. It is actually the key to representativeness. This is surprising, 
if not downright paradoxical. How can we establish representativeness if we do not 
know who is participating? Because we are situated at the global level, in the absence of 
a world state, representativeness plays out differently. It is difficult to set objective 
criteria to evaluate representativeness – numerical or otherwise – because of the lack of 
structure. Actually, one may even wonder who would be entitled to check whether 
criteria are met or not. Representativeness is a major concern precisely because of the 
necessary informality of the practice. Vagueness here presents the great advantage of 
enabling inclusiveness. It is compatible with a bottom-up process by giving the 
constituent power the ability to act in a more organic unfiltered fashion. This principle 
of inclusiveness simply means that all non-state actors are allowed to participate. There 
is an open invitation for participation.  
Does this mean there is no prerequisite for participation? Are all non-state actors equally 
entitled to participate? The answer has to be yes. All non-state actors are legitimate. 
Legitimacy should not to be thought of entity by entity but as a whole. Legitimacy will 
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come from the fact that all individuals, through non-state actors, are able to voice their 
opinion. Evaluating legitimacy at the level of each entity would amount to restricting 
the expression of particular opinions. We are less concerned by the content of the 
opinions that are being raised than by the fact that these opinions are being raised. This 
is a better reflection of the diversity of opinions among individuals from all over the 
globe and who together constitute the global component of the global constituent 
power. The main concern is to create the conditions for a decision to be made after all 
interested parties have been given the opportunity to participate and express their 
opinions. This is in line with deliberative democracy, which stands for the fact that 
democracy cannot be reduced to a vote. It requires more from citizens, including their 
informed and active participation ahead of what is usually a vote. This requires a 
systemic evaluation of legitimacy and representativeness, as opposed to an itemized 
evaluation.  
What if powerful individuals were to create many such non-state actors so as to control 
the process or unduly influence outcomes? Just like there is a risk of overrepresentation 
of certain groups, there are obvious risks of underrepresentation of certain groups. If 
anything, money issues among others might make participation of groups from 
economically less developed regions of the world harder. These concerns however do 
not stem from the composition of the global component of the constituent power and 
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are better seen as an implementation issue that can be addressed by a careful choice of 
decision-making procedures.  
The question arises whether the inclusiveness principle knows of any limits. Can we 
exclude any group? If so, on which basis? To take a rather extreme (and possibly 
unrealistic) example, we can ask whether terrorists groups, which are commonly 
included in the non-state actor category, belong to the global element or not. While the 
instinctive answer is likely to be no, a reasoned answer needs to elaborate on the notion 
of lawfulness. Because we do not want to duplicate the state component, the shape of 
the global component should not be conditioned upon states. This excludes criteria 
such as lawful purpose or legal personality that are bestowed by states or by reference 
to states. Because we cannot rely on states’ conception of lawfulness, we need to find a 
global definition of lawfulness. There is a body of international law that could be relied 
on to exclude terrorist groups from the global component. But this raises a host of 
other issues, not least among them the question whether the constituent power may be 
bound by any law. Such laws would not be self-enforcing and thus would require the 
involvement of a court. Once again, would that be compatible with the exercise of the 
constituent power? The domestic constituent power is de facto bound by domestic laws 
that regulate such things as who is entitled to vote. That would tend to show that the 
global component may similarly be constrained by international laws. Alternatively, we 
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could introduce full openness and rely on deliberation to ensure outcomes that are 
compatible with the values associated with global constitutionalism. 
Because there is no selection of the non-state actors, there will be overlaps and 
redundancies, and in all likelihood gaps. An individual may feel that several non-state 
actors represent his or her interests, thereby fully expressing the complexity of 
individuals’ identity. Individuals do not have just one defining feature but often feel 
pulled in various, and sometimes opposite, directions. The absence of selection of non-
state actors means that individuals in all their complexity can be represented. This also 
decreases the risk of communautarization that would result from individuals being each 
represented or at least mediated by a single entity. Individuals do not have to choose 
and can participate through as many groups as they deem appropriate, fully expressing 
the richness of their identity. This should also incidentally promote dialogue. If the same 
individuals are members of several groups, then those groups might recognize a 
common core more readily than otherwise. Once again, inclusiveness might work 
towards better communication and more trust. 
Non-state actors thus will be any entity, whether or not formally organized, that may 
claim to be the voice of a group of individuals. Non-governmental organizations or 
religious groups would be likely candidates. But what about the private sector? Whose 
interests do corporations represent? This takes us back to some extent to the origins of 
multistakeholderism and the understanding of corporations as a place where the often 
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conflicting interests of a plurality of stakeholders converge and are processed – that of 
employees, customers, shareholders, subcontractors, suppliers, among others. In this 
broad understanding of the corporation as being more than the exclusive instrument of 
the shareholders, corporations can be seen as representing a plurality of interests. 
Actually, all groups represent a plurality of interests. It would be a rare case when all 
the members of the group believe and think exactly alike. Instead, groups’ opinions 
result from the confrontation of the diverging ideas of members. The voice of every 
group is already a mashup.  The question thus becomes whether mashups can 
sufficiently be traced back to individuals so as to be representative of them or not. It 
seems that the answer depends on how the mashup is arrived at. With some exceptions, 
we may believe that members who would disagree with a decision made by the group 
would simply elect to leave the group and find or even found a more suitable one. This 
rationale of implicit support is often advanced as a (rather unsatisfactory) way to solve 
the intra-generational conflict in domestic constitutionalism, as we shall see below in 
Chapter 6. In this case, it might work better since the cost of exit is low compared to 
the cost of exiting one’s country.  
Access	and	connection:	specificity	requirement	
Access by individuals to non-state actors is usually easier than participation in domestic 
political systems. For instance, it is easier to become a member of an NGO than a 
citizen of a country (generally that is, unless you are really rich or really athletic). Thus 
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participation could in theory be broader and more inclusive. At the domestic level, 
citizenship constitutes the main obstacle preventing many from effective participation 
into the exercise of the constituent power, when it relies on unfettered action or special 
representation. The global element of the global constituent power is free from 
citizenship concerns. Participation is available to all.  
How do we ensure that individuals feel that there is a direct connection between the 
ultimate decision and their own opinion? They must understand – and trust – the 
making of the decision. The importance of allowing all to participate and the 
importance of articulating the rationales underlying decisions cannot be overstated. The 
decision-making process must be designed with this concern in mind. At least two main 
approaches are conceivable. Either a structured decision-making process, relying on a 
pyramidal structure or, on the contrary, a spontaneous expression of opinion by 
interested parties.  
Structured decision-making requires that someone be in charge of structuring. Issues 
of constitutional governance usually will fall within the jurisdiction of an international 
organization or supranational entity of some kind. One need only to look at the list of 
international organizations, for instance, to discover that many issues that are under the 
radar of even well-informed people have their own dedicated organization. These 
organizations could take the lead in structuring the decision-making. International 
organizations, by definition, have an international membership that could be relied on 
 	 177 
to reach out globally to individuals. It would however be imperative that the organizing 
organization not turn into a gatekeeper. Imposing certain procedures for participation 
might end up excluding some from the process.  
The case may also arise where several organizations are candidates for leading the 
decision-making. A possible way to structure the decision-making would be by 
introducing a pyramidal process, with the organization of many local meetings, that 
would feed into regional meetings, that would feed into global meetings, where the final 
decision would be made. The possibility of this bottom-up process to be followed by a 
top-down process could be explored. The top-down process would be meant to ensure 
that the decision reached at the global level does not ignore views expressed at the most 
local level by a substantial number of people.  
At the other end of the spectrum, we could conceive of a spontaneous movement 
leading to the emergence of a shared decision. This would be very similar to a social 
movement. Practically, it seems unlikely that this would happen globally. Without 
anyone being assigned the duty to convene and organize, we may also doubt whether 
all global constitutional dots would receive any attention. Let us not forget that though 
constitutional governance, by definition, deals with issues of the utmost importance, it 
does not mean that mobilization would reflect the importance of a particular issue. 
Highly technical issues, for instance, might stay under the radar of many, creating 
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orphan global constitutional dots. It would also be difficult to decide when a decision 
has been reached.  
D. Majority	vs.	unanimity	
Domestic constitutionalism has been struggling with justifying its reliance on the 
majority rule in constituent power matters. How will this affect the global constituent 
power? Let us look at each component in turn before looking at their articulation.  
Within the domestic component, we need to distinguish further. Within each state, 
unfettered and special representation will follow traditional procedures and thus rely on 
majority rule. The same goes when states act as agents. Because mediation happens 
through the state and the state, assumed to be democratic, does represent the majority 
of individuals, there is a majoritarian support albeit not specific to the constitutional 
moment at stake. The boosters are there to reactivate this majoritarian support. Though 
it does not entail a vote, state mediation still has a majority underpinning.  
At the level of the domestic component, which aggregates all domestic constituent 
powers, do we follow unanimity or majority rule? There is a dilemma here. On the one 
hand, as I have explained earlier, global constitutionalism justifies the fact that certain 
norms of international law bind states that have not consented to them. This would 
support the majority rule. On the other hand, not requiring unanimity means that 
certain domestic constituent powers may choose not to consent to the delegation of 
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competence to the global constituent power. What happens then? Does it jeopardize 
the global constitutional dot-making?  
A domestic constituent power that has refused delegation of power cannot be deemed 
to be bound by decisions adopted by the global constituent power. This statement 
seems to contradict one of the key narratives associated with global constitutionalism, 
namely that it explains how states may be bound even when they have not consented. 
However, we should not forget that when it comes to global constitutional dot-making, 
it is not states’ consent that matters – but the state component’s. The distinction is 
crucial. States do not hold the constituent power – individuals do. Indeed, it may very 
well be the case that states, understood as real persons, may want to reject a particular 
constitutional dot that the corresponding domestic constituent powers, exercising their 
powers in accordance with the procedures outlined above, choose to embrace.  
Within the global component, unfettered action and special representation, if they ever 
were implemented, would likely rely on the majority rule as well. As for the case of 
mediation via non-state actors, the informality of the practice requires consensus. It 
would not be possible to define a majority because of the necessary vagueness and 
openness of the process.   
The relationship between both elements of the global constituent power flows naturally 
from their respective roles. Both elements of the global constituent power have a 
different role and we cannot do without either of them. We need both. Thus both need 
 	 180 
to consent for a constitutional dot-making to happen. We need the consent of the state 
component to establish the delegation of power. Then the global element needs to reach 
a consensus on the substance of the constitutional dot-making. Only if we have both 
can we say that we have a global constitutional dot. 
It is because of these distinct but complementary roles that we require unanimity. 
Habermas argued that unanimity was necessary because both components of his dual 
constituent power were made up of the same unit: individuals. But this disregards the 
fact that by treating each component equally, we de facto institute inequality between 
the weight of an individual as part of the global component and the weight of the same 
individual as part of the domestic component. Thus justifying unanimity by focusing 
on the fact that the unit of reference is the same is not as strong an argument as might 
seem.  
In this chapter, I have outlined a model for a composite global constituent power 
model, one that aims to increase the legitimacy of global constitutionalism by securing 
the consent of the governed while at the same time avoiding the hegemonic fears of 
some critics. Koskenniemi for instance wrote that  
[t]he agreement that some norms simply must be superior to other norms is not 
reflected in any consensus in regard to who should have a final say on this. The 
debate on an international constitution will not resemble domestic constitution-
making. This is so ot only because the international realm lacks a pouvoir 
constituant but because if such presented itself, it would be empire, and the 
 	 181 
constitution it would enact would not be one of an international but an imperial 
realm.244  
The unanimity requirement combined with the shared role of the domestic and global 
peoples as constituent power should alleviate some of Koskenniemi’s concerns. 
However, I do not mean to say that the composite global constituent power model is 
unimpeachable. In the next chapter, I will provide an overview of the limits of the 
model.  
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CHAPTER 6: SOME LIMITS OF THE COMPOSITE GLOBAL 
CONSTITUENT POWER MODEL 
    
In this chapter, I am discussing the limits to the composite global constituent power 
model. I first compare it to the other global constituent power theories described earlier 
in Chapter 4 and observe that it addresses most, but not all, the gaps I had identified in 
the existing literature (Section 1). I then discuss the limits inherent to my choice of 
international law theory, namely global constitutionalism (Section 2). I finally point out 
the practical obstacles that the implementation of the composite global constituent 
power would face (Section 3).    
Section	1:	A	solution	to	many	gaps	in	the	existing	global	constituent	power	literature	 
In Chapter 4, I described the current literature on the global constituent power and 
highlighted some missing pieces in those emerging theories of global constituent power. 
In this section, I assess the composite global constituent power model in light of those 
missing pieces.  
The first limit identified in the existing literature related to the method of identification 
of the global constituent power. In particular, I criticized the exclusive reliance of the 
emerging theories of global constituent power on textual sources or preexisting notions 
such as the international community and called for a reasoned standalone framework, 
lest the global constituent power just become another more respectable name for what 
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is already in place. The composite global constituent power model is a model that does 
not begin with texts. Instead, it starts by identifying the fundamental parameters that 
the model must take into account. The first parameter is popular sovereignty and the 
need to implement it at the global level while maintaining it at the state level. The second 
parameter is the nature of the globalization process as a movement away from the states 
in the direction of the global level. These two parameters work as two axes defining a 
plane within which to try and identify the global constituent power. This process allows 
us to step back and distance ourselves from specific wording, the interpretation of 
which may always be disputed. It has a pedagogical function as well as clarifies the 
reasoning. It also helps situate criticism of the composite global constituent power 
model, whether it is aimed at the assumptions or at the implementation of the 
assumptions, thereby allowing a more fruitful debate.  
The second set of limits comes from the pointillist nature of global constitutionalism. 
Many of the emerging theories of global constituent power identify states as global co-
constituent power. However, because of the pointillist nature of global 
constitutionalism, the global constituent power is called on to act on a regular basis, 
which raises the question of the effectiveness of constitutional constraints on states as 
constituted powers when they are as likely to often act as constituent power as well. 
There might be confusion regarding the capacity in which they act in a given case. On 
the contrary, in the composite global constituent power model, states never hold the 
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constituent power. They at best exercise the constituent power as mediators, in which 
case constituent power boosters are there to pressure states into acting according to the 
will of the actual constituent power. Another issue that flows from the pointillist nature 
of global constitutionalism is when and how the global constituent power is created. In 
and of itself, the composite global constituent power model does not weigh in on this 
issue. It is compatible with both the view that the constituent power predates the 
constituting act and the view that the constituent power results from the constituting 
act. However, the pointillist nature of global constitutionalism, within which the 
composite global constituent power fits, would seem to suggest that the global 
constituent power predates the constituting act. If not, we would be in a situation where 
the constituent power never really gets constituted since the constitutionalization 
process happens over time, possibly perpetually.  
The third type of limits stems from states acting as co-constituent power alongside 
individuals in several of the reviewed emerging theories of global constituent power, 
and the fact that the former retain power over the latter. In the composite global 
constituent power model, the issue does not arise with the same intensity, and possibly 
not at all, as states do not hold the global constituent power. The composite global 
constituent power model only completely removes states from the picture at the level 
of the global component. They may be mediators of the state component of the global 
constituent power, in which case the question of their power over individuals, the true 
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holders of the global constituent power, may come up. Here again the function of the 
constituent power boosters is to address this concern by requiring that states consult 
and follow the constituent power.  
The fourth type of limit revolves around mediation of the global constituent power and 
asks whether the constituent power can ever be mediated or should always act 
unfettered. The composite global constituent power does not fully do away with this 
limit, though it tries to attenuate it by offering alternatives to mediation. If mediation is 
indeed the path taken, likely for practical reasons, the composite global constituent 
power model incorporates boosters as a way to ensure compliance with the will of the 
constituent power. According to the composite global constituent power model and its 
specificity requirement, boosters must occur at a time that is close to the constitutional 
dot-making moment to ensure that the connection between the constituent power and 
the mediator is tight.  
 
Overall, the composite global constituent power model represents a further step in the 
direction of a global constituent power theory. Its commitment to popular sovereignty 
and the reassignment of states from co-constituent power to mediators at most 
addresses and alleviates most concerns. I now turn to limits related to my choice of 
global constitutionalism as international law theory.    
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Section	2:	Carrying	the	burden	of	constitutionalism	and	global	constitutionalism’s	faults 
So far, I have described global constitutionalism in very positive terms, arguing that 
global constitutionalism has a lot to contribute to the efforts to increase the legitimacy 
of international law. Nevertheless, we shall not be fooled by an overly rosy picture of 
global constitutionalism. It has its detractors, who raise many negative points associated 
with global constitutionalism. These are in addition to the weaknesses of 
constitutionalism that naturally carry over into global constitutionalism.  
In the latter category, we find the many theoretical puzzles raised by the notion of 
constituent power. Some would argue that the notion of constituent power is plagued 
by so many internal contradictions as to be rendered useless, or worse, damaging at the 
international level. One such contradiction that has not been mentioned yet relates to 
the constituent power’s consent. To be thought as the maker of the constitution, the 
constituent power has to consent. This proposition is far more complex than it sounds. 
As one scholar eloquently said, “[t]o accept without reflection the legitimating function 
of consent and to substitute the myth of social contract for that of divine rights of kings 
is to reject both the value of reason and the necessity of offering a reasoned explanation 
for a political system.”245  
																																																						
245 W. F. Murphy, Consent and Constitutional Change, 127-145, 127 in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
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Two obvious limitations come to shake the simple logic of the consent of the governed. 
On the one hand, and not even going into details about the quality of the consent (i.e. 
free, informed etc.), consent seems apt at legitimating the constitution only if it is 
unanimous. In practice, unanimous consent seems impossible to obtain (assuming 
people are free not to consent). Can the consent of less than all of the governed make 
the constitution legitimate? How can a constitution be legitimate to those who have not 
consented to it? “Why should the losers in the constitutional strife accept the outcome 
as the will of “We the People” that incorporates their will as well as the will of their 
winning rivals despite these alienating conditions?” asks Tremblay.246 What about those 
who have abstained? Can they be said to have consented? Hardly so. As Barnett puts 
it, a system in which a less than unanimous consent could legitimize the constitution 
could be said to play by the following rules: “’Heads’ you consent, ‘tails’ you consent, 
‘didn't flip the coin,’ guess what? You consent as well.”247 For Barnett, “[t]his is simply 
not consent.”248  
The dead hand argument249 underlines another fundamental flaw of the consent theory. 
How can consent at time t bind later generations? Jefferson proposed that each 
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generation consent anew to the US constitution.250 In addition to being quite 
impractical, it would not have solved the issue. There would still be people, falling in 
between two generations for instance, who would not have been given an opportunity 
to consent. It has been argued that the deadhand is the best way to save the sovereign 
from itself, its own madness, by constraining its later actions. But, as Tremblay points 
out, “it is not fair to characterize the constitution-making generation and subsequent 
generations who are bound by the constitution made by the former as rational and 
irrational moments of the same agent.”251  
To cope with these conflicts, arguments have been made in favor of a less literal and 
more relaxed definition of consent. For instance, the receipt of benefits of a particular 
legal system has also been seen as approximating consent under the principle of fair 
play.252 So has continuous residency within the jurisdiction, based on the rational that if 
you didn’t like it, you would have left it. This strategy has not convinced all authors.253 
Some have displaced the burden of legitimation from the mythical consent to 
compliance with certain values. For instance, Barnett explained that “if a constitution 
contains adequate procedures to assure that laws imposed on non-consenting persons 
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are just (or not unjust), it can be legitimate even if not consented to unanimously.”254 
His vision of constitutional legitimacy is procedural in nature – the legitimacy of the 
constitution depends on how procedures are designed - but presupposes the adoption 
of a theory of justice by which to evaluate the legitimacy of the constitution.255 Similarly, 
in Murphy’s view, consent is a manifestation of human dignity, which is the ultimate 
legitimator.256 Only a political system that protects and fosters human dignity will be 
legitimate. Human dignity, “based on a capacity to reason, a need for moral autonomy, 
and an ability to make morally binding commitments,”257 thus requires that people be 
given the opportunity to consent.258 
This criticism is powerful as it goes to the heart of my theory of global constitutionalism. 
Regarding the intra-generational conflict, the composite global constituent power 
model requires unanimity between both domestic and state components but that does 
not mean that unanimity is required within each component. As far as the 
intergenerational conflict is concerned, it also remains as it is hard to conceive of a 
functioning constituent power that would constantly be unanimously consenting to the 
same thing over and over again to ensure that all people living under constitutional 
norms have agreed to it. While global constitutionalism follows a pointillist pattern and 
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the global constituent power will be called on to act on a regular basis, it does not mean 
that it will be asked to consent to the same issue again and again but rather that it will 
be asked to consent on many different issues. That may at least contribute to the 
involvement of each generation to the global constitutional project and may help 
individuals feel committed to the overarching process. 
For those who do not reject the notion of constituent power as a matter of principle, 
the absence of a global demos constitutes a sizeable issue. The idea of a global 
constituent power, or at least the possibility of a constituent power beyond the state, 
requires that a corresponding people exists. No demos, no constituent power, the 
argument goes. This kind of reasoning can be criticized as it assumes a very narrow 
definition of demos. The no demos argument transposes domestic solutions to the 
international realm. The global demos would be in all respects the same – including the 
degree of cohesion - as the domestic demos on a bigger scale. However, the question 
whether there is a global demos is far from being settled in literature. List and Koenig-
Archibugi note that there is not a single definition for global demos.259 A demos could 
be defined as a group of people affected by a certain issue, or sharing certain traits, or 
as capable of forming a general will. Depending on how one defines a global demos, 
one may very well conclude that there is indeed a global demos, or that there will soon 
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be, or that there might be, or that it is impossible to ever be. There are many authors, 
which List and Koenig-Archibugi call the “optimists” or possibilists,” who do believe 
that a global demos exists, even if in embryonic form.260  As we saw in Chapter 5, the 
global constituent power is called on to decide on narrower issues that the domestic 
constituent powers. This may justify a less cohesive, less intense constituent power than 
at the domestic level. The composite global constituent power in its global component 
embraces the possibility of a global people. In internet governance, physical location 
does not carry exactly the same weight as when it comes to internet matters. Internet 
users may share similar experiences wherever they are in the world. As explained in 
Chapter 1, the internet is borders blind and has fostered communication across nations, 
and as a result the sense of closeness and shared destiny among people. We often hear 
the terms “netizen” or information society, which convey the idea that a group of 
people has appeared that does not define itself by its relationship with states but by its 
relationships to the internet. It thus does not seem unreasonable to side with those who 
believe that a global demos may exist. The purpose here is not to declare the notion of 
constituent power flawless and unimpeachable. It is simply to offer the global 
constituent power as a possible approach to increase legitimacy in global governance. 
Constitutionalism without a constituent power does not allow for the democratic 
determination of what the content of the constitutional norms should be.  
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Most attacks on global constitutionalism, however, have tended not to focus on the 
constituent power. This is unsurprising as global constitutionalism has positioned itself 
more as an overarching system of rules that can bring order in an otherwise chaotic 
world than as a theory of legitimacy based on consent of the governed. The most 
common criticisms are that global constitutionalism would lead to hegemony, less 
diversity, and a lack of accountability.261 We can see here the specter of a world 
government controlled by a happy few imposing their laws onto the whole of 
humankind, regardless of their specificities or wishes. Because the nation-state is seen 
as the only guarantor of freedom, a world government can only mean the end of 
freedom. This concern may be dismissed easily, as the vast majority of global 
constitutionalists do not advocate for a global government. Global constitutionalism 
should certainly not be reduced to the institution of a world government. A global 
constituent power should not be equated with a single world government, as the 
composite global constituent power model shows.  
Another serious attack has to do with constitutionalism’s image, its aura. It is often 
claimed that having recourse to constitutional language gives an air of respectability to 
processes beyond the state that might not actually deserve such positive labels, almost 
as if our subconscious automatically associated constitutionalism with legitimacy and 
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authority.262 Schwobel warns against the self-legitimation danger, writing that “[t]he 
rhetoric of global constitutionalism could be (mis)used to award legitimacy to global 
constitutional ideas themselves. The description of cooperation, the force of the law 
that is believed to exist despite violations, and other constitutionalist parlance can be 
viewed as the attempt of advocates of global constitutionalism to bring about what they 
describe as already existing.”263 Here again insisting on the requirement that the 
governed consent to constitutional rules should alleviate these concerns. 
Section	3:	Significant	implementation	difficulties	
Implementation difficulties are as important as theoretical limits. For the composite 
global constituent power model to work, practical hurdles at both the domestic and 
global levels will have to be overcome.      
A. State	component	
	
When it comes to the exercise of the state component of the global constituent power, 
a challenge will consist in ensuring that the state component is aware of and engaged in 
the global constitutional dot-making. The modes of exercise of the state component 
described above rely heavily on governments. Indeed, referenda and elections are 
usually initiated by governmental institutions. Even when states act as agent, states are 
also in a leading position, despite the constituent power boosters. As a result, it is of 
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paramount importance that governments accurately characterize the decisions at stake 
as global constitutional and act accordingly by soliciting the state component’s will. 
Since, as explained above, the exercise of the state component is not bound by the 
domestic constitution, we can think of ways in which this hurdle may be partly lifted. It 
could be decided that citizens could trigger the process themselves, including by 
collecting a certain number of signatures, with the government being bound to follow 
through. We must recognize that the global constitutional nature of a decision might 
not be easy to ascertain.       
B. Global	component	
The obvious difficulty in the exercise of the global component of the composite global 
constituent power is the scale. Organizing anything on a global scale is bound to be a 
challenge. The challenges are of two types: firstly, logistical difficulties, in which I would 
include the organization of the vote (in case of a vote, i.e. referendum of election); 
establishing rules governing the voting process, election finance, compliance with the 
rules… E-voting might alleviate some of these issues, including the actual logistics of 
organizing voting. However, that would require each state to ensure that all its citizens 
have access to the internet to vote. Reliance on non-state actors might be plagued by 
fewer issues. For instance, organizing and funding the campaign would not be the 
responsibility of some global entity but shared among all non-state actors. However, 
this leads to another issue, which is the inevitable inequality among non-state actors, 
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and the likely underrepresentation of certain groups. Participation into the decision-
making process could be remote, though it is hard to believe that remote participation 
is as good as in-person participation.   
The second type of challenge consists in mobilizing people. ICANN’s experience is 
telling in that respect.  Indeed, at the very beginning of its existence, ICANN had briefly 
experimented with global elections. The experience turned out to be a failure, not so 
much for logistical reasons, but mostly for a lack of widespread popular engagement. 
We must remember that the digital divide is real and that a large portion of the world 
population has not used the internet and among those who are internet users, an even 
smaller group is interested in internet issues to the point of getting informed and 
exercising their prerogatives. A similar response might be expected even on non-
internet related topics. Participation rates in regular domestic elections are relatively 
low. To expect a better rates of participation for global issues would require a massive 
effort at the local level. Once again, this could be done by non-state actors in the case 
of mediation, or by states in the case of unfettered direct action and special 
representation.  
The composite global constituent power model by no means addresses all questions 
and ends all discussions. Rather it serves as a basis for new discussions, whether it would 
be about counterproposals or limits of the model. With the limits described in this 
chapter in mind, I now apply the principles regarding the identity of the composite 
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global constituent power to internet governance and ask whether multistakeholderism 
may be considered as an iteration of the global constituent power.  
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CHAPTER 7: MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM AS A COMPOSITE 
GLOBAL CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
Chapter 7 brings together global constitutionalism and internet governance by applying 
the composite global constituent power model to multistakeholderism. In particular, 
we first ask the conditions under which multistakeholderism may be legitimized by the 
composite global constituent power model. This accomplishes two things: it provides 
legitimacy to multistakeholderism and helps substantiate it (Section 1). We then proceed 
to look at ICANN’s gTLD program, a global constitutional dot in internet governance, 
and offer suggestions on how to conform it to global constitutionalism (Section 2).    
Section	1:	Legitimizing	equal	multistakeholderism	 
In this section, I shall explain how the composite global constituent power model helps 
define each stakeholder’s role and promotes equality among them.  
A. A	newfound	role	for	each	stakeholder	
Approaching internet governance, and in particular multistakeholderism, via the global 
constituent power angle, firmly places individuals at the center. The WSIS Outcome 
Documents support this approach as they underline the need to build a “people-
centered” information society as the main goal.264  
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For memory, the composite global constituent power model’s main features are as 
follows: 
1) decision-making belongs to individuals in two capacities, as members of the state 
component and members of the global component;  
2) both the state and global components must consent to global constitutional dot-
making moments;  
3) The state component is made up of the individuals within the jurisdiction of a 
state;  
4) states do not make decisions – they may only serve as agents of the state 
component, in which case there must be mechanisms to ensure that they stay 
within the bounds of their role and implement the will of the state component; 
5) the global component is completely disassociated from states: it comprises all the 
individuals in the world; 
6) non-state actors, understood in the most inclusive way, may act as mediators of 
the global component.  
How does multistakeholderism fit in, if at all? Each stakeholder, namely states, civil 
society and the private sector, may be found legitimate under certain conditions under 
the composite global constituent power model. The underlying assumption is that the 
nature of the contemplated decision(s) is of a global constitutional nature. With respect 
to internet governance, this would include decisions impacting rights and freedoms, or 
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allocating power to regulate certain global aspects of the internet. Let us review what 
could be the role of each stakeholder under the composite global constituent power 
model.  
States	
States may only be involved in the exercise of the global constituent power as mediators 
of the state component. Their participation in the making of global constitutional dots 
is guided by their respective domestic component that keeps states accountable through 
constituent power boosters. States cannot simply appoint government officials to 
negotiate and participate in talks, the way they would at any intergovernmental 
conference. The composite global constituent power model forces a shift in states’ 
perception and understanding of themselves.  
Civil	society	and	private	sector	
Under certain conditions, these two categories, though different in many respects, 
including the nature of their aspirations and their structure, could be considered 
together as the mediators of the global component. One does not go without the other. 
One does not prevail over the other. In the past, civil society has had a more difficult 
time than the private sector in establishing its role in internet governance. The private 
sector was indeed de facto an active participant in internet governance as we have seen 
in Chapter 1. Because there is no procedure or rule structuring the mediation of the 
global component, there is a risk that civil society might be overshadowed by the private 
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sector. As we have said above in Chapter 6, the informality of the procedure may lead 
to the underrepresentation of certain groups. However, this informality is required for 
the diversity of opinions to be reflected during deliberation and decision-making.  
To fulfill their role as mediators of the global component, civil society and the private 
sector must be fully engaged in the deliberations leading up to the constitutional dot-
making as well as in the constitutional dot-making itself. There should be no 
gatekeepers restricting participation in this process. Some rules overseeing the 
deliberations and decision-making cannot be dispensed with. They would need to be as 
neutral as possible so as not to comparatively affect some groups more than others.  
B. A	newfound	balance	among	stakeholders	
As we have explained above, both the state and global components must consent. This 
means that states (as mediators) on the one hand and civil society and the private sector 
on the other hand must arrive at a consensual decision. In other words, the composite 
global constituent power model supports equal multistakeholderism, a brand of 
multistakeholderism that places all stakeholders on an equal footing. States may not 
proceed without both civil society and the private sector being on board (as was hoped 
for at the WCIT in Dubai). States and the private sector may not proceed without civil 
society on board (as was the case with the e-G8 or the OECD principles).  
This contradicts the usual division of labor in internet governance as captured by the 
“in their respective role” phrase. The WSIS Outcome Documents had tried to assign 
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specific roles to states, civil society and the private sector. Though it hardly was a 
workable allocation of power, it conveyed the message that civil society or the private 
sector were not to be involved generally in internet governance. Their involvement was 
to be specific. The composite global constituent power model says otherwise. Civil 
society should not be involved only in community-building initiatives, the private sector 
should not only deal with technical issues, leaving all the rest to states. All stakeholders 
are involved in everything they see fit since they mediators of those who are ultimately 
in charge of making decisions – that is to say, individuals, whether through the state 
component or through the global component. That is not to say, however, that the 
allocation of roles found in the WSIS Outcome Documents is useless. It could indicate 
a possible allocation of powers among constituted powers.  
Conforming multistakeholderism to the requirements of the global constituent power 
model may in practice be difficult to obtain. Substantial changes are required both at 
the domestic and global levels. However, these parameters could be useful as targets to 
tend to. We should also not forget that multistakeholderism is not the only way to give 
life to the composite global constituent power model. I shall now examine ICANN’s 
gTLD program, which provides a good case study for the implementation of the 
teachings of the composite global constituent power model.   
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Section	2:	Thoughts	on	ICANN’s	gTLD	program		
We shall see that ICANN’s gTLD program may be analyzed as a potential global 
constitutional dot and that the composite global constituent power model is a useful 
tool to increase the legitimacy of this rather unprecedented initiative by ICANN.  
A. A	bit	of	background	on	ICANN	and	its	gTLD	program	
As we have explained above in Chapter 1, ICANN is a California based nonprofit 
corporation whose task is to perform the so-called IANA functions “on behalf of the 
global Internet community.”265 These functions have been delegated to ICANN by the 
NTIA pursuant to a contract that expired in September 2016. This contract was not 
renewed as the NTIA has relinquished all oversight power over it, leaving ICANN fully 
in charge.266 There are three main IANA functions, namely (a) coordinating the 
assignment of protocol parameters; (b) allocating internet’s unique identifiers (including 
IP addresses) and (c) managing the domain name system (“DNS”). It is this last 
function that will get our attention. Each device connected to the internet (for instance 
smart phones, tablets or computers) is identified by a unique IP address that takes the 
form of a long series of numbers. As it would be extremely inconvenient to have to 
memorize numeric addresses, the DNS allows a series of letters, the domain name, to 
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be used instead of the IP address. Obviously these identifiers, IP addresses and domain 
names, must remain unique so computers know where to find each other. Hence the 
need for the centralized management of domain names that was entrusted to ICANN. 
Responsibilities includes making decisions on requests for new top-level domain names, 
whether country-code top-level domain names, such as “.fr” or “.in,” or generic top-
level domain names (“gTLDs”), such as “.com.” Until recently, only a very few gTLDs 
existed but ICANN has introduced a new gTLD program that enables the introduction 
of new gTLDs. The introduction of new gTLDs, which is to take place over several 
rounds, is meant to increase competition, diversity and choice in the domain name 
system and ICANN expects to receive hundreds of applications for new gTLDs every 
year.  
B. The	Limited	Public	Interest	Objection	as	a	potential	global	constitutional	dot	
The gTLD application process is governed by an applicant guidebook that is meant to 
add predictability and clarity to the process. Of interest here is the fact that the applicant 
guidebook provides for a third party right to object to the introduction of gTLDs that 
are “contrary to generally accepted legal norms of morality and public order that are 
recognized under principles of international law.”267 Whether this Limited Public 
Interest Objection, as it is called, should be granted is to be determined by a panel of 
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international arbitrators in accordance with the procedural rules of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris.268 The decisions of the panel bind ICANN.269 ICANN 
also appoints an independent objector who “acts solely in the best interests of the public 
who use the global Internet.”270 The independent objector may file objections to “highly 
objectionable” gTLDs on specified grounds, including the Limited Public Interest 
Objection.271  
The goal of the Limited Public Interest Objection is to protect gTLD applicants’ 
freedom of speech, the underlying assumption being that the new gTLDs do constitute 
speech. The new gTLDs may be up to 63-character-long, using virtually any alphabet. 
A lot can be said in 63 characters. In addition to the gTLDs’ inner ‘expressiveness,’ 
gTLDs may also be viewed as proxy for the content that could be hosted under such 
gTLDs. It is sufficient to think of an example like “.isis” to see the merits of this 
approach.  
Earlier, we had described global constitutional dots as having two components, a 
substantive one and a procedural one. Substantively, the dot must relate either to the 
management of constituted powers (for instance allocating power or on the contrary, 
constraining power) or to the introduction of rights and freedoms for the enjoyment of 
																																																						
268 Id. at Section 3.2.3. 
269 Id. at Section 3.4.6. 
270 Id. at Section 3.2.5. 
271 Id. at Section 3.2.5. 
 	 205 
individuals. Procedurally, the dot must have been consented to by the global constituent 
power. Looking at the Limited Public Interest Objection, we can easily conclude that 
its substance is global constitutional. It is in essence a form of global speech regulation.  
In that respect, the Limited Public Interest Objection is quite unique.  
ICANN had never before set out to regulate speech. Indeed, previous rounds of gTLD 
creations were not subject to similar rules. There were only few conditions to be met, 
mostly financial and technical in nature, the only legal requirement being a commitment 
to ICANN’s top-level domain name policies and policy development process. The 
decisions were made in an ad hoc manner, unconstrained by any substantive rules. 
ICANN’s gTLD program also differs from previous instances of regulation of speech 
by ICANN. As Nunziato underlined,272 ICANN has been involved in speech regulation 
since its creation in two subtle and incidental ways. First of all, by prohibiting the 
anonymous registration of domain names, ICANN prevents internet users from 
engaging in anonymous or pseudonymous speech via their websites. Secondly, it has 
been shown that trademark owners successfully use, or arguably abuse, ICANN’s 
dispute resolution mechanism for solving domain names disputes arising out of 
trademarks to prevent product or brand criticism, with a negative impact on freedom 
of speech. The speech regulation resulting from the Limited Public Interest Objection 
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is not incidental. On the contrary, the Limited Public Interest Objection is directly 
aimed at regulating speech by deciding what speech deserves protection and what 
speech does not.  
The Limited Public Interest Objection is also unique in that there is no equivalent global 
adjudication system for freedom of speech. There have been notable efforts, most 
recently initiated by Switzerland with the support of prominent human rights lawyers, 
to create a world court for human rights that would include freedom of speech.273 The 
proposal was however met with criticisms and has not produced any concrete results.274 
So far exist only at the supranational level regional courts, such as the European Court 
of Human Rights, that would have jurisdiction over freedom of speech disputes. There 
are many obstacles that render the global adjudication of freedom of speech unlikely. 
Among others, some common ground on what constitutes protected speech would be 
a necessary prerequisite and we are far from it. The Yahoo case275 that highlighted the 
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divergence between the American and French approaches to freedom of speech is 
ample proof of it.  
C. Global	constitutional	dot-making	process	under	review	
We have established that with the Limited Public Interest Objection, ICANN has added 
what is in substance a global constitutional dot to the internet governance canvas. Now 
the question becomes whether, from a procedural point of view, the dot-making 
complied with the composite global constituent power model. This is crucial as the 
Limited Public Interest Objection, with its ambitious global speech regulation, could 
easily appear as an illegitimate exercise of power by ICANN.  
Beyond uneasiness with the wording of the Limited Public Interest Objection or with 
the adequacy of arbitration for dispute resolution, the fact that ICANN was able to 
introduce a global system of speech regulation denotes a formidable kind of power. To 
remarkable power should correspond remarkable legitimacy. However, in this case, the 
legitimacy of ICANN and its gTLD program is of a nontraditional kind. ICANN gets 
its authority over the DNS from a contract with the US government, the US 
government itself, owing its authority over the DNS from its historical role in the 
creation of the internet. While the US government, through the NTIA, had until 
recently retained some oversight power over ICANN, that would hardly seem sufficient 
– and not just because this oversight ceased as of October 1, 2016. It is nothing more 
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than a locally defined, derivative source of legitimacy that is not a match for ICANN’s 
global speech regulation scheme.  
Using the composite global constituent power model, we can evaluate whether 
ICANN’s multistakeholder governance may provide much needed legitimacy to the 
Limited Public Interest Objection. ICANN has indeed been conceived from the 
beginning as a multistakeholder organization serving the global internet community.276 
ICANN has a complex organizational chart that involves instituted groups representing 
many interests, with the ICANN board (the “Board”) sitting at the top. The Board 
makes decisions on the basis of recommendations and advice from those groups and 
the general public. At every level, there is an effort to ensure “functional, geographic 
and cultural diversity,”277 and to involve “those entities most affected”278 by ICANN 
policies.    
The Board. The Board consists of 16 directors, half being directly elected by the 
Supporting Organizations (see below) and the At-Large Advisory Committee 
(“ALAC”), half being selected by a nominating committee that is itself composed of 
members selected by the three Supporting Organizations, the ALAC, the IETF and 
																																																						
276 D. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet Governance, 52 EMORY L. J. (2003), 
187, 233-234 and 237. 
277 ICANN, Bylaws, Article I(2)(4) (11 February 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-02-16-en (last visited on 4 November 2016). 
278 Id. at Article I, Section 2.7. 
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non-voting members.279 Directors must “in the aggregate display diversity in geography, 
culture, skills, experience, and perspective.”280    
Instituted groups. There are two types of instituted groups: 
• Supporting Organizations: There are three supporting organizations, which 
create policies within their field – IP address, ccTLDs and gTLDs. Their own 
membership must reflect the various groups affected by their policies 
(businesses, individuals etc.).281  
• Advisory Committees: There are several advisory committees, often dedicated to 
technical issues such as security. However, two Advisory Committees stand out 
for they enjoy special rights. First is the Governmental Advisory Committee (the 
“GAC”), through which governments participate in ICANN’s governance. 
According to Article XI, Section 2 (a) of ICANN’s bylaws, the GAC “should 
consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to 
concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction 
between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or 
where they may affect public policy issues.”282 The Board must explain the 
reasons why it chooses to disregard advice given by the GAC and allow time to 
																																																						
279 Id. at Article VI, Section 2 and Article VII, Section2.  
280 Id. at Article VI, Section 2 (2). 
281 Id. at Articles VIII-X. 
282 Id. at Article XI, Section 2 (1)(j).  
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try and find a mutually acceptable solution.283 If this proves impossible, the 
Board’s opinion will prevail. The At-Large Advisory Committee represents 
individual internet users. It relies on, and is for the most part selected by, a 
pyramidal structure of local and regional at-large organizations. Among other 
roles, the ALAC gets to directly select one member of the Board.   
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
283 Id. at Article XI, Section 2 (1)(j).  
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The adoption of the applicant guidebook was the result of a lengthy multistep process 
involving the relevant Supporting Organization, namely the Generic Names Supporting 
Organization (“GNSO”). The GNSO comprises 4 constituencies – the commercial 
stakeholder group (i.e. business users, including ISPs), the non-commercial stakeholder 
group (i.e. individuals interested in and/or affected by gTLD policy, often represented 
by NGOs), and two groups that are directly participating in the operation of the DNS, 
the registries stakeholder group (who maintain registries of all domain names within a 
top level domain name) and the registrars stakeholder group (who provide registration 
services to individuals or businesses that wish to register a domain name) - and that 
came up with a list of policy recommendations, including the recommendation that the 
gTLD applicant’s freedom of speech should be protected. The ICANN board then 
adopted 19 such policy recommendations that were later on used as guidelines for the 
drafting of the applicant guidebook. The draft applicant guidebook was then posted on 
the ICANN website for public comment and was amended several times over the 
course of the following 3 years. As part of the process, the Board also met with the 
GAC over a period of three months to “promote joint understanding of the issues and 
arrive at an agreed-upon resolution of those differences wherever possible.”284 Almost 
all of the changes requested by the GAC were incorporated into the applicant 
																																																						
284 ICANN, New Generic Top Level Domain Name, Board/GAC Consultations, 
https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/about/historical-documentation/board-gac-consultations (last 
visited on 21 August 2016).  
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guidebook. Tensions between the Board and the GAC rose when it became clear that 
the Board would not incorporate a couple of trademark-related modifications that the 
GAC demanded. The Board finally adopted the applicant guidebook in June 2011.285 
From the angle of the composite global constituent power model, the multistakeholder 
model that is currently in place and was adopted for the introduction of the Limited 
Public Interest Objection at ICANN is lacking.  
The drafting of the Limited Public Interest Objection involved many actors: the GNSO, 
the GAC and the Board, as well as the general public. This broad participation seems 
consonant with the composite global constituent power model. As we have said earlier, 
an inclusive drafting process should make consent of all parties much easier. The issue 
here, however, is that the decision-making is far from inclusive.   
Under the current bylaws, the Board is the ultimate decision-maker. It can even change 
the bylaws on its own.286 As we have seen, a slight concession is that it must give full 
consideration to government advice, make every effort to find a compromise and 
explain the reasons if that turns out to be impossible. If the Board has rarely relied on 
its power to overcome the GAC, it remains that the institutional set-up grants the Board 
all powers. In the case of the applicant guidebook, we have seen that the Board had 
																																																						
285 ICANN, Board Resolution, (20 June 2011), available at https://www.icann.org/resources/board-
material/resolutions-2011-06-20-en (last visited on 21 August 2016).  
286 ICANN, Bylaws, Article XIX (11 February 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-02-16-en (last visited on 4 November 2016).  
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scheduled many meetings over a three-month period to ensure GAC support, and 
indeed, GAC supported the wording of the Objection as it was adopted. Unresolved 
issues between the GAC and the Board did not relate to the Objection. We can 
conclude that, with respect to the Limited Public Interest Objection, the Board and the 
GAC consented. The GNSO or the general public were only involved in drafting. Their 
opinions were mere suggestions.  
Does the consent by the Board and the GAC to the Limited Public Interest Objection 
suffice to comply with the composite global constituent power model? The short 
answer is that it falls short of representing both the state and global components. On 
the one hand, the GAC does not amount to the state component. The GAC is 
composed of governmental officials.287 They may be government employees, or elected 
representatives. However, the state component requires a tighter connection to the state 
component, which is created either through referendum, special representation, or 
through state agency supplemented by constituent power boosters. This is certainly not 
the case with the GAC. Government appointees to the GAC are usually diplomats or 
civil servants involved in telecommunication regulations. On the other hand, the Board 
cannot be approximated to the global component. The directors are currently selected 
by ALAC and the three supporting organizations. ALAC and the three supporting 
organizations may be viewed as an emanation of civil society and the private sector, 
																																																						
287 Id. at Article XI, Section 2(1)(e).  
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respectively. Thus the Board could potentially be seen as the mediator of the global 
component, were it not for two issues. Firstly, there is a disparity between the weight 
of each, civil society being mathematically entitled to only a fraction of the influence 
that the private sector enjoys. For instance, under the current bylaws, ALAC directly 
appoints only two directors while the three supporting organizations together directly 
select six of them. This inequality between civil society and the private sector is an issue 
I have pointed out earlier in Section 1 (B) above. Furthermore, the connection between 
the Board and the global component is not tight enough. If ALAC and the three 
supporting organizations select the Board, they have no direct connection once the 
Board is elected. In particular, they cannot remove a director from office. They may 
provide advice and make policy proposals. However, there is no obligation for the 
Board to consider the advice thus received, in contrast to what is required of the Board 
with respect to advice given by the GAC. As a result, the connection between the Board 
and the global component that would make the Board its mediator of the global 
component is missing.   
However, the situation is going to evolve soon. The reform of ICANN’s accountability 
mechanisms prompted by the IANA transition that came into force in October 2016 
goes in the right direction. Indeed, under the new bylaws, the Board’s powers are 
somewhat reduced. The Board will no longer be able to unilaterally change the most 
fundamental articles of the bylaws. In addition, the newly created Empowered 
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Community, which will have the legal form of an unincorporated association under 
California law and will count 5 Decisional Participants (the three Supporting 
Organizations, the ALAC and the GAC)288 will have enforcement power against the 
Board, including the power to remove some or all the members of the Board. These 
changes will somewhat shift the pendulum away from the Board in the direction of the 
internet community. A telling sign is that the article in the new bylaws related to the 
Empowered Community comes before the article related to the Board.289  
This constitutes a definite improvement of the decision-making process at ICANN 
from the point of view of the composite global constituent power model. What more 
could be done? Turning the GAC into the state component of the global constituent 
power would require changes at the domestic level, rather than at the level of ICANN. 
Indeed, it is up to each government to modify the way their GAC representatives are 
selected. The government appointees could be replaced by specially elected 
representatives. Governments could also introduce constituent power boosters, for 
instance by submitting all ICANN business that amounts to a global constitutional dot 
for comments at the domestic level. Remains the civil society-private sector imbalance. 
That would require a further ICANN reform and is thus unlikely in the near future.  
  
																																																						
288 ICANN, Bylaws, Article 6(1)(a) (1 October 2016), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en (last visited on 5 November 2016).  
289 Id. at Article 6(2). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the introduction, I asked whether it was legitimate for multistakeholderism to eclipse 
traditional international law in the global governance of the internet, especially in view 
of its own legitimacy deficit. Who should get to consent to global internet governance? 
This was the question that I set out to answer in this dissertation.   
I mobilized the tools of constitutionalism as it promises democratic legitimacy. 
Domestic constitutionalism relies on the notion of constituent power to secure the 
consent of the governed. I assumed that global constitutionalism would similarly 
revolve around a global constituent power. A nascent literature has indeed taken this 
path but has so far failed to offer a model for a global constituent power that would be 
replicable beyond the area of law in which it was devised – mostly EU law.  
Such a model would have to meet two conditions. Firstly, globalization does not mean 
that state-level governance is a thing of the past. On the contrary, self-government in 
the era of globalization requires that individuals govern themselves in the constitutional 
sense both at the domestic level and the global level concomitantly. Secondly, the 
pointillist nature of global constitutionalization, which happens dots after dots, 
influences both the identity and the exercise the global constituent power. It prescribes 
the continued involvement of the state element of the global constituent power and 
alternative modes of participation that do not display the level of formalism of votes.   
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These conditions mandate the basic features of the composite global constituent power 
model: 
• Individuals, to the exclusion of all other entities, are the holders of the 
constituent power. 
• The composite global constituent power is made up of the same individuals that 
are packaged differently: along state borders (state component) and irrespective 
of state borders (global component).  
• Both the consent of the domestic element and of the global element of the 
composite global constituent power are necessary.   
Individuals may exercise their constituent power in various ways, more or less formal. 
The modes of participation have in common that they must allow for the active and 
specific participation of individuals.  
Implications	for	global	internet	governance	
Going back to the initial question of whether multistakeholderism is a legitimate form 
of governance, I concluded that the composite global constituent power model could 
support a specific form of multistakeholderism – equal multistakeholderism, with states 
acting as agents of the state component and the private sector and civil society as 
mediators of the global component of the global constituent power. The composite 
global constituent power model helps us go beyond the “necessary actors” rhetoric 
prevalent in internet governance when it comes to identifying legitimate actors. While 
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multistakeholderism often is presented as a considerable progressive achievement, it 
becomes clear that further modifications to the way internet governance is currently 
conducted must be implemented for multistakeholderism to comply with the global 
constituent power model and realize its full potential.  
Scalability		
The principles governing the definition of the global constituent power are adaptable 
at various levels beyond the nation-state. Whether the governance level is regional or 
global, the composition of the constituent power would follow the same principles. The 
continuity between each level of governing derives from the fact that in the end, the 
governed are the same: individuals. The composite global constituent power model may 
also be used in fields other than internet governance.  
Virtuous	circle		
The implementation of the composite global constituent power model would trigger a 
virtuous circle in global governance. Indeed, by imposing the need to obtain the global 
constituent power’s consent to constitutional dots, it indirectly encourages changes of 
behaviors in the pre-consent phases. Involving people whose consent you need as early 
in the process as possible is likely to ease the consenting phase.  
International	law	
The legitimacy of multistakeholderism as a form of global internet governance was an 
important question in its own right. However, the fact that multistakeholderism was 
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used to ward off traditional international law made the issue even more critical. A global 
constitutional understanding of international law, however, reconciles both 
multistakeholderism and traditional international law. Multistakeholderism as a mode 
of exercise of the composite global constituent power would be one of the ways in 
which constitutional international law could be made, leaving the possibility of some 
non-constitutional international law being made by states acting as constituted powers.  
If uncovering the legitimacy formula behind multistakeholderism is an important step 
towards greater legitimacy and clarity in global internet governance, there is still a long 
way to go. In particular, we should not forget that a significant portion of global internet 
governance is not done pursuant to (and not even approaching) the composite global 
constituent power model but by the private sector on its own. The private sector seems 
to be aware of its extraordinary power and its associated responsibility, as shown by 
initiatives such as the Global Network Initiative. The next step would be rethink these 
actors’ role in the context of global constitutionalism, possibly granting them a status, 
and related rights and duties, commensurate with the actual power they have over our 
lives.  
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